THIS GLOBALIZING WORLD

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Despite the increasing flow of publications on globalization, our ideas and knowledge about this phenomenon still leave much to be desired. That is why the special periodicals and books in the field of Global Studies are of utmost importance for modern society. Of great importance are also the books which accumulate the last achievements of scientific thought in the field of Global Studies. The present edited volume is just the book of the kind. Its title, *This Globalizing World*, reflects the main idea of the formation of a new World System. This book comprises the best articles which have been published in the interdisciplinary journals *Age of Globalization* (published in Russian), its English-language digest, as well as in the *Journal of Globalization Studies*. The articles included in the volume reflect the today's pressing issues, and they also present a number of forecasts for the nearest future and for the more distant periods of the global development as well. In the present volume one can find the perceptions of globalization by a number of scholars from different countries, whose articles have been published in the mentioned journals.
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PREFACE

Despite the increasing flow of publications on globalization, our ideas and knowledge about this phenomenon still leave much to be desired. Especially this refers to the global processes in general, since globalization is their constituent part. The problem of an adequate development of the system of scientific views both on global processes and on various consequences which they generate is especially urgent. In short, against the background of expanding globalization the acute shortage of knowledge in the field is perceived rather well.

The transformations of this rapidly changing world are too fast for our perceptions to keep up with them and our institutions also lag behind. The numerous changes sometimes indicate considerable global progress. One of the major changes, that have recently become evident due to the 2008 crisis, is the shifting balance of the world forces. Today many analysts anticipate in the coming decades the diminishing influence of the United States and of the West, in general. Meanwhile, the recent events related to the Ukrainian crisis and confrontation with Russia show that the USA still possesses huge opportunities and are unwilling to yield their leading position to anybody else; moreover, they are eager to fight to preserve it by all means. So the global stability is endangered. At the same time we witness a growing economic power of a number of developing countries. Thus, first, some rearrangements are inevitable in the world ranking of countries; and second, there are signs of major changes in developing countries. The consequences of these changes will be extremely significant. For a better understanding of these changes we need to constantly exchange ideas and insights, observe the process of globalization in different regions and countries.

That is why the existence of special periodicals, like *Vek globalizatsii* [Age of Globalization] and *Journal of Globalization Studies* and others,\(^1\) is an urgent need of modern society. Of great importance are also the books which accumulate the last achievements in scientific thought in the field of Global Studies.

The present collected volume belongs just to the books of this kind. It comprises some of the best articles that have been published in the interdisciplinary journal *Vek globalizatsii* [Age of Globalization] published in Russian since 2008 and in its English-language digest entitled *Age of Globalization*. By the moment, twelve issues of the journal have come out, containing about 260 articles devoted to academic research and analysis of various aspects of globalization.

The journal *Vek globalizatsii* is a specialized interdisciplinary periodical in Global Studies that seeks to integrate innovative academic insights on important issues of development and globalization from across different fields. The journal has become in-

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\(^1\) For more information about the journal *Vek globalizatsii*, please, visit its homepage at http://www.socionauki.ru. As for the *Journal of Globalization Studies*, its homepage can be found at http://www.sociostudies.org. Both these sites also provide abundant information in Russian and in English about theoretical and applied research, ideas and approaches driving from scholars from economics, political science, psychology, sociology and anthropology, global studies.

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creasingly popular not only with experts in the field of Global Studies, philosophy, anthropology, history, and other spheres of knowledge dealing with the issues of globalization, but also with a wide audience interested in globalization theory, processes, and patterns. The urgency and relevance of the subjects of the journal are beyond any doubt. More and more well-known scientists as well as political and public figures are engaged in cooperation. The journal Vek globalizatsii publishes articles in a number of sections, presenting theoretical and empirical studies as well as alternative perspectives on various aspects of globalization and Global Studies, global problems, causes and consequences of the World crisis, and Russia’s position in the global world.

Some of the articles presented in this collected volume were published in the recently launched Journal of Globalization Studies which has been coming out only for six years, but has already earned good reputation in the world, and not only due to posing topical issues in the field of global researches, but also due to the content of the published materials, and a variety of approaches to the proposed solutions of analyzed problems.

The title of the collected volume – This Globalizing World – reflects not only its relation with the journal, but also a general concern for our future, and it presents a number of forecasts for the nearest future and more distant periods of the world development as well. In the present volume one can find the perceptions of globalization by a number of scholars from different countries (including, of course, Russia) whose articles have been published in the journals Vek globalizatsii and Journal of Globalization Studies. For the readers’ convenience we provide detailed information about previous publications and translations of the articles included in the present collected volume in a separate section in the end of the book.

A great number of interesting and debatable articles have been published in the journals during the whole time of their existence. Among the contributors to the journals there are the foremost scientists. We decided that there is no need to update their articles, as for us the way the creative thought developed on the pages of the journal is of special interest. It also shows that in our publications the creative approach is appreciated which prevents an absolutization or restrictions of this or that point of view and from time to time reveals opportunities to approach former problems in a different way. Besides, sometimes it is very instructive to go back a few years and to watch how the problems have been perceived before, in what issues we have become wiser, and what we do not still understand. Such time travel with respect to the still ongoing crisis is especially useful.

We have written no editorial introduction as we think there is no sense to reproduce ideas which a reader will find in the articles. Instead we offer two short articles – passionate and at the same time profound essays where the world intellectual elite’s alarm for the future of our planet and civilizations is reflected. These are the articles of a prominent humanist and a bright public figure Princess Irène of the Netherlands and of an outstanding philosopher of the present Ervin László; they in many respects introduce the keynotes for contributions presented in this volume.

The current situation in the world is extremely complicated: during the whole years of its existence the humankind promoted the emergence and increase of global problems due to the huge scales of its activity. The aspiration to a better and wealthier live,
uncontrollable growth of human needs cause new problems of a global scale. As shown in theoretical researches including those published in our journals, the specified processes will inevitably proceed in foreseeable future. Thus, it becomes obvious that it is necessary to unite efforts to overcome global threats which can affect the whole humanity and thus, the destiny of both the global community and of separate peoples depends on their solution.

The characteristic feature of global threats is their close interrelation. Hence, the aggravation of one of them involves also the exasperation of all others. The inability to anticipate and prevent negative consequences of these threats is fraught with accidents of planetary scale. The solution of global problems is a very challenging issue. Here it is necessary to consider a number of interrelations of different nature: social and economic, political, and ecological, etc. For this reason one should solve the global problems in a complex manner, combining the efforts of all countries, and not only of countries, but of families and individuals since their fragmentary or partial solution can bring about some dangerous consequences. The role of science and the humanities in the solution of global problems consists not only in understanding the causes of their emergence, but also in the development of peculiar measures for their overcoming, minimization as well as eliminating their negative consequences.

The contributions to the present volume are multi-faceted. Some of them present theoretical ideas and points of view in whose terms global problems and globalization are considered in a complex manner; other articles analyze the fundamental factors and processes in the contemporary world and in its certain regions. Still other contributions to this collected volume are topical, showing the achievements and difficulties of our time in various perspectives.

Editors
PROLOGUE

THE WELL-BEING OF THE EARTH AND OUR OWN WELL-BEING ARE ONE AND THE SAME*

Princess Irene of the Netherlands

What is the use of running when we are on the wrong path?

Mahatma Gandhi

I am profoundly happy China has chosen to host this vibrant and important World Cultural Forum that will undoubtedly put ecology high on the world agenda. Why is the Forum important? Because behind the economic, financial and climate crises that affect a large part of the world lies a deep moral and ethical crisis that we need to consider and explore as we have done here these days, to be able to envision a future for all life on earth.

‘To see what is right and not to do is want of courage’, these are wise words of Confucius and the reason why we were called to assemble here these days.

We all know that for the first time in history we are witnessing a global disruption of the biological foundations of the Earth. We seem to have forgotten that we are part of nature. We need to understand what we are actually doing to ourselves, when disrupting the biological foundations of the Earth.

As a result of losing our deep inner sense of connection and ease with our natural environment, our priorities have begun to shift from a deep harmony with all of life to a disconnected way of life. We have lost the deeper understanding of our human relationship with nature and at the same time part of our self-nature or inner-nature.

It is of vital importance that we realize how the well-being of the earth and our own well-being are one and the same. And that treating the earth sustainably has everything to do with ourselves, our mental and physical health.

Active measures and political decision-making are actually always linked to an inner attitude towards life, a worldview. We have come to think and act from a view that prioritizes humans, instead of considering the well-being of all of life.

When we talk about sustainability, do we have a worldview in mind where humanity is disconnected from nature, or a worldview that understands and feels the interrelation with all life?

My worldview is that of a broad society, which extends beyond the human society. A global interrelated society of all life with its rivers, mountains, animals, plant life…

Therefore, my vision of sustainability is: a sustained well-being for all living creatures. We are part of nature.

The wise South African Zulu, professor Koka, once said: I am because nature is, and because she is I am.

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* The speech was delivered on 19 May, 2013 at the Second World Cultural Forum in Hangzhou (China).

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Actually that says it all. On a personal note: living consciously in close harmony with nature makes life so much more beautiful and happier and realistic.

The diminished connection to our environment, has contributed to a deep separation, a split between humans and nature and a split within humans themselves.

And thus the concept of economic growth has overtaken old human values. Values of interconnectedness and interrelation with each other and with our environment. An interrelation China still seems to have deeply rooted in its society.

What we need, and many young people are fully aware of this, is to remember that when human culture merges with ‘the fundamental nature of the universe’ (which is also a Taoist view) then we are back on track. We need to understand this, deeply feel this, and then act accordingly. Then we will act and feel as part of the greater whole, with respect for the great Ecosystem Earth. Then we will work in harmony with nature. Then we will think and act from the worldview of ‘we’, as participants of the greater system Earth.

The root of ecology and economy is the same in Greek – oicos – it means a house, a home. How we manage the home. In practical terms, this means to be aware that we can actually combine economy with ecology. Then economy will no longer be narrowly defined as meaning a mere profit, but economy will be understood as being the fundament for the well-being of all life.

Globally we observe a significant shift in consciousness towards an ecological civilization.

We are indeed globally re-evaluating our role in the web of life. We are aware that we, the humankind, have become a force of nature, possibly more destructive than tsunamis or earthquakes together. The future of all life now lies for a very large part in our human hands: we can actually make or break life on Earth, our home.

The Chinese philosopher Mencius (who lived twenty-four centuries ago) mentions how the destruction of the forests originated, as the humankind lost its original self-nature. How the mountains used to be places of healing, to preserve health and to strengthen people's vitality. Protecting the health of natural places was considered as a priority, to protect the health of all.

This is what many old philosophies knew and taught. We need to protect nature and we need to protect areas of wilderness. And, we need to understand how the interdependence and interrelation of all life is what we desperately need to understand again, feel and act upon.

The vastness and intensity of human suffering on earth is overwhelming and should be enough for a wakeup call for each and every one. We need to work towards the necessary basic needs that need to be realized for all; the difference now is that we can consciously do this ecologically, in harmony with nature.

Green economy, circular economy, and social entrepreneurship are hopeful developments in this sense.

However, we need to tackle this all together.

Global citizenship is needed to realize these goals.

And at the same time it calls for personal leadership, from a perspective of our authentic self in all our own personal and professional dimensions. The individual input is often undervalued and seen as without power to make a difference. Yet, on the contrary, let us not underestimate how our personal choices make a difference as they have an effect on our personal life, on our neighbours, and on our community. Like concen-
tric circles. The more are there these individually originated circles, the more it will become mainstream to be thoughtful of how we live, how we act and what is important to us. Then the ‘I’ becomes the ‘We’. Life is to be in relationships.

That does not mean it is easy to change from our anthropocentric or human-centric worldview, to a worldview of a harmonious togetherness with all life. It is a significant change of mentality and attitude towards life. Actually it is a shift from fear or greed, to love. We should allow ourselves to grow towards this together. Small individual decisions are a starting point.

What is your worldview and what is your starting point? What kind of example do we want to be for our children and grandchildren? Research has revealed that today's children can barely muster any interest for nature at all, purely because they do not know it.

We live at a fascinating moment of history, when we are challenged to invent and discover new technical and spiritual ways for a lifestyle in harmony with nature. A lifestyle we would truly be able to call an ecological civilization.

China has the courage to prioritize ecology and will undoubtedly be one of the leaders in vision and resilience in this matter. This will benefit the whole world and the whole Ecosystem Earth.

To summarize.

The foundation for sustainability lies within ourselves.

Reflecting on our common future, we need to steer towards the direction where it becomes natural for us to make our decisions proceeding from the idea of the well-being of all life; where it becomes natural that we are indeed part of the whole. Then we are in harmony with the primordial essence, or life itself.

We need to do this all together, as a single global human civilization, with all our cultural differences.

So, what is sustainable development directed to? To a conscious interrelationship with all life.

My pledge here is that we as the global human society, consciously decide together that we are indeed interrelated with and part of the Great Ecosystem Earth, and act upon this.

This decision would bring us back on the right path, a path towards an ecological civilization. Nations, communities and each and every one of us can be a leader and an example on this path, with an open heart and mind towards each other and towards all of life.

Our most precious natural resource, our consciousness, will guide us to make the right decisions.

Confucius, who knew it all, mentioned, ‘Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish’.
GLOBAL BIFURCATION: THE DECISION WINDOW
Ervin Laszlo

It has been said that our generation is the first in history that can decide whether it is the last in history. We need to add that our generation is also the first in history that can decide whether it will be the first generation of a new phase in history. We have reached a watershed in our social and cultural evolution. The system theories tell us that when complex open systems, such as living organisms, and also ecologies and societies of organisms, approach a condition of critical instability, they face a moment of truth: they either transform, or break down.

The BAU (Business as Usual) Scenario

Humankind is approaching a critical instability – a global bifurcation. The following scenarios illustrate the nature of the choice at this critical point.

- There is no real change in the world in the way business is conducted, resources are exploited and energy is produced. This causes, on the one hand, aggravation of the global economic crisis, and, on the other – major climate change due to the accelerated warming of the Earth’s atmosphere.
- In some regions global warming produces drought, in others – devastating storms, and in many areas it leads to harvest failures. In coastal areas vast tracts of productive land are flooded, together with cities, towns and villages. Hundreds of millions are homeless and face starvation.
- Massive waves of destitute migrants flow from coastal regions and areas afflicted with lack of food and water, above all in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, toward inland regions where the basic resources of life are more assured. The migrants overload the human and natural resources of the receiving countries and create conflict with the local populations. International relief efforts provide emergency supplies for thousands, but are helpless when confronted with millions.
- In futile attempts to stem the tidal wave of destitute people India builds up its wall along the border with Bangladesh, the USA along the Mexican border, and both Italy and Spain build walls to protect their northern regions from their overrun southern regions.
- The world’s population fragments into states and populations intent on protecting themselves, and masses of desperate people facing imminent famine and disease. The conflicts create unsustainable stresses and strains in the structure of international relations. Social and economic integration groups and political alliances break apart. Relations break down between the USA and its southern neighbors, the European Union and the Mediterranean countries, India and China and the hard-hit Southeast Asian states.

Global military spending rises exponentially as governments attempt to protect their territories and re-establish a level of order. Strong-arm régimes come to power in traditional hot-spots and local food- and water-wars erupt between states and populations pressed to the edge of physical survival.

Terrorist groups, nuclear proliferators, drug-traffickers, and organized crime syndicates form alliances with unscrupulous entrepreneurs to sell arms, drugs, and essential goods at exorbitant prices. Governments target the terrorists and attack the countries suspected of harboring them, but more terrorists take the place of those that are rounded up and killed or imprisoned.

Hawks and armaments lobbies press for the use of powerful weapons to defend the territories and interests of the better-off states. Regional wars fought initially with conventional arms escalate into wars conducted with weapons of mass destruction.

The world's interdependent and critically destabilized economic, financial and political system collapses. The environment, with productive processes and vital heat balance impaired, is no longer capable of providing food and water for more than a fraction of the surviving populations. Chaos and violence engulfs peoples and countries both rich and poor.

Here, however, is another scenario.

The TT (Timely Transformation) Scenario

The experience of terrorism and war, together with rising poverty and the threats posed by a changing climate, trigger a widespread recognition that the time to change has come. In country after country, an initially small but soon rapidly growing nucleus of people pull together to confront the dangers of the global crisis and seize the opportunity it offers for change.

The rise of popular movements for sustainability and peace leads to the election of political leaders who support economic cooperation and social solidarity projects. Forward-looking states monitor the dangerous trends and provide financing for the urgently needed economic, ecological, and humanitarian initiatives.

Non-governmental organizations link up to undertake projects to revitalize regions ravaged by environmental degradation. Emergency funds are provided for countries and regions afflicted by drought, violent storms, coastal flooding, and harvest failures.

Military budgets are reduced and in some states eliminated, and the resulting ‘peace-dividends’ are assigned to increase the production of staple foods, safe water, basic supplies of energy, and essential sanitation and health services for the needy disadvantaged populations.

Country after country shifts from fossil fuel-based energy production to alternative fuels, reducing the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and slowing the process of global warming. A globally networked renewable energy system comes on line, contributing to food production, providing energy for desalinizing and filtering sea-water, and helping to lift marginalized populations from the vicious cycles of poverty.

Leading business companies join the classical pursuit of profit and growth with the quest for social and ecological responsibility. On the initiative of enlightened managers a voluntarily self-regulating social market economy is put in place, and the newly elected forward-looking political leaders give it full support.
- As the new energy system and the self-regulating social market economy begin to function, all countries and economies get access to economic activity and technical and financial resources. Frustration, resentment, animosity and distrust give way to a spirit of cooperation, liberating the spirit and enhancing the creativity of a new generation of locally active and globally thinking people. Humanity is on the way to a peaceful and sustainable, diverse yet cooperative planet-wide civilization.

The choice between these scenarios is not yet made. As of today, we are moving along the path of the BAU scenario, but more and more people are waking up and searching for ways to move to a scenario of timely transformation. The question is how much time is there for this shift? The window of time is finite: when conditions in a complex open system reach a critical point the system becomes chaotic, and it either transforms, or breaks down. The longer the transformation is delayed, the more difficult it becomes to carry it out.

To define the feasible decision window we must take into account both the time by which individual trends reach a critical phase, and cross-impacts and feedbacks among the trends.

1) The unfolding of individual trends. Time estimates of when individual life-threatening trends would reach critical points have been shifted from the end of the century to mid-century, and for some trends to the next ten to twenty years.

For example, the sea level has been rising one and a half times faster than predicted in the IPCC's Third Assessment Report published in 2001. The forecasts published at the end of 2008 project global sea-level rise that is more than double the 0.59 meter rise forecast even by the Fourth Assessment Report.

Carbon dioxide emissions and global warming have likewise outpaced expectations. The rate of increase of CO₂ emissions rose from 1.1 per cent between 1990 and 1999 to over three per cent between 2000 and 2004. Since 2000 the growth-rate of emission has been greater than in any of the scenarios used by the IPCC in both the Third and Fourth Assessment Reports.

The warming of the atmosphere progressed faster than expected as well. In the 1990s, the forecasts spoke of an overall warming of maximum three degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Then the time-horizon for this level of increase was reduced to the middle of the century, and presently some experts predict that it could occur within a decade. At the same time, the prediction for the maximum level of global warming rose from three to six degrees. The difference is not negligible. A three degree warming would cause serious disruption in human life and economic activity, while a six degree warming would make most of the planet unsuitable for food production and large-scale human habitation.

2) Feedbacks and cross-impacts. Most predictions of points of criticality take into consideration only one trend – the global warming and attendant climate change; water quality and availability; food production and self-reliance; urban viability, poverty, and population pressure; air quality and minimal health standards, or others. They fail to consider the possibility that a criticality in one trend could accelerate the unfolding of other trends toward a point of criticality.

There are multiple feedbacks and cross-impacts among the relevant trends, both in regard to the biosphere and conditions in the human world.
In the biosphere, all the trends that affect human life and well-being also impact the cycles that maintain the planet's ecology within a humanly viable range. This is the case in regard to the global water and the global carbon cycle: the alteration of these cycles by any one trend affects the way the other trends unfold. For example, an increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere leads to global warming and that affects rainfall and the growth of forests. That, in turn, reduces the biosphere's carbon absorption capacity. Feedbacks are also conveyed by air and ocean currents. Warmer water in the oceans triggers hurricanes and other violent storms and alters the course of major ocean currents, such as the Gulf and the Humboldt. And that triggers further changes in the climate.

Feedbacks also obtain between ecological and societal trends. For example, the warming of the atmosphere produces prolonged drought in some areas and coastal flooding in others. Starving and homeless masses are impelled to migrate from the highly impacted areas to less hard-hit regions creating critical conditions in those regions as well. A drop in the quality of the air in urban and industrial megacomplexes below the minimum required for health creates a breakdown in public health, with epidemics spreading to vast areas. A breakdown of the financial system would impact not only on banks and stock markets, but would interfere with industrial output and trade the world over, creating critical conditions first of all for the poorest countries and economies.

The cross-impacts among accelerating global trends reduce the feasible decision window. The precise time for effecting meaningful change is not predictable with certainty, but due to feedback and cross-impacts among the trends, it is likely to be less than the forecasts of critical points for individual trends. The decision window may close within ten years and possibly sooner.
The question of the return of religion to the study of world politics and international relations is considered in terms of the neglect of religion since the Peace of Westphalia. This neglect has largely occurred because of the primacy given to changes and events in the West, particularly since the formal separation of church and state and its imposition on or emulation by Eastern societies. The recent concern with globalization has provided the opportunity to undertake historical discussion in new perspectives which overcome the Western ‘normality’ of the absence of religion from Realpolitik. Moreover, it is argued that much of the neglect of religion in work on world affairs has largely been the product of the inaccurate perception of ongoing secularization. The overall discussion is framed by some objections to the limiting consequences of disciplinarity.

Introduction

While this paper is primarily concerned with the conditions that are giving rise to the conspicuousness of religion in contemporary international politics, it should be said at the outset that the recent controversy surrounding the alleged evils of religion – notably in the UK and the USA – is less than marginal to this focus. This is because much of the polemical ‘shouting’ that has issued from the anti-religious, or anti-God, camps has undoubtedly been much influenced by the overlapping presence of religion in intranational, transnational, and international politics. At the same time the militancy of, for example, Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens has certainly contributed significantly to the presence of religion in the minds of contemporary politicians, journalists and academics.1 Another big controversy has also played a part in subduing the significance of religion in international affairs – namely, the significance of religion in the American policy toward Israel. It has become very clear in recent years that this is a subject which many avoid, for fear of arousing ethnic passion that can effectively damage academic careers, at least in the UK and the USA.

However, there is currently a strong move within sociology, philosophy and related disciplines away from atheistic secularism. This shift against the latter, as well as proliferating critiques of the idea of rampant secularization, is of great consequence for the general comprehension of global trends and circumstances.2

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What follows is divided into two sections. The first deals with what can be called the ‘disciplinary’ world, while the second may be called the ‘real’ world. There are most certainly oversimplifications involved in this delineation, not least because what was once a matter of disciplinarity then becomes central to reality. Put another way, while disciplinarity is a constructed, ‘artificial’ way of comprehending reality, at the same time reality is partly constituted by disciplinarity. The complexity of this problem cannot be pursued here – not merely for reasons of space, but also because it has been, and will continue to be, an intractable one in all of the sciences, both natural and human. Many philosophers have sought over the centuries, in different civilizational contexts, to solve this epistemological and/or ontological problem and many have claimed to have resolved it. In full recognition of various contributions of the latter kind, in this paper the author will simply take the problem for granted and deal with it in a very simple way.

The Problem of Disciplinarity

At least since the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries interpretation and/or analysis of the world, for the greater part, have been undertaken from increasingly specialized and compartmentalized perspective. A vast amount has been written about the origins, the histories and the genealogies of various disciplines, as well as variations in such from society to society, region to region, and civilization to civilization. Nonetheless, it should be stipulated here that the present focus is primarily a Western one and that it involves no systematic attempt to be specific about the civilizational structuring of particular academic disciplines; nor of their trajectories or configurations within different societies. What has to be firmly stated is that each discipline in the western academy, as well as in the primary and secondary sectors of school systems, has rested upon rhetorical constructions and academic contingencies. Thus the idea that disciplines reflect the natural condition of life is without any foundation. One has to make this point strongly, precisely because it seems that many academics and intellectuals – and not least their bureaucratic administrators – do believe that disciplines reflect or grasp reality, although some of these may also grant that so-called reality is partly constituted by disciplinarity.

In spite of these considerations it should be said that throughout the last century and a half or so various individuals and schools of thought have attempted to overcome or lay out the preconditions and sustaining infrastructures of the disciplines on a universalistic basis. For example, Comte made an extended attempt to connect systematically all disciplines, Marx also approached the same issue (but, of course, from a very different perspective), as did John Stuart Mill. The same might be said of Freud and certainly this is true of the rise of General Systems Theory in the 1930s and also of the work of Talcott Parsons during the mid-twentieth century. Foucault explored rather thoroughly the basis and forms of disciplinarity in the broadest possible sense – which led in his work to the casting of academic discipline as similar to discipline in the penal sense.

Increasingly, during the past twenty years or so, there has been much disciplinary mutation, particularly around the theme of globalization. Much of the study of the latter, in spite of its enormous fashionability, has unfortunately been centred upon the idea of interdisciplinary. This has been very counterproductive and has served more the bureaucratic interests of academic administrators and power-seekers within academic professions than it has the enhancement of substantive intellectual progress. Specifically,
interdisciplinarity has consolidated, rather than overcome, disciplinary and professional distinctiveness. For example, interdisciplinary collaboration often involves the practitioners of two or more disciplines getting together and seeing what each can contribute to a particular topic from their own disciplinary standpoint. What, on the other hand, ideally ought to occur is a direct concern with the substantive issue as opposed to a rehearsal of the identity of particular disciplines. Many enterprises of a so-called interdisciplinary nature have entailed little more than each disciplinary representative pronouncing what her or his discipline could/should contribute to the topic in question. Thus, we should turn in the direction of what preferably should be called either cross-disciplinarity or trans-disciplinarity (although cogent claims could and have been made on behalf of ‘counter-disciplinarity’ and ‘post-disciplinarity’).

In the case in hand – namely the study of international relations, or world politics, in connection with the study of religion – such reflections on the limitations of disciplinary approaches have contributed mightily to the relative absence of attention to the interpenetration of religion and IR in historical terms. This means that rather than trying to account for the great significance of religion in world politics at the present time – as if religion had suddenly erupted onto the world-political scene – we would be much better advised to try and account for why the relationship between religion and IR has been grossly neglected for many years. Indeed, International Relations as a discipline or sub-discipline was professionally established without any reference to the significance of religion. While economics has often been called the dull science, that label might well be equally applied to IR, at least until fairly recently.

From the standpoint of those who have been mainly concerned with religion, the obsession with the secularization thesis has served both to insulate the sub-discipline of sociology of religion from other disciplinary perspectives and subdue its influence in the wider society. Indeed, for many decades, sociologists of religion have expressed, not unironically, much regret that their sub-discipline is marginal to the wider discipline of sociology and have complained in so doing that the findings of sociology of religion are not taken seriously by political elites and the more intellectual elements in the mass media. Thus, since the 1960s individual practitioners of sociology of religion have only recently been invited to contribute to discussions of political events, circumstances and trends. For much of this period students of religion have been mainly involved in public discussion in relation to controversies surrounding religious sects (sometimes called ‘cults’). However, with the advent of religions of violence sociologists have been increasingly called upon to participate in public debate and give advice to governments, particularly since 9/11. Similar, but greater, neglect of religion can be said of the study of world politics, although there has been an increasing concern with the relation between religion and societal politics during the same period. Thus the neglect of religion has been most evident in the study of international relations.

Another significant factor in the neglect of the involvement of religion in international relations is the way in which assumptions have been formed concerning distances between particular disciplines or subdisciplines. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century it was possible for historians and sociologists to say that it was strange to connect the study of religion to the study of economics. Within a few years, however, the relationship between religion and the development of capitalism had assumed the status of the obvious. Much of this was a consequence of Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* which was first published in
1904/1905. In the particular case at hand, many practitioners on the IR side would have asked, only a few years ago, what religion could have to do with their own domain of analysis? Now, in the early years of the twenty-first century very few would be so daring – perhaps, one might say foolish – to ask this question. Undoubtedly this has a great deal to do with the present so-called war on terror (a term which is, in fact, fast retreating) and, more specifically, with the problematic thesis as to the clash of civilizations (which is also in retreat). To be more precise, it is the centrality of jihadist, or caliphate, Islam and its opponents—not to speak of its targets—that has been so crucial in the attention to the subject of the present paper. The surprise among the relevant disciplines as to the apparent eruption of Islam onto the world scene as symbolised and expressed by the events of 9/11 now seems rather difficult to comprehend. Even most of those who have been studying religion and regretting its marginality within and without the academy seem to have been amazed by 9/11. This can, to a considerable degree, be attributed to the insulation of IR from the study of religion and vice versa. On the other hand, it should be said that the study of the politics/religion connection had been expanding in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

This expanding interest almost certainly had much to do with the increasing conspicuousness of religion within and without nation-states since the late 1970s. At that time such events as the coming to power in Nicaragua of the Sandinistas, the complex connection between those opposed to the latter, Iran and the US Republican government (the so-called Iran-Contra affair); the injection of theocratic ideas into the global arena in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979; and the rise of the Solidarity movement—heavily backed by the Catholic Church—in Poland raised, so to speak, religion above the parapet for systematic attention. The spread and intensification of tensions between ‘church’ and state constituted the end of a long era that had begun following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which had marked the termination of religious wars within the West. Prior to the Westphalian settlement, the sacred and the profane were seen to have co-existed—although often problematically. Westphalia marked the end of such co-existence, in such a way as to largely separate religion from politics.

The consummation of that trend was the Declaration of Independence in the nascent American Republic in 1776, with its commitment to the constitutional separation of church and state. This rapidly produced globe-wide implications, even more important than in the USA itself. Moreover, it was not a coincidence that it was in this same period that Jeremy Bentham pronounced, in 1789, the need for a specialised focus on international relations. Few scholars have recognized the significance of this conjunction. However, this was a Western phenomenon which was, nonetheless, imposed upon, or emulated by, a number of Asian societies during the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. The variety of political orientations to attempts to disentangle religion and politics—or church and state—cannot be explored here. Suffice it to say that in East Asia one finds that whereas in China the demise of religion was taken to be a prerequisite of a modern society, in Japan there was a serious attempt to emulate the American separation of ‘church’ from state. In Japan State Shinto was established in the Meiji period by denying that it constituted a religion in the

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Western sense of the word. In contrast, the Chinese political elite and leading intellectuals took the lead from such Western philosophers as Bertrand Russell and insisted that there was no significant place for religion in a modern society.\footnote{Robertson, R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. – London: Sage, 1992. – Pp. 115–128, 146–163; also Gong, G. The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. – Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.}

The areas of the world which most strongly resisted both of these trends were, overwhelmingly, Islamic. In view of this it is not surprising that the ‘return’ of religion to the international arena should have come in the form of a conflict between Islam and much of the rest of the world, particularly those parts of the latter that were seen to be particularly responsible either for the separation of religion and politics and church and state, or the imposition of state organized atheism, as in Communist regimes.

The considerable interest in the theme of globalization has undoubtedly drawn attention to the significance of religion in world politics and international relations. In arguing this I am emphasizing strongly the\footnote{Darwin, J. After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire. – London: Allen Lane, 2007. – P. X; cf. Bayly, C. A. ‘Archaic’ and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850 // Globalization in World History / Ed. by A. G. Hopkins. – London: Pimlico, 2002. – Pp. 47–73.} multidimensionality of globalization. Rather than conceiving of the latter in the form of neoliberalism, thus giving it a distinctively economic gloss, I regard it as having political, social, and cultural dimensions. This type of broad conception of globalization has constituted the basis of an ever-expanding interest in global, or world, history. This revival in the study of world history is significantly different from the kind of West-skewed interest in the latter that thrived at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The new global history – at least as it is practised in the West – is not anywhere near so Eurocentric. In fact has not infrequently been anti-Eurocentric. This means that in many societies and world regions different, often competing, paradigms and images of global history are being presented and promoted. Many, if not most, of these involve situating a particular society or region at the centre of world history. Clearly, this has a great deal to do with the present globe-wide concern with national identities.

In the frame of globalization this has come about for two main reasons. On the one hand, globalization involves the increasing connectivity of the global whole – sometimes expressed as a compression of the entire world, producing a circumstance in which each society, region or civilization is under constraint to identify and proclaim its own uniqueness. On the other hand, globalization also involves increasing global consciousness – better, self-consciousness – in the sense that, with periodic interruptions, the world as it is increasingly has become ‘one place’. This frequently neglected feature of globalization enhances, problematically, the sense of humanity being one. Needless to say, in recent times, the actuality of pandemics, epidemics, climate change – as well as the rise of religions concerned with ‘the end-time’ – has greatly consolidated this heavily contested oneness. In fact, much of the contemporary globe-wide concern with religious and civilizational conflict is centred upon the issue of religious-cultural hegemony.

soon began the exploration of the sea routes that became what Darwin calls ‘the nerves and arteries of great maritime empires’. The European expansion after Tamerlane led to ‘the rise of the West’, but when the European empire dissolved – in the period lasting from the beginning of World War Two until the mid-twentieth century – the story of world history began to be retold, particularly with the rise of the so-called Third World. As Darwin says, this retelling cannot be written without a fully global view of the past. He cogently quotes Teggart, who in his Rome and China argued that ‘the study of the past can become effective only when it is fully realized that all peoples have histories, that these histories run concurrently and in the same world and that the act of comparing them is the beginning of knowledge’. This suggestion of the need to co-ordinate inter-unit relations with comparative analysis is, perhaps, the most important step forward that we must make in the study of international relations. This has been the main methodological consequence of the widespread concern with globalization. Much has recently been written about the need for new approaches to the latter, but virtually none of this has dealt with this analytic desideratum, or with the substantive relevance of religion and culture. Undoubtedly the ‘terror wars’ that were, in a sense, ‘scripted’ by Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, have brought religion – via radically politicized Islam – into a central, but highly problematic position, in world affairs. But little has been seen of the necessary analytic readjustments. On the IR side, this has much to do with the so-called positivism of the discipline, which has largely eschewed any concern with such matters, particularly in the USA. Nye's concept of soft power is a rather meagre acknowledgement of these kinds of consideration.

Even though IR has continued since its inception in the early 1920s to display continuing controversies about Realpolitik it has nonetheless been overwhelmingly centred upon ‘realistic’ motifs. Many would, perhaps, contest this strong argument, but it is here claimed that – at least until recently – that has been the case. The rising attention to international society, global civil society, and global society by what Buzan calls ‘the English School’ contrasts with the emphasis on Realpolitik. Buzan seeks to establish a view of world society as ‘a concept to capture the non-state side of the international system’ or, to put it more elaborately, to ‘create a synthesis between the structural elements of the Bull/Vincent side of English school theory about international and world society, and Wendt's… social theory of international politics’. In so doing Buzan speaks disparagingly about the analytical vacuousness of “the ‘G’ word”. (Wendt, of course, refers to the concept of globalization.) However, despite some praiseworthy attempts to bring back the social into IR, Buzan dangerously simplifies the concept of globalization. This is so, largely because he treats the latter concept in primarily political terms.

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The unidimensional tendencies of many contributions to globalization theory have severely limited its analytical and empirical purchase, even though Buzan himself displays considerable interest in some sociological conceptions of world society outside conventional IR. For example, he attends, appropriately, to the work of the so-called Stanford school (led by John Meyer) which has promoted an important extra-IR view of the world as a whole. In the process, on the other hand, he has entirely neglected the major contributions of the Stanford school to the study of religion. Undoubtedly, there is a failure in the meeting of minds in so far as he rightly accuses members of the Stanford school of being either unaware or unwilling to consider the work of such people as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull in the English school of IR. Buzan rightly emphasizes that one – if not the – central concerns of the work of the Stanford sociological school is that of global culture. However, he overlooks the fact that a close relation of the Stanford school has been what used to be called the Pittsburgh school, whose major figures included Roland Robertson, Frank Lechner, Peter Beyer and Victor Roudometof. In the works of such sociologists religion has been absolutely central. Another lacuna in Buzan’s approach is the neglect of the fact that some representatives of the sociological approach to globalization deny that the process is greatly concerned with what has conventionally been called micro-sociological aspects of what Robertson has conceptualized as the global field.\footnote{Robertson, R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. – London: Sage, 1992. – Pp. 25–31.} In articulating his ideas about the latter, Robertson has typologically divided the world into four major elements: individual states (national or otherwise), the system of states (or nation-states), humanity; and, not least, individual selves. The principal reason for including the latter within the frame of globalization is that it is completely impossible – when one seriously thinks about it – to exclude individuals from the world! Nonetheless, the idea that globalization is primarily a macro topic continues, in spite of anthropologists and sociologists insisting that globalization occurs interpersonally, that personal interaction can have very large consequences and that globalization occurs on the street, in the supermarket, in marital and other relationships, among but a few examples.

A great deal has recently been written in the millennial genre. This can be seen in both utopian and dystopian forms. For the most part, the present global millennial concern is more of the latter than the former kind, certainly in the Western portion of the world. It is in terms of this standpoint that it is particularly necessary to consider the relationship between religion and IR.\footnote{Robertson, R. Global Millennialism: A Postmortem on Secularization // Globalization, Culture and Religion / Ed. by P. Beyer and L. Beaman. – Leiden: Brill, 2007. – Pp. 9–34.}

The millennial and apocalyptic view of the ‘terror wars’, is at the centre of what may be called the religiocultural turn in world politics, specifically the relationship between radically politicized Islam and the ‘modern West’. Indeed, the degree to which this global conflict between the two major actors on either side – namely al-Qaeda and the Bush regime in the USA – has assumed heavily religious terms cannot responsibly be questioned. However, there are those who still cling implausibly to the contention that this conflict is ‘really’ about oil, water and other material factors. The insistence on reducing all phenomena to a single factor is, however – it should be noted – a distinctively Western disposition. The failure to recognize that all human phenomena and interaction are – to put it in ‘Western’ terms – multidimensional, or multifactorial has been, throughout the course of Occidental history, an egregious limitation. Looked at...
from another angle, we should not now be misled by the fact that communist regimes, for example, have claimed that they have considered international relations and world politics in ‘atheistic’ terms. Needless to say, virtually all communist or neo-communist regimes have claimed to be committed to either the complete elimination of religion or its totalitarian control. But, from a sufficiently sophisticated perspective, one can surely see that such ideological commitments have been framed historically by ancient religious traditions. In the most obvious case of Marxist Communism the religious or theological context of such is well documented. In any case, within forms of orthodox Marxism this embeddedness has been clearly acknowledged – for example, by Engels in his writing about European peasant utopianism as a forerunner of working class militancy and in Marx's contention that theology provides the basic categories for theoretical struggles.\(^1\)

At the same time, it has not been sufficiently recognized that the major opponent of Communism also has had a very strong millennial culture.\(^2\) Or, at least, the millennial thrust of American culture – at least since the late eighteenth century – has rarely been analysed and represented from an international affairs standpoint. In this specific sense, IR, as well as sociology of religion, have both ‘developed’ as forms of false consciousness. It should be reiterated that the obsession with the secularization thesis among a (declining) majority of sociologists of religion has been as responsible for the neglect of politics/IR as has the neglect of religion from the latter side.

**Conclusion**

The main concern in this article has been with the way in which religion has appeared in recent years to be a crucial theme in world politics and international relations, not least because religion appears to be at the centre of some of the world's most formidable global conflicts. It has been argued that the new global history that has developed in the context of the disputed concern with globalization provides us with an opportunity to comprehend how, on the one hand, religion has been greatly overlooked in the interrogation of world politics and how, on the other hand, the study of religion – particularly in its sociological form – has similarly neglected international relations because of its continuous and misplaced concern with secularization. In sum, on both sides of the equation there has been much mutual neglect. This has been largely attributed to the structure of academic disciplines, particularly in the Western world.

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GLOBAL LEADERS AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Wali Teymouri

One of the major features of the modern world is the diversity of ideas and attitudes; therefore, leaders should know how to communicate with the account of this inherent point. In other words, a global leader is required to be culturally intelligent and such ability can be acquired only with the lapse of time.

The present article is devoted to the issue of cultural intelligence as an essential characteristic of global leadership. The purpose of the study is to develop a theoretical framework for the relationship between the globalizing world, global leaders and cultural intelligence through the analysis of the existing literature on the subject and other related data. The findings of the study confirmed the assumption that future world leaders should be aware of cultural diversity to carry out the process of the ongoing globalization. They must believe in collective global governance based on mutual respect and understanding.

Introduction

The contemporary world witnesses globalization as a major socio-political trend in all aspects of life, which has led to the emergence of the concepts of global governance. In the past most people were born, lived and died in one and the same geographical region and never met with representative of other cultures. But nowadays one can hardly meet people who live all their lives without getting in touch with people of a different culture.

Meanwhile, one should distinguish internationalization from globalization. Internationalization is a project designed by certain groups and countries in order to maximize their own profits. Within this framework nobody cares about others' profit. The powerful relations and personal profit determine the desired output of the project.

On the other hand, globalization is a natural process that brings people of different ethnic background close together. Globalization is in harmony with human nature and it is a reality that human beings understand quite well.1 The world globalized in this way is characterized by an abundance of international contacts between people of different cultures. There are more opportunities for individuals to meet, interact and live side by side with people with different cultural background. The rapid changes in human societies contribute to the emergence of a developed society in which all human values are actualized, and a person achieves a real moral perfection and happiness. This will be the world of perfect and powerful humankind. The good leadership can help to work out such an interpretation of globalization; it is a reaction to the on-going complexity de-

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velopment, changes, individual differences, and diverse situations.\textsuperscript{2} Such a leadership establishes a firm relationship both among leaders of different societies and between leaders and their followers in any given condition. There is no doubt that this kind of leadership is impossible without applying multiple intelligences. In addition to the ordinary intelligence (IQ) and emotional intelligence (EQ), modern leaders should be culturally intelligent as well.\textsuperscript{3} The future world leaders must be aware of cultural diversity to set the right trend of globalization. They should believe in mutual respect and the nations’ equal rights. That is to say, they need to be culturally intelligent to have an impact on the current trend of globalization.\textsuperscript{4}

**Literature Survey**

To design a model of global leadership, Joost Bücker and Erik Poutsma\textsuperscript{5} studied the following four factors: global framework, intercultural competencies, intercultural sensitivities and cultural intelligence. They found out that cultural intelligence is of real importance in this respect.

Lynn Imai and Michele J. Gelfand\textsuperscript{6} examined the impact of cultural intelligence on the process of negotiation. Their study included 124 subjects from the USA and East Asian countries. The findings of their research showed that there is a meaningful relationship between these factors.

Ilan Alon and James M. Higgins\textsuperscript{7} in their model (see Fig. 4) showed that there should be a good balance between IQ, EQ and organizational intelligence as well as other motivations within any company.

Robert Gregory, Michael Prifling and Roman Beck\textsuperscript{8} explored the cultural intelligence through 32 interviews and analyses of their findings. Thus, they developed a model of the impact of cultural intelligence on the IT systems’ output.

Klaus J. Templer, Cheryl Tay and N. Anand Chandrasekhar\textsuperscript{9} state that cultural intelligence affects an individual's ability to adapt himself/herself to the new requirements of global leadership. They found out that those who willingly learn about new cultures adapt easily when placed within a new cultural context and show a higher sense of responsibility in the international and global interactions.

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\textsuperscript{2} Friedman, T. The World is Flat. – New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.


Globalization Theory

The leadership study has led to a model based on three elements: a leader, the followers and situations as shown in Fig. 2.

These three elements interact to a different extent under any given situation. The major element of this model is leadership. Leadership has many different forms and styles: from the simplest type of command and control to more complex interactive forms.10

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

The basic factors of ‘Duty’ and ‘Relationship’ also affect the process of globalizing leadership and, therefore, are explored by experts in management. These two factors can be defined as leaders’ responsibility and leaders’ communication. The first group implies a one-sided activity to control the followers; these responsibilities do not demand a high level of skills and need only a high level of IQ to make others act in a certain ways. This style of leadership worked out well in the industry and driver communities. The second style is more the result of emotional and social interaction in the context of inter-relationship with others; this type of relationship is not simply logical and rational in nature, but roots in the need of individuals to develop their personality as a social being. Emotional leadership unites the leaders with each other and with their followers.

Global Leaders

We are living in the era of rapid changes and flexibility in almost every sphere of everyday life. This requires leaders who can keep the trend in check. Those leaders who want to be globally influential must think beyond the borders, including the nations' geographic boundaries. Awareness of cultural and ethnic values and diversities as well as establishing a multicultural relationship within human communities is the key concepts of globalized leadership. Cultural intelligence plays a crucial role in realizing objectives of globalized leadership. CQ functions as software and IQ is in fact the hardware of human capital. The objective is to familiarize the current state of cultural diversity. The globalized world requires leaders who are well aware of multiple intelligences and are able to apply both CQ and IQ in performing their leadership functions.

Cultural Intelligence Theory

The concept of intelligence in modern life is much broader than its traditional understanding. In psychology, intelligence is an outcome of innovation, personality and reasoning.

This concept is extensively investigated and there is already quite a lot of works on the subject. These studies indicate that the issue of intelligence should be approached from different aspects; and experts analyze various types of intelligence.

Culture

The term culture refers to the set of traditions, customs, religious rituals, moral values, and literary heritage of any given community. The definition of these concepts is the first step in studying culture. The comprehensive definition of culture regards it consisting of two tangible and non-tangible elements.

In this definition non-tangible/mental culture relates to the individual's understanding of his/her environment and its values and norms. On the other hand, tangible culture is related to legal systems, economic, political, religious and educational practices. The human interaction is the core of this study and of other researchers in this area.

These interactions are easy to observe and analyze, they give the researchers a firm understanding of people's values and traditions.

In tourism industry, the organization of human relations by tour guides is only possible when they have this cultural awareness and show it in their interactions with tourists in a way satisfying tourists.

Cultural awareness, internal motivation to understand cultural behaviors, and cultural behaviors are three elements that make up one's cultural intelligence.

**Cultural Intelligence**

Cultural intelligence is directly related with diverse work environment. It enables individuals to understand how others think and react to behavior pattern. The end result is to facilitate cultural relations and empower those involved by the required management skills. The complexity of work environments makes cultural intelligence a necessary component. Those with low level of cultural intelligence are not able to communicate with their colleagues and fail in their management.

P. C. Earley and S. Ang have defined cultural intelligence as an ability to learn new cultural patterns while interacting with others and the capacity of reacting properly under these conditions. They believe that finding familiar cultural clues in new situations is usually difficult. An individual needs to establish a common cultural framework through the application of cultural intelligence.

The other definition for cultural intelligence say that it is an individual's ability of lifelong learning of cultural diversity that gives people cultural flexibility in their daily interactions. It also applies to emotional intelligence and social intelligence.

The most important factor of cultural intelligence is its dynamic quality. The scientists regarded it as an interdisciplinary concept.

Basing on the existing literature, one can say that cultural intelligence is the individual's ability to adapt in new cultural settings.

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Global leaders need to be aware of different elements of cultural intelligence (see Fig. 3).

![Cultural Intelligence Diagram]

**Cultural Awareness**

Cultural awareness is an observable factor that deals with cultural behavior and answers the questions: What makes people behave in a similar manner and what is the reason of these common patterns?

Cultural awareness emphasizes the necessity to understand the nature of culture and cultural interactions. The main issues to deal with are: the definition of culture, cultural flexibility and transfer, and the ability to understand other cultures as an essential factor in gaining this flexibility.

The emotional aspect of cultural intelligence deals with cultural interaction and exchange, which essentially requires, alongside with other factors, curiosity. Self-belief, which is known as the individual’s understanding of his/her abilities in cultural matters, is also an essential element of cultural intelligence. Those who lack it do not show a high level of motivation when contacting with other cultures and fail to build bridges with them.

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23 Earley, P. C., Ang, S. Cultural Intelligence...  
The behavioral aspect of cultural intelligence refers to those specific behavioral patterns that promote cultural understanding.29

In cultural interaction, two important factors of cultural awareness and cultural motivation work together to urge an individual to cultural interaction with people of other backgrounds. Some of the essential skills are as follows:

– Active listening;
– Asking question;
– Summarizing;
– Communicative skills.

The proper cultural exchange based on these issues, enables people of different backgrounds to take well each other. The most positive aspect of cultural intelligence is that it can be developed through a proper training.30

**Conclusion**

We are living in the era of rapid changes and flexibility in almost every aspect of everyday life. Being diverse and at the same time interdependent, human societies need the leaders with a great knowledge of intercultural communications. They should understand the existing diversity and differences by applying several intelligences (ordinary intelligence – IQ, emotional intelligence – EQ, cultural intelligence, and cultural awareness, etc.) and should be in close contact with a relevant representative in other cultures. That is to say, the globalized world need a management realized within a coherent and proper advisory board. The need for those leaders who can control the trend of change in contemporary world is a generally accepted fact. The main skill of global leaders is their cultural intelligence.31 Only leaders with a high level of cultural intelligence can affect the trend of changes. What is needed in the modern globalized world is the understanding of other cultures, belief in diversity, and cultural interaction with people of different cultural backgrounds. The world leaders should believe in mutual respect and equal rights of the nations. They must be aware of cultural diversity to carry out the real globalization process. They must believe in a collective global convergence based on mutual respect and understanding.

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29 Earley, P. C., Ang, S. Cultural Intelligence…
WHAT MUST WE DO CONFRONTED WITH GLOBALIZATION?

Alexander N. Chumakov

The article is devoted to the process of globalization initially seen as an objective historical process. The author reveals main problems and contradictions engendered by globalization, of which lack of governance in the contemporary world is the most dangerous. It is discussed how global governance is possible and who is responsible for it. The author analyzes lessons of the world financial crisis and concludes that dialogue is the most effective means to overcome the contradictions of the contemporary world.

General Remarks

The current global financial crisis is not over. This crisis once again has clearly demonstrated that financial markets can become a source of serious socioeconomic tensions. The crisis has also shown that without an adequate system of control and coordination of activities of the bodies regulating the world economy, the financial markets transform from a creative force into a destructive one.

Documents of international organizations as well as many economists' investigations maintain that financial crises are inevitable for the market economy evolving in a cyclical manner.

It is important, first, not to commit subjective errors which can exacerbate or provoke crises. Second, we need to take well-timed and proper measures in order to mitigate consequences of crises.

As for specific decisions made by certain countries or regional organizations such as, for example, the European Union, they should be left to politicians and specialists in economics, management and so on. However, taken out of the world context and without taking into account globalization processes, such decisions will never be efficient.

An adequate understanding of the world situation in general and of globalization in particular becomes the task of utmost importance. Mere technological solutions are insufficient to solve it. We need a philosophical analysis of the contemporary situation and of earlier trends of the world development. The concept of globalization acquires the primary importance here.

Globalization as Reality

Today almost everyone seems to be interested in globalization, including scholars, politicians, artists, businessmen, journalists. However, this does not mean that in this field one can find any general, though vague, concepts, consolidated opinions or, at least, a substantial understanding that alongside with new problems, dangers and negative consequences globalization also brings new opportunities and prospects. On the contrary, we doubt even the fact that global society itself is now emerging on the planet, although many things seem evident, such as a full closeness in geographic space, universal interdependence, common environmental and nuclear threats, planetary information system, and world transport communications, etc.

This Globalizing World 30–41
To assess the global world properly, one should understand that from the very beginning its processes, including globalization itself, are first and foremost objective. Of course, the global processes are somewhat influenced by subjective factors, but, nevertheless, in their progressive development they occur basically irrespective of the will and subjective aspirations of individuals, social groups, corporations, or even separate states. Globalization processes and global problems of modernity have emerged not spontaneously or by mistake, not due to somebody's good or wicked plan. They resulted from an objective and logical development of society and its new relations with the environment.

The contemporary world seems to have dramatically changed virtually within the last decades; but it is not so. True globalization started in the age of the great geographical discoveries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, globalization became fundamental after it had strengthened and expanded to new spheres of social life. Today globalization is total and multi-faceted as economic, political, cultural and information flows, links and relations have irreversibly transcended the boundaries of countries and nations, being no longer their domain and prerogative.

One can hardly agree with a widely-held view that globalization was born by the twentieth century. It would also be a mistake to equate globalization with modernization or mostly with economic integration. Unfortunately, this simplistic vision of a complex issue is common even among scholars, engendering numerous debates about ‘waves’, ‘intensification’, or ‘stagnation’ of globalization.

It is important to emphasize that up to the early twentieth century different parts of humankind had been developing mostly fragmentary and separately. Originally there were local, later regional, cultural-cum-civilizational systems, which had relatively insignificant mutual influence or did not even interact. Now the world cultural-cum-civilizational system is being formed. Its shape became clear by the beginning of the twentieth century. With the emergence and exacerbation of the global problems in the 1970s and the 1980s, the global significance of changes became evident also in the broad public consciousness. The humankind became a planetary phenomenon. It entered the age of universal interdependence of different countries and nations. In spite of the emergence of the foundations of universal culture they still preserve their national cultures, but at the same time some signs of civilizational unity are increasingly manifest.

It is impossible to dwell more on these ideas, so I would like to emphasize the main point. Now one can speak about the global society or the single world civilization being really formed. With increasing persistence, more and more countries and nations are required to follow universal norms, rules, bans and prescriptions. Having entered the era of transformation from ‘local’ and ‘regional’ cultural-cum-civilizational systems to universal cultural-cum-civilizational system, we should act in an appropriate manner.

Perceptions of Globalization

In real life even an obvious necessity of changing human behavior quite often produces no desired results. In other words, people either completely ignore the changes around them, or react inadequately. This is absolutely true in the case of globalization as well.

Today globalization is as real as a sunrise. The contemporary world, beyond question, has radically changed under the influence of globalization and faces dangers, which have never existed before. Even mass consciousness, not to mention the academic community, understands it as an axiom.
It can be both good and bad. It is good because there is no need to prove that globalization is a topical issue. Thus, we have more opportunities to find constructive solutions and reasonable practical responses. It is bad because even sound experts in Global Studies start to see the contemporary situation through the lens of habit. Thus, they are able to see only one aspect of the situation, from the position of their long-held views. As a result, attention is focused, as a rule, on what is conventional and evident. All other secondary or nascent problems (dangers, obstacles to social development) remain without due consideration. For example, there is a common statement that the world community has never been so endangered in its history as today, in the twenty-first century. It is usually associated with the threat of nuclear war and environmental disaster, which is true, but the problem cannot be reduced to these issues. The point is not that we just have nuclear weapons, poorly controlled and threatening humankind with a real possibility of self-destruction. The increasing human pressure on the environment definitely worsens the tough ecological situation, but it is not the greatest danger.

What is more important now is that humans and their behavior in the global world is not an integral part of this world. In other words, in the last decades the whole complex of global problems has been enlarged by a new danger, still hardly comprehended – a cardinal and rapid change of the architectonics of world interconnections and interrelations. At the same time, the world community demonstrates the inability to react adequately to such changes.

We need a new approach to world problems and we should rethink the priorities of their solution. One should emphasize that by the end of the twentieth century globalization made the world community fully global and that relations, communications and information flows became cross-borders. Humankind has become a holistic system with respect to all the main parameters of social life. Nation-states (now their number reaches 200) have ceased to be the only international actors. Numerous multinational corporations, international organizations (including criminal ones, connected with drug trafficking and international terrorism) have also become actors. And as before, this world with many interdependent and confronting actors is simply spontaneously self-regulated and does not have the governance that it needs.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that humans are naturally biosocial beings. They still combine good and bad, kind and evil, love and hatred, peacefulness and aggression. Of course, culture, upbringing and education make people humane and tolerant. But we cannot change human nature and biological essence: aggressiveness, lust for domination, struggle for survival, violent solutions, etc.

As before, these things can be traced in the behavior of separate communities and in the nation-states' policy. Now the whole world community as a holistic system behaves selfishly toward the natural environment. The one who does not notice or pays no attention to it will lose firm soil under her feet, becomes deluded by abstractions and has no prospects for changes for the better.

It is also important that the number of earth inhabitants has exceeded seven billion people and continues to grow. At the same time, the planetary resources needed to support human lives are limited. They are also unevenly distributed (as well as the population) and some are scarce or extinguished. There is overt and covert struggle for the access to natural resources. Most likely, this conflict of interests is going to increase in the future and confrontation is going to become more severe.
The Main Issue of the Contemporary World

As a result, the global world, facing essentially new challenges and having no adequate system of governance, gets more and more into the situation of increasing contradictions and uncertainty. This is the main problem, the main contradiction of our epoch! We can also say that under the influence of globalization processes the world community, in fact, becomes more and more a single holistic system with respect to all parameters of social life. At the same time, there are no governance mechanisms adequate to this holism.

The most striking in this situation is not that this governance does not exist as such, but that it is not purposefully constructed. Moreover, even theoretical discussions about it are rather infrequent today, not being the focus of public attention as they deserve to be (although concerns about the situation in question grow). Besides, governance in general and global governance in particular, unlike regulation, cannot emerge spontaneously. This issue is to be discussed below; here I would like to make some points about the reasons why this happens.

First, we deal with a principally new, unprecedented situation related to governing an extremely complicated and huge socio-natural system, which human beings have never encountered in their history. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the mankind’s experience and the proven practices of resolving complex problems are not valid any more. At the same time, no new approaches have been worked out yet.

Second, the world community, in spite of the increasing interdependence of different countries and peoples, still remains fragmented, divided into autonomous and self-organized structures, which function in accordance to their own laws targeting, first of all, their private profits and interests. These are nation-states, multinational corporations, and confessional systems, such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.

And third, globalization itself and its numerous consequences remain a subject of serious discussions. Such discussions often conceal the main thing: globalization is, first of all, an objective historical process and not a project specially designed by someone, or someone's insidious plan and intention. We should emphasize this point because if in rethinking globalization processes and their circumstances we proceed from a subjective factor and pay attention mainly to those who benefit from it, and then we would start to search for perpetrators and discuss globalization scenarios. In this case we face our inability to distinguish between an objective, natural course of events of social development and subjective human activity. The former, of course, is the basis of social development but it is not sufficient to provide governing complex systems without adequate structures and mechanisms. Thinking globally, one cannot help recognizing the state of affairs: there are no structures and mechanisms of government adequate to the holistic global world. That is why, in my opinion, it is useless to look for perpetrators or those responsible for globalization. Moreover, such approach engenders illusions and is dangerous because it complicates the matter and distracts from the search for real solutions for the urgent issues.

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When considering globalization first of all as an objective historical process (which is my position), one should look for means of solving globalization-engendered problems (including governing social systems) in the sphere of structural changes of the world society. This approach is based on a proposition that complex systems, or, at least, biosystems (of which human beings are a part) in their development are regulated naturally, based on natural laws. Here one can talk about the self-regulation of complex systems.

Apart from that, social systems are also governed, because an active element plays an important role in their development. This active element is human beings who, due to their abilities, consciously influence various parameters of development. It is evident that the planetary-scale social system, which is being formed now, should not be just self-regulated but also governed. It is important to distinguish between regulation and government, because they are not the same.

**Regulation** (from Latin ‘regulo’ – to set up, to fix, to order) should be understood as a spontaneous process or intentional activity aimed at providing functioning of this or that system within a framework of parameters, set up naturally or intentionally.

Via regulation (as well as self-regulation) one can solve the task of the optimal functioning of a system, creating the most favorable conditions for interaction of different components of this system. Regulation is aimed at consolidated actions of various parts of a whole and can be done consciously (when human beings play a regulative role), or spontaneously (when we talk about self-regulating systems). Population numbers constantly changing within some limits is an example of natural (spontaneous) regulation of a system. It depends on the presence of food supplies, or on obtaining its external parameters based on its genetic code and specific environmental conditions.

The biosphere as a whole is also a self-regulating system, whose balanced development is supported by the law of the struggle for survival. Regulation becomes purposeful when it is done with participation of a subjective factor, introducing some order to this or that system. This is how a traffic-controller acts at a crossroads or a specialist regulating, for example, the functioning of an engine, the level of water in a basin or tuning an antenna. Regulation can be conducted automatically, for example, on roads via traffic lights.

**Governance**, unlike regulation, never occurs naturally and spontaneously. It always assumes the presence of subjective factors and is characterized by more complex structure of relations between the subject and the object. Governance is associated with such notions as ‘justice’ and ‘law’; it is a conscious process or activity aiming at achieving a specific result. This activity is based on predetermined order of conduct combined with creative acts of an agent making decisions not only on the basis of already set norms and rules, but depending on situational changes.

So, unlike regulation, governance is always connected with conscious human activity based on setting goals, feedback and creativity. In other words, government is always performed consciously and purposefully. It presupposes both getting this or that result and finding the most optimal means to achieve the goal. Thus, general governance and *global governance* in particular cannot emerge spontaneously or naturally. It only can appear in a society and can only be developed consciously, purposefully and following certain logic, which provides specific parameters of such governance. Here, unlike regulation, one always can find an active source – *subjects of governance*, setting some goals and providing their achievement.
Governance is, thus, a higher level of regulation, as well as development is a higher form of movement. That is why there can be no development without movement while we can commonly see movement without development. Similarly, governance presupposes regulation, while regulation can take place (occur) without governance.

In this context we can talk about historical dynamics of development of social relations when their natural regulation was eventually complimented by governance. For example, in the period of savagery and, to a large extent, in the period of barbarity, primitive people’s relations were regulated by force and the survival of the strongest. As for governing social relations in the full sense, it emerges later, together with settled way of life, labor division, formation of a state and, finally, formation of the first civilizations. Such governance is already based on the realization of certain interests and purposefulness. It does not substitute natural regulation, but rather supplements it, making social development more predictable and less controversial. This is how all social systems evolve, of which nation-states have become the largest and the best organized.

From the mid-twentieth century the situation has principally changed because due to globalization processes the whole humankind has become a holistic system. It more and more resembles a single holistic organism based on the central parameters of social life (economic, political, and informational, etc.), on its interaction with natural environment, on exploring world oceans, outer space, etc. At the same time, in spite of the fact that international anarchy of the past gradually became more ordered, this order is not satisfactory when one takes into consideration contemporary challenges to humankind.

From this viewpoint, it is evident that humankind has reached a threshold, beyond which spontaneous regulation of social relations cannot continue any longer. It should be supplemented with conscious and purposeful building of systemic governance, because the world of global relations without effective global governance would encounter serious testing.

Nowadays our world is like a tall ship, which has so far no steering wheel, but is already being brought by wind from a relatively safe haven to the open sea. Its crew, stuck in conflicts and making no efforts to governing the ship, inevitably becomes hostage of circumstances and natural elements. The world community, having entered the era of global interdependence, should acknowledge the danger of uncontrolledness of the modern world and to start acting in concord and with purpose. If not, this state of affairs promises nothing good for the world community. Without effective governance, the world community will only slide more and more into the abyss of increasing conflicts and contradictions.

There can be another analogy to the contemporary global world – a period of human history, which Thomas Hobbes metaphorically called ‘war of everyone against everyone’. We all know that in that time the problem was resolved through the emergence of state as an artificial body able to provide peace and order both locally and globally. Hobbes compared it to Leviathan – a biblical monster possessing immeasurable power.2

Has the situation changed much? The world community seems to have reached the same situation of ‘war of everyone against everyone’. The difference is that this now global and, in fact, non-regulated confrontation is not between separate people but between sovereign nation-states together with various international bodies and organizations.

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How is Global Governance Possible?

This state of affairs in the absence of global ethics, global law and universally recognized human values, drags the world community into the situation of struggle for survival.

As a result, most international contradictions and discussions are resolved by power policy. Power is not necessarily represented in a brutal and rough form. Quite often, especially in the economic sphere, coercion is exercised through soft power. Anyhow, the one who is stronger and more sophisticated, the one with advantages and pursuing uncontrollably selfish interests, wins.

In this situation, the UN is practically powerless, although seems to be the only institution for us to rely on. This organization was created in a different epoch and for resolving issues other than governing the global world, such as, first of all, prevention of the new world war and performing regulatory functions worldwide. It would be naïve to think that the reform of the UN as such can change anything cardinally. At the same time, new attempts are made to respond serious challenges. New global and regional supranational organizations emerge, such as G8, G20, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc. But one should not be mesmerized by these structures. They are built to provide cooperative efforts at regional and global levels and they somehow manage to do it. At the same time, these organizations do not solve and are by and large unable to solve the main contradictions of our time formulated above.

First, all of them represent only a certain part of humankind, a region or a separated sphere of social activity. Without representing the world as a whole and in its different aspects, any governance is doomed to be, at least, limited.

Second, such organizations at the worldwide scale are only able, at their best, to perform some regulative functions, being not appropriate for governing the world system as a whole.

It is not surprising that nearly all global projects of the last days, of which ‘Peaceful coexistence’, ‘Sustainable development’, ‘Multiculturalism’ and some other are the most well-known ones, provide no desirable results or even prove to be invalid. It happens because, as it has been mentioned above, we have no adequate mechanisms to realize them successfully.

As a result, the conflict of interest in the global world increases, reinforced by growing openness and accessibility of information, which becomes the most important resource and an effective tool for governing social processes, including distant governance. This is why dispersed oppositions in various countries act with such coordination and can overthrow governments in the course of so-called ‘colored’, or ‘Twitter’ revolutions.

Thus, modern humankind simply has no alternative but global governance, which should be created at all costs and as soon as possible. It does not matter, whether it will be something like a world state or some supra-national structures to govern the world community. Evidently, the world government, so much spoken about, would be insuffi-

1 This topical issue is still widely and vigorously debated.
How is global governance generally possible and what is the logic of this governance?

What are the main tasks of global governance?

What preconditions for the creation of the global governance already exist in contemporary world?

What kind of present international organizations and bodies fit (or will be able to fit after some degree of reform) the essence and principles of global governance?

What obstacles can be found on the way towards creating global governance?

What principal decisions and at what level should be made as the first and the following steps in achieving the goals set?

Who can and should take responsibility for developing global governance?

Finally, what are the costs and who should pay them?

So, to answer the above-listed questions, one should first answer the most important one: is global governance generally possible, and if ‘yes’, then, ‘how’?

History allows us to face the future with some optimism. Since the modern age and the emergence of the first ideas to make social life peaceful universally and up to now, when this task became paramount, humankind, beyond doubt, has collected some theoretical and practical results in this sphere. Serious contributions to the theory and philosophy of human unity and world (planetary) government were made by John Lock, Immanuel Kant, Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Vladimir Vernansky, Karl Jaspers, Ferdinand Tönnies, Thorstein Veblen, Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, Norbert Elias, Saul Mendlovitz, Helmut Schmidt, Aurelio Peccei, Andrei Sakharov, Amitai Etzioni, Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochvil, Carl Fried-

trich von Weizsäcker, Ervin Laszlo, Glen Martin and others.

Summing up the heritage in this sphere of knowledge one can say that all specula-
tions, theories and ideas on common destiny of humankind, global governance, world
government and so on, have, as a rule, one goal: to find ways and means to achieve
peaceful coexistence of peoples while preserving their cultural identity. Kant, for exam-
ple, as early as in 1795 when thinking about possibility and principles of reason-based
social governance wrote in his famous treatise ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ that eternal peace
is not an empty speculation but a task which is being gradually solved and is approach-
ing its realization.4

To confirm that the famous philosopher was right one can point to a constantly
growing interest in this problem and to numerous public organizations that emerged
in the last decades. Their names speak for themselves: the World Constitution and Par-
liament Association, World Federalist Association, World Federalist Movement, World
Union, World Citizens Movement, etc.5

If one looks at practical issues, it cannot go unnoticed that the world community has
accumulated, during its long history, a significant experience of governing large social
systems – states, empires, kingdoms, confederations, unions, blocs, etc. The state has
proven in practice to be the most widespread and enduring form of organizing social life.

Morality and law are central instruments of social governance, through which one
can provide the strongest influence on social consciousness and human behavior. We

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should also emphasize ideology, politics, economy, finance, culture, etc., through which social systems are also directly or indirectly governed. But morality and law, no doubt, dominate these factors, because they literally penetrate and link together all other spheres of social life, being, in this or that way, subdued to moral and legal norms and laws.

Today, when multi-aspect globalization makes the whole world community a holistic planetary system, governing this mega-system becomes a demand of the time and it should be built taking into consideration the whole experience accumulated by humankind in this sphere. It seems evident that global governance should be based on the historically tested principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

In this regard one can and should talk not just (as usual) about World Government (executive power) but also about a World Parliament (legislative power) and Global Law System (judicial power), based on global law. To see them realized, as well as to form an effective planetary system of governance, we should create adequate conditions, of which the most important are the following:

**Universally recognized moral foundations**, meaning that we should form universal values and universal morality for the planet. They should not replace, but enforce and amplify morality and values of different peoples. It seems that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, equating all people in their right to life, freedom and property, should be the starting point for the formation of such a morality.

**A single legal system** is another necessary condition for global governance, together with a planetary system of adaptation and implementation of legal norms universal for all countries and peoples. We should emphasize that here we speak not about international law, which is already well-developed at the level of interstate and regional relations, but about global law, which would be really universal. Such a law does not presuppose abolishment of legal systems of separate states or regional structures, of international legal acts and institutions. It is important, but the national/regional law should be brought with correspondence with the global law and should not contradict it.

Global governance also means providing cooperative security and uniting efforts in maintaining it through various forms of cooperation. First of all, we talk about economic cooperation, which already successfully evolves in the modern world in the form of multinational corporations, consortiums, joint ventures, etc. World trade has already made all peoples of the planet involved into the single market of labor, goods and services.

Planetary political cooperation is the next necessary condition for global governance. It should provide resolution of conflicts and peaceful coexistence through compromising and resolving disputes taking into consideration the maximum of interests of different parts. Global political cooperation, unlike economic cooperation, still is to be developed because in this sphere relations are built so far on the absolute priority of national and corporate interests.

**Military cooperation**, existing nowadays at the regional level and meeting the defense tasks of separate countries and peoples (i.e. protecting them from external threats), should be replaced by police forces providing law and order, protection from criminal activities.

The recent world financial crisis has shown once again that coordinated planetary financial policy is a necessary condition for global governance. It is evident that it is hard and even impossible to implement coordinated financial policy without a single currency.
Religious tolerance and separation of church (religious institutions) from institutions (structures) of global governance is necessary as the most important condition for peaceful coexistence and constructive interaction of different people, independent of their religious beliefs or non-beliefs.

Scientific and technological cooperation as well as cooperation in the sphere of health and education presupposes creating conditions for a balanced cultural and social development of various continents and regions of the planet.

A common (world) language for international communication is needed to support conversation in various spheres of social life and to develop intercultural interaction. A well-known Korean philosopher Yersu Kim mentions that language may be compared with culture: as well as culture itself is a system of symbolic meanings serving common needs of its members.6

Of course, we have not listed all conditions needed for creating a system of global governance. But these are the most important ones, without which all the rest will make no sense.

Who is Responsible?

Now a few words regarding what principal decisions and at what level should be made initially and afterwards to achieve the goals set.

Decisions concerning building the global system of governance should be made, of course, at the planetary level. A World Conference, roughly analogical to the World Environmental Conference in Rio de Janeiro (1992), could become the first step. It could also be a world summit of heads of all states, which would work out principal approaches to global governance. In the future operative-tactical and strategic decisions would become more and more the prerogative of the emerging structures of global governance.

Finally, who can and should take responsibility for building global governance and what are the costs and who should pay them?

First of all, this responsibility lies on the world academic, political and business elites, that is on people having adequate worldview, possessing necessary knowledge, have the strongest authorities and material resources. On the other hand, the most affluent countries and alliances (the USA, the EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil and others) should take initial basic responsibility for building the system of global governance. They also should carry the main burden of financial support of a reform of modern international relations. This does not mean, however, that there should be countries or nations at our planet, which would be free from their own reasonable contribution into common expenses.

Some may say that this is all a utopia, and that global governance is impossible, and the supporting arguments listed above are insufficient. This viewpoint has its right to exist, because we cannot so far provide a final proof of the truth of our statements. Some can question the appropriateness and sequence of the steps proposed and they may also be right, because we discuss a topic unprecedented in human history. That is why it is so important to consider the issue of global governance in all its aspects, including philosophy, which, unlike science, is oriented not so much towards finding con-

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crete, final solutions but towards broadening the scope of various approaches to solve a problem. Such philosophical analysis is especially valuable where exact scientific methods have not been worked out yet, but the situation does need immediate resolution. The problem of governing the contemporary global world is such a case.

**Dialogue as a Way to Cope with Problems**

So, if we take into consideration the above said, today in the global world political decisions between rationality and demands of wisdom and the dialogue of cultures and civilizations are the only possible way to resolve contradictions in a constructive way and to provide a balanced social development both at the national and global levels. But they have their limits defined by the following points.

First, approaches based on a separate ‘dialogue of cultures’ or ‘dialogue of civilizations’ are not successful, because they do not reflect the genuine (cultural-cum-civilizational) nature of social life, which is a combination of cultural achievements and civilizational relations of society.

Second, every culture is initially self-sufficient and is eager to preserve its identity. Therefore, a constructive dialogue based on culture alone is impossible; one should not expect much from intercultural dialogue and count on bringing different cultural positions close to each other. At the same time, one should not be too pessimistic.

And the higher is the level of civilizational development of the interacting parties, the more productive this dialogue can be. However, the level of civilizational development of various nations and humanity as a whole still remains at a very low level. Even the academic community does not fully understand that the level of development of civilization of this or that people (a country, a collective, an individual) is the other side of their cultural development. That is why the policy of multiculturalism, not considering the civilizational gap in the development of various cultures, has been, in fact, seriously defeated not only in Europe but in other countries and regions as well.

One cannot agree with Samuel Huntington talking about ‘clash of civilizations’. In fact, we deal with confrontation of different ‘cultural-cum-civilizational’ systems (the West and the East, capitalism and socialism, Islam and Christianity, etc.), where they confront one another on the basis of cultures but interact on the basis of civiliza- tion. This creates multiplicity of cultural-cum-civilizational systems.

Thus, the cultural-cum-civilizational dialogue implies admitting the multipolarity of the contemporary global world. And to make it effective we need common civilizational principles of social organization, of which the most important are the following:

- recognizing and protecting basic human rights;
- a conventional system of ethical norms and values (universal morality);
- a single legal system (global law);
- religious tolerance and freedom of consciousness.

Responsibility for building such principles and providing conditions for a productive dialogue in the global world lies, first of all, on the world political, academic and business elites, as well as on nation-states as the largest organized social systems.

And, if the measure of responsibility of politicians depends on their position, the level of states' responsibility depends directly on their role in the global system of economic, military, political and cultural relations.
Lessons from the World Crisis and Conclusions

The decisions on the creation of the global system of governance should be made, of course, at the planetary level.

And we must say that apart from states and intergovernmental organizations two major factors have emerged in world policy by now: global business and global civil society. They seem to become the main components of the nascent global governance mechanism.

One should expect the partnership of these structures to become dominant at all levels – global, regional and local – in the near future.

While solving the task of global governance humankind needs to overcome an important psychological barrier. For centuries the state remained at the core of international relations; these relations seem to be impossible without states. Now, globalization more and more eliminates the differences between internal and external economic and social processes. Intrastate regulators are losing their autonomy and have to act in cooperation with other states, large multinational and world civil society. Governing alliances are formed, where the state interacts with civil society and private business.

With increasing globalization, the transnational relations expand and world civil society becomes more and more visible. This process is supported, first, by the growing number of problems encountered by most (or even all) countries. Second, rapid development of the means of international communication, such as Internet, makes the consolidated activity of national civil societies much easier.

Thus, the global civil society as a system of non-governmental and non-commercial organizations, concerned with the destiny of the world community, will increasingly play its role of one of the regulators of the world society, alongside with business and, surely, the state.

At the same time, in this emerging global governance system the separate states are expected to be not sovereign and all-powerful masters of their territories, but one of the elements of a supra-state mechanism for regulating global processes. This mechanism will not be habitually hierarchical, but rather network-like. National power structures, being remnants of the previous era, may become hubs of the nascent global governance network.

In conclusion, I would like to note that it is impossible by simple means to overcome the differing interests of the countries that are at different stages of economic development. Possible compromises are also very limited, as the range of differences is too great. But the path of small compromise is, apparently, the only one which in the future could reduce global risks associated with inequality. The development of new and the reform of existing principles of global governance should be among the priority tasks of all national governments and international organizations. No need to tackle the great challenges immediately – it will be very difficult or even impossible to resolve it given divergence of interests. But, taking slow steps to each other, in the future you can get close so that the contradictions will cease to be insurmountable.

If at some point it becomes clear that the bar is set too high and is insurmountable, we should lower it and continue our efforts. The convergence of countries, especially in the sphere of trade, is a necessary prerequisite for reduction of the risks in many spheres, including economy.
WHICH GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS WOULD THE GLOBAL CRISIS LEAD TO?

Leonid E. Grinin

This article analyzes the global causes of the contemporary crisis and the possibilities to eliminate the most acute problems that have generated this crisis. It analyzes both the negative role of the world financial flows and their important positive functions including the ‘insurance’ of social guarantees at the global scale. In connection with the outcome of the crisis it analyzes the conditions of possible transformations of the world system and the possibility of various global scripts of its near future. It gives a characteristic of the coming ‘epoch of new coalitions’; it gives some futuristic prognosis.

GLOBAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CRISIS AND THE NECESSITY OF CHANGES

The global crisis that has somehow sobered down (at least for some time) those who believed global development would proceed without crises appears to be fading away (though the threat of one more wave of crisis does not seem to have disappeared entirely). The world economy in general has moved from the phase of recession to the phase of depression, and there seem to appear some indications suggesting certain movement toward the recovery phase. This implies that we can look at the causes (as well as proximate and ultimate consequences) of the deepest (within the last 75 years) economic crisis in a way somehow different from that of one and a half year ago.

The history of economic crises suggests that each of them was connected with the type of relationships within the World System. However, some strongest crises also changed in a rather significant way the World System structure, the connecting lines of this system. The current global financial-economic crisis is also likely to contribute to the beginning of the process of major changes in the World System structure and functioning, as well as in the principles of the international relations in the forthcoming decades. The main part of the present article will be devoted to the analysis of probable future transformations in connection with the crisis and to estimating the probabilities of various scenarios in the development of the World System during the forthcoming decades.

1. Global Causes of the Global Crisis

The growth and deepening of financial-economic globalization has led to the unprecedented development of a number of countries and regions in the last decade; yet, it

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has also caused some crises. That is why on the whole the current crisis may be considered as the reverse side of globalization.

It is quite natural that the causes and character of the current crisis will be a subject of attentive research for quite a long time. However, it is quite evident that the main factors causing the crisis have not disappeared. Also many problems have been just temporarily dampened by an unprecedented pumping of funds that can be only justified as an extraordinary measure that can worsen the situation in the future. That is why there are some grounds to expect in the near future (within 3–5 years) a new outburst of the crisis. In the meantime, there is a considerable probability that the strongest manifestations of the crisis will be felt most distinctly in the fast growing Asian economies that have suffered rather moderately from the current crisis. Similar situations, with a similar asynchrony during the strongest crises with respect to Europe and the USA, were observed to occur in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

The occurrence of major changes in the global division of labor between countries is associated with the most important causes of the crisis. One of the most salient points here is that the countries of the World System center (especially the UK and USA) have developed their financial sector in the most active way. In the meantime the semiperipheral countries have been developing more actively the ‘real economy’. As a result, within Western economies the GDP share produced by the financial sector reaches between a quarter and a third of the total GDP, exceeding the share produced by industry.

In general, within the world economy (due to the West's ability to accumulate the world capitals, as well as due to the formation and diffusion of new financial technologies) the financial sector has been growing faster than the other sectors over the last three decades. As a result of this, the financial sector has been transformed from a sector serving the economy, to a sector producing the main vector of its development; thus it has become a sector where an immense share of added value is produced. Such a division of labor has a number of important consequences. Western countries become not only the world capital accumulation center, they also become net importers of capitals. In these countries one can observe a phenomenon of deindustrialization.

On the contrary, one can observe a fast industrial growth in the semiperipheral countries. This has appreciably contributed to the development of the situation when

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3 As the World System core countries in the wide sense may be considered the most developed OECD countries including 24 of the 30 members of this organization and that produce 60 % of the entire world GDP.
the growth rates in such developing economies – e.g., the ones of the BRIC and some other semiperipheral countries – are significantly higher than in the West. In the semiperipheral countries one can observe an especially fast growth of the exporting sectors, whereas the USA and some other core countries become more and more a world center of consumption whose demand determines to a considerable extent the prosperity of semi-peripheral and peripheral economies. Thus, in general we can observe the decline of the role of the West as an industrial-economic center of the World System; on the other hand, this is accompanied by the growth of its importance as an importer of commodities and capitals; correspondingly, the economic role of the semiperiphery (in general, and certain semiperipheral centers, in particular) grows; yet, their economy becomes more and more dependent on the ability of the West to consume. The consumption economy has become an imperative not only for the West, but for the World System as a whole.

An anarchic and extremely rapid development of new financial centers, financial currents and technologies (that has secured a fast growth of the financial sector) has also contributed in an extremely significant way to the genesis of the global financial-economic crisis. Their negative role, according to financiers, has been amplified by the lack of transparency with respect to many financial instruments and institutes, which led to the actual obscuring of risks and to the general underestimation of global risk.

It should be noted that the aspiration for risk (which is usually characterized as a positive quality feature of an entrepreneur's psychology) should be reconsidered in conditions of globalization. If financiers (and finally other businessmen) consider the whole world to be a sphere for possible investment, and thus, given this condition, risks are counted in trillions of dollars, then to risk or not to risk stops being just a question of personal choice for individual entrepreneurs and firms. An adventurous inclination for risk (whose consequences could produce a fatal influence on the whole global economy) becomes a very dangerous feature. Consequently, it becomes necessary to control activities of such global entrepreneurs.

2. Why there have been Manifested the Classical Features of Economic Crises?

The global causes of the contemporary crisis, in my opinion, have led to an unexpected effect – we observe within it some classical features of the cyclical crises of the past time that appeared to have been eliminated. Crises in their classical form (as unexpected and even unexplainable economic collapses occurring against the backdrop of unprecedented florescence, growth of profits and prices) were typical for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Later, in the second half of the twentieth century (in a direct connection with an active countercyclical interference of the state) the cyclical crises became much weaker and less pronounced.

Let us recollect that medium-length economic cycles with a characteristic period of 7–11 years (that go through the upswing phase turning into the overheating subphase, and ending with a crisis/collapse/recession and depression) are also known as Juglar cycles.4 Such cycles were typically characterized by fast (sometimes even explosive)

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4 They were denoted as Juglar cycles after Clément Juglar (1819–1905), who was one of the first to demonstrate the periodical, regular, cyclical character of economic crises; though a number of economists (including Karl Marx) studied the economic cycles simultaneously with Juglar.
booms (that implied a great strain on the economic system) followed by even faster collapses.

The period of upswing followed by boom and overheating was accompanied (a) by a fast and inadequate growth of prices of raw materials and real estate objects; (b) by an excessive demand for credit funds and investment expansion beyond any reasonable limits; (c) by outbursts of speculations with commodity and stock assets; (d) by enormous increase in risky operations. All these features were described many times in studies produced by representatives of various schools of economic thought. All these features have been observed in the current crisis.

Abrupt transitions from booms to collapses were connected with spontaneous economic development that was regulated by market forces and almost nothing else, as state interference into the economic development was insufficient. Karl Marx had already considered the anarchic character of development inherent in a capitalist economy (against the background of the economic agents’ urge towards the expansion of supply) as the main cause of the economic crises.

As a result of the Great Depression the role of the state in regulating the economy changed. Due to various direct and indirect ways to influence the macroeconomic framework of national economic development it became possible for the state to minimize dramatic distortions of booms and busts. As a result, the crises became much less pronounced than before.

However, the global causes of the current crisis have made those Keynesian monetary methods of economic regulation (that are effective at the scale of a single country) ineffective at the global level. The world economy is being transformed into a single system, but technologies of the countercyclical management at the World System scale have not yet been worked out. Nation-states wage a tense competition for higher growth rates (and the question of possible limitation of those rates is not even discussed). Respectively, in the absence of the necessary level of control, the features of anarchic and arrhythmic development of non-regulated market economy become more and more salient at the World System level.

Hence there is a definite resemblance between the functioning of the non-regulated market national economy and modern global economy. This likeness, in my opinion, explains the contemporary recurrence of some features of the cyclical crises of the past times.5

It should be noted that in modern economy not only new financial technologies have emerged, but also modern economy itself to a large extent has started to produce values exactly in the financial sphere (of financial services). Thus, the financial constituent of the crisis has harshly risen compared to the preceding decades, where the main growth occurred in the material sphere.

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3. Financial Speculation: Does it have a Positive Side?

Financial middlemen were cursed in all epochs. And there were always certain grounds to curse them. But they exist and the modern economic system cannot reproduce itself without them, as the modern market economy depends on financial middlemen in a rather significant way, as they transform households' savings into productive investments.6

The activities of modern financial corporations and funds (which lead to the uncontrolled growth of financial assets and anarchy in their movements) are quite justly criticized (this point will be discussed below).7 However, it would not be correct to maintain that modern financial technologies are fundamentally deleterious, that they only lead the world economy to various troubles, that they are only beneficial to the financiers and speculators. On the contrary, both the formation and the current development of the financial sector are connected with the performance of very important functions – and just at the global scale.

Thus, the modern financial globalization should not only be cursed; it also has some positive sides. Summing up the achievements of what is called ‘the financial revolution’8 we would provide our own version of the most important directions taken by the development of financial engineering (in addition to the computerization of this sphere of business). We shall also try to specify the positive influence produced by them. Those directions can be described as follows:

1. Powerful expansion of nomenclature of financial instruments and products, which leads to the expansion of possibilities to choose the most convenient financial instrument.

2. Standardization of financial instruments and products. This creates the possibility to calculate an abstract (that is, an aggregate, unified measure based on a standard package of shares and other stocks) base (and not just concrete prices of concrete securities). This secures a considerable economy of time for those who use financial instruments; it makes it possible to purchase financial securities without a detailed analysis of particular stocks; this leads to an increase in the number of participants by an order of magnitude.

3. Institutionalization of ways to minimize individual risks. In addition to the above mentioned expansion of nomenclature and assortment of financial products, it appears


especially important to mention: first, the development of special institutions – specialized clearing chambers – with their internal regulations (which makes it possible to avoid reliance on courts of law); second, the use of special rules and computer software, various technologies; and, third, new forms of risk hedging. All these changes help to minimize both the individual risks of unfulfilled deals and also of bankruptcies in the framework of certain stock markets.9

4. Increase in number of participants and centers for the trade of financial instruments. Modern financial instruments have made it possible to include a great number of people through various special programs, mediators, and structures.10 These changes result in the diffusion of technologies among the owners of capitals with various sizes (this is similar to the development of joint-stock companies that made it possible to accumulate enormous capitals). It is also possible to observe a significant increase in the number of financial centers and their specialization, as well as in the interconnectedness of national and world financial centers. It is also extremely important that we observe the growth of the number of emitters of various financial derivatives which earlier had lacked the access to global markets.

What is the significance of these changes in the financial sector on the global scale?

- Enormous new capitals, actors, markets are accumulated and engaged.
- Due to enormous growth in the volumes of operations, we observe the emergence of possibilities to extract profits from such operations, from which it was impossible to extract any profits earlier. Thus, a firm could earn just 3 cents from re-selling one share, but it may re-sell millions of such shares every day – and what is more, it may re-sell the same shares dozens of times within the same day.11 One may compare this with the industrial concentration of low-grade ores, whose processing was not profitable before the invention of respective technologies.

The growth of diversity of financial products, the development of specialization in the production of financial services, and the increase in nomenclature of those services make it possible to smooth the demand fluctuations and to increase the general volume of sales (in fact, the growth of nomenclature of products achieves the same results within any branch of economy).

- Financial currents and financial centers start to structure the world economy in a new way. The market economy is always structured along certain modes of communications. One may recollect how railway construction not only altered the transportation of commodities but also changed the whole organization of economic life. Within the modern information economy the financial currents start playing a role of such system-creating communications. In those zones where we observe the most important financial currents, we may also observe the most intensive economic life.

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9 However, the expansion of the operations' volume and their acceleration create a threat of global financial collapses.

10 The Foreign Exchange Market (FOREX) is the most famous among them.

Small financial streams (like, before, small streams of commodities along the railways) create a new economic network.

- The new structure makes it possible for the periphery to participate actively in the world economy. It is quite clear that the spontaneous movement of capital can lead to collapses and global crises; yet, the same was observed in the 19th century when the vigorous railroad construction (accompanied by unprecedented speculations) led first to enormous upswings, and, later, to collapses. Thus, the main task is to put the most dangerous and unpredictable actions under control.

### 4. Financial Currents as the World Pension Fund?

Our research has made it possible to detect such global functions of the world financial sector that do not seem to have been noticed by analysts. Those functions have developed in conditions of currency not guaranteed by gold and they are connected with the necessity to protect savings in conditions of inflation against losses and risks during long periods of time. They emerged as an unintended consequence of the radical transformations in the world financial system that began in the 1970s. At that time the world financial system finally rejected the gold monetary standard as a result of the double devaluation of dollar and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system. The price of gold was no longer tied to the dollar even nominally, it became free, whereas the currency exchange rate became floating.

However, as a result of the rejection of the golden standard the function of savings' protection moved finally from an “independent” guarantor (i.e., precious metals) to the state. However, there was no state left, on which the capital owners could rely entirely as they could on a perfectly secure guarantor. One should add to this, the growth of inflation that especially bothered the West in the 1970s and 1980s. One should note that it was during the 1960s and 1970s that the volume of “social capitals” in the direct sense (i.e., various pension, social, insurance funds, including the medical insurance funds) grew very significantly in direct connection with active social legislation, the growth of the quality of life, and some demographic processes (first of all, the coming to age of the numerous baby-boom generation). There were some other important sources for the growth of capitals in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to the above-mentioned ones. The general volume of capitals also grew due to the petrodollars, the increase in the emission of stocks, and borrowing (including the sovereign borrowing). In general, since that time one may observe the process of rapid growth of the volume of free capitals that should be invested somewhere.

With inflation the question of where to invest capitals and funds not guaranteed by gold or hard currency becomes extremely important. This is especially relevant for capitals accumulated by pension funds, as their designation is to be found dozens of

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12 Naturally, the value of gold and silver could fluctuate. One can easily recollect the so-called price revolution of the 16th century, as a result of which the prices grew four times. But there has never been a single case when gold or silver lost their value momentarily, or when their prices dropped close to zero (this eventually happens with prices of shares), whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (when many states applied the gold standard) the value of money was sometimes surprisingly stable for long periods of time (the same is true for prices of many key commodities), and this allowed many people to live from the interest rates of their savings. It made it possible to rely on savings in the form of gold/silver coins to guarantee one's survival in old age or for any emergencies. Incidentally, this was a very important basis for the development of thriftiness. Today prices of precious metals are as unstable as the ones of any other assets, and the magnitude of their fluctuations is great.
years later preserved and multiplied. Thus, it was necessary to find new ways to guarantee the preservation and multiplication of capitals.

The actual abandonment of the gold standard led to the transformation of not only the world monetary system, but also to the transformation of the financial economy and all financial technology. The sharp increase in the quantity of capitals, the necessity to preserve them from inflation and to find their profitable application objectively pushed the financial market actors to look for new forms of financial activities. As a result, one could observe the start of the process of rapid growth of the volumes of financial operations, the number of financial assets, objects, instruments, and products. Some new instruments were already available at that time, and it became possible to apply them rapidly on a wide scale. A factor that contributed greatly to all this was nothing else but the information-computer revolution that occurred simultaneously with the financial revolution and that gave it a solid material basis.

Thus, in contrast with precious metals (that retained their value even if they were not invested in anything) the modern capitals do not have such an anchor; that is why if capitals just lie still (as gold in treasuries), they risk to depreciate gradually into ‘dust’. What are the possible sources of their preservation and growth – and, hence, what are the possibilities of the fulfillment of respective financial obligations (as well as social obligations connected with them)?

The first point is a system of dynamic movements of capitals, continuous change of their forms, the engagement of new people, mediators, and services that allow them to be preserved and multiplied. The faster the movements and transformations of financial objects, the better the preservation of capitals.

The second point is the distribution of risks at the global scale. We observe the growth of opportunities to distribute risks among a larger number of participants and countries, to transform a relatively small number of initial financial objects into a very large number of financial products. This makes it possible to achieve the maximum diversification by letting people choose convenient forms of financial products and to change them whenever necessary. That is why derivative financial instruments become more and more derivative, they acquire more and more modified forms that become more and more distant from the initial money one.

The third point is the growth of specialization (including various forms of deposit insurance) that supports diversification and the possibilities for expansion.

The additional importance of the world finances’ functions – with respect to the preservation and multiplication of savings in pension, insurance, and social funds – is amplified every year by a very significant (and, in some sense, global) process of the

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14 One should take into account that pension funds, insurance companies etc. act as institutional investors and owners within many corporations that themselves invest in numerous stocks and projects; this way the finances of the world have been so mixed up that it is difficult to comprehend whom exactly these particular funds belong to, whether they are ‘good’, or ‘toxic’.
finalization of the second phase of demographic transition in Europe, the USA and Japan. It is well known that as a result of this process the natural population growth rates declined in those countries to values that are close or even below zero; depopulation began in a number of developed countries, a rather rapid population aging is observed, whereas the proportion of pensioners in total population tends to increase in a rather dramatic way. The forecasts suggest a further acceleration of this process. In 2010 one can observe 1 pensioner per 4 working-age adults, whereas in 2025, according to forecasts, there will be less than 3 working-age adult per pensioner in the developed countries\textsuperscript{15}, and there are even more pessimistic forecasts. Who will be filling the pension funds in the future, who will fulfill the social obligations with respect to hundreds of millions of elderly voters? Note meanwhile that, in addition to the overall growth of the number of pensioners, one can also observe simultaneously the increase in volume, complexity, and value of respective obligations (in particular, health care services).

Indeed, within such a context, against the background of the slow down of the economic growth in the West and the threatening growth of state debts in many developed countries, the guarantees of pension (and other social insurance) payments do not look perfectly secure.

Here one should take into account that most pension funds are concentrated not in the state pension funds, but in thousand of private (non-state) pension funds that are very active as regards the search for the most secure and profitable investments. The amounts of money concentrated in pension funds are enormous. At the world scale they are counted in dozens of trillion dollars. Note that we are dealing here not with some financial derivatives or bad debts, but, in general, with honestly earned money accumulated over the three to five decades that constitute a working life. Thus, according to some calculations, the volume of the American pension funds can be estimated for the moment of the start of the world financial crisis as about 10 trillion US dollars.\textsuperscript{16} The crisis led to tangible losses and even bankruptcies of many of those funds. How to make the preservation of those resources secure? It is easy to see, that security is a rather relative notion. The best shares can suddenly turn out to be insecure, the same goes with respect to the apparently best shares, real estate, and even state obligations. In 2008, the Russian State Pension Fund lost 10 billion roubles because of drop in rate of these obligations.\textsuperscript{17} It seems that within a single developed country it

\textsuperscript{15} See World after Crisis. Global Trends. 2025: Transformed World. The Report of the National Intelligence Council. – Moscow: Европа, 2009. – Р. 57–58. In Russian (Мир после кризиса. Глобальные тенденции – 2025: меняющийся мир. Доклад Национального разведывательного совета США. – М.: Европа, 2009. – С. 57–58). A dramatic change in the proportion of pensioners to working people could be seen from the following numbers: in 1950 in the USA the ratio was 1:16, in the middle of the 2000s it was already 1:3, so it has changed five times (see Meliantsev, V. A. Developed and Developing Countries in the Age of Transformations. – Moscow: Klyuch-S, 2009. In Russian [Мельянцев, В. А. Развитые и развивающиеся страны в эпоху перемен. – М.: Ключ-С, 2009]).

\textsuperscript{16} Shtefan, Ye. American Pension Capital Funds have Lost 2 Trillion Dollars // Novyi region 2.08.10. URL: http://www.nr2.ru/economy/199830.html. In Russian (Штефан, Е. Пенсионные фонды США потеряли два триллиона долларов // Новый регион 2.08.10. URL: http://www.nr2.ru/economy/199830.html).

becomes more and more difficult to achieve a sufficient level of the security of pension funds.

In the meantime in the developing countries we observe enormous numbers of young adults; and it is extremely difficult to provide all of them with jobs and education. It is impossible to solve this task without an active integration of the peripheral economies into the World System economy, without the diffusion of capitals and technologies from the World System core, whereas such an integration cannot be achieved without the development of the world financial system. In the meantime the number of pensioners in the developing countries is still relatively small, the social obligations with respect to them are relatively low, and only after a significant period of time the problem of the pensioners’ support will become acute in those countries.

Against this background, the world monetary resources have already begun to take part in solving this social problem (though, naturally, they are unable to solve it completely). It appears that the redistribution of capitals throughout the whole world and the distribution of risks through investments in the diverse assets of developing countries (through numerous mediators and specialized funds) actually creates for the borrowers/ recipients from the developing countries (i.e., those countries with a high proportion of young adults in their population) financial obligations that multiply the invested capitals within rather long periods of time. And those multiplied capitals will be potentially used for the payment of pensions and other social obligations in the creditor countries. The developing countries are very interested in attracting capitals that create jobs for the numerous cohorts of young adults. A considerable part of requested capitals come from pension, insurance, and social funds of the developed countries. In other words, to some extent the young adults of India, Indonesia, Brazil, will be working indirectly to support the elderly population of the core countries.

Thus, those countries that are rich in demographic resources, but that are poor in capitals are involved more and more in an extremely important (though not quite apparent at the surface) process through which they participate in the support of the elderly population cohorts living in the core countries through the vigorous unification of the world financial currents, its standardization, and increasing global mobility and anonymity.

In other words, global finances not only integrate capitals of the various regions of the world, they also contribute to the solution of an extremely important social problem (purely inner problem, which is, however, becoming more complicated to solve within the limits of individual countries) to support the numerous elderly population of the core countries. Within such a context one can foresee a situation when a failure of one country would be regarded as a common failure. Actually, this outruns (and prepares) political and legal globalization in some very important respects. Such interweaving of interests (as soon as it becomes evident) will make the actors move more actively toward the institutionalization of some financial and social relationships, toward a more rigorous control of financial currents, toward the full security of financial technologies.

In other words, the modern financial assets and currents have become global and international, huge funds are circulating within this system (though, of course, not all
its participants extract equal profits). Meanwhile, it is important to understand that a considerable percentage of the circulating sums are social (pension and insurance) money whose loss may lead to disasters with such consequences that are very difficult to forecast.

Thus, a more secure management of the world capital has (in addition to its evident economic and social dimensions) such a dimension as the security of the future of pensioners and those in need of social protection (there are certain respective insurance systems at national levels, but what could they mean in the situation of a global financial collapse?). Hence, the issue of the institutional support of the financial globalization becomes more and more important. However, one could wonder how many new crises are necessary in order that this problem would be solved?

5. Feeling of the Necessity of Changes

Today many specialists see that the main current problems of the world stock markets stem from the defects of their regulatory system, though many specialists (if not most of them, at least in the United States) still believe that the problems of stock and financial markets stem from defects and imperfections of the national (rather than supranational) regulation systems. One should admit that the United States has derived some conclusions from their crisis experience; in particular, the American actors have started discussing (and taking) measures aimed at tighter regulation. They have also begun cleaning bad and ‘toxic’ debts. All these are important developments, especially taking into account the special and enormous global influence of American financial institutions and instruments. A few quite reasonable opinions have been expressed recently with respect to the possible directions of the necessary regulation of financial activities. For example, Schäfer maintains the following:

Particularly risky financial products must be prohibited. At present, if one invents a new financial instrument, he can offer it to his clients the next day. For example, an inventor of a new derivative is not obliged to register it in any state agency; he can start selling it immediately. Free market proponents believe that financial markets will regulate everything themselves, that they will sort out and discard bad products by themselves. In reality this does not happen. Banks and funds threw ‘toxic waste’ amounting to trillions of dollars to the market, and meanwhile they diffused a belief that one can produce really valuable stocks from a large number of dubious assets, whereas nobody felt being responsible for all this. But if the market cannot take responsibility upon itself, it should be assumed by the state. Financial corporations must be obliged to register in advance all the financial products that they invent (similarly to what is observed with the production of medicines in the pharmaceutical industry). A state agency should anticipatorily check and test all the financial instruments before banks get their right to sell them. And if those instruments turn out to be too dangerous, the agency should prohibit them. State agencies controlling financial markets should subordinate rating agencies in such a way that a part of them would calculate ratings, whereas the other part would provide consulting services to banks. In the meantime, rating agencies and their clients should publish all the information that has been used to calculate the rating. In this case, any other rating agency will be

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able to check the ascribed rating and to publish an alternative calculation if it does not agree.20

Actually, the business of tax havens consists of the sucking of funds from industrially developed countries. The ‘havens’ attract them with their extremely low tax rates. They offer absolute secrecy to their depositors and exempt financial corporations from any checks. That is why the industrial countries should coerce ‘havens’ to abandon bank secrecy and make them inform foreign tax agencies of all the respective capitals and revenues. ‘Havens’ should raise their tax rates to an internationally acceptable level. They will not do this voluntarily. That is why, if necessary, they should be coerced to do this with economic sanctions.21

It is not difficult to see that this citation (with an important exception in the last section) is addressed to the national government. However, though the role of national regulation still remains very important, we observe now such a situation in the financial markets that a single state (in contrast with the previous period) cannot cope with it. Thus, as finances internationalize more and more (and as we have observed they play obviously a significant role, which can not be solved in the national scope), respective measures should be taken at the supranational level.

The necessity of the transition from the national level of regulation to the supranational one has been discussed by some analysts for quite a long time.22 Lester Thurow, as well as some other analysts, finds the cause of the instability of the world stock markets in the contradiction between the international character of operations of the world stock markets and the national nature of the stock markets themselves. However, he has very good grounds to note that, though the epoch of national economic regulation is coming to its end, the epoch of the global economic regulation has not started yet.23 Will radical changes in this direction take place in the near future?

The current global crisis has demonstrated, in an especially salient way, the necessity for major changes in the regulation of international economic activities and movements of world financial currents, the need for the growth of coordinated actions by governments and unified international legislation. Actually, the world needs a new system of financial-economic regulation at the global scale.

Comprehension of the causes of the crisis may provide a push to start a new round of global transformations, but the respective path (to effective transformations) appears rather long. However, even the transition to the very initial phase of a new system of supranational regulation will imply rather profound changes (whereas many transformations can hardly be predicted today). The point that the political landscape and the balance of world power will change in the forthcoming decades is felt more and more strongly. American analysts believe that ‘the international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will be almost unrecognizable by 2025…

20 Ibid. – P. 280.
The transformation is being fueled by a globalizing economy, marked by an historic shift of relative wealth and economic power from West to East.\textsuperscript{24}

**SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE POSSIBLE WAYS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT**

1. Change of Leadership or Fundamental System Change?

It is quite obvious today that we observe the weakening of the economic role of the USA as the World System center, in more general sense we observe the working of the World System core countries as a whole\textsuperscript{25}. That is why there is no doubt that sooner or later (and in any case in the foreseeable future) the USA status of the world leader will change and their role will go down. Many are worried by this in the USA. The current crisis is an important step in the direction of the weakening of the present leader. As we have already spelled out, the earlier priorities and the earlier bases of the world economic order that are advantageous for the USA will start sooner or later being transformed into a new order. In the foreseeable futures such a transformation will constitute collisions of relations between national interests of the USA, on the one hand, and the general world interests, on the other.\textsuperscript{26}

However, such a collision will lead to exceptionally major transformations, which, unfortunately, does not appear to be taken into account. There is a tendency to believe that the leading place of the USA will be occupied by the European Union, China, or some other country (starting with India and ending with Russia).\textsuperscript{27} But this is a serious mistake – to model the World System transformations mostly in perspective of the change of its leader. Actually, we are dealing today not just with a crisis in the World System, or even the crisis of the World System core; we are dealing with a crisis of the established model of its structure headed by its leader that concentrate *many aspects of leadership* (political, military, financial, monetary, economic, technological). The USA also acts as an avant-garde of the developed countries as whole. Thus, we deal with a rather complex leadership structure: the USA – leading European countries and Japan – newly industrialized countries of Asia – Pacific and medium developed European countries; a special position is occupied by the USA neighbors (Mexico etc.)

When we speak about the loss of the status of leader by the USA, we should not imply the change of the World System leader, we should rather imply a radical

\textsuperscript{24} World after Crisis…. – P. 12. In Russian (Мир после кризиса… – С. 12).
\textsuperscript{25} This is manifested in the slow-down of the economic growth rates in the World System core and their acceleration in the most part of the World System periphery, in the too rapid and anarchic deindustrialization, in the dependence on cheap imports and capital import, in the budget deficits, in the general growth of public and private debts, in the dynamics of some demographic indicators, etc. This resurrects the ideas of the *death of the West* (see, e.g., Buchanan, P. J. The Death of the West. – Moscow: AST, 2007. In Russian (Бьюкенен, П. Дж. Смерть Запада. – М.: ACT, 2007).
transformation of the overall structure of the world economic and political order. The simple change of the World System leader is rather unlikely already because of the point that **no country will be able to occupy a place similar to the one of the present USA, as no country will be able to concentrate so many leader functions.** And this is already because of this (though there are a number of other important factors) that the loss of the leader role by the USA will mean a radical transformation of the World System as a whole.

One should stress that the USA world leader position is unique in history. We also believe that the concentration in one center (in the USA) of the economic, financial, military, political, and innovation-scientific potential after the Second World War was a generally positive development (and the presence of the USSR as the alternative political and military center even amplified its positive value in some respects).

Let us recollect that the USA became the World System leader after the First World War. But even at that time the United States only concentrated the economic and financial power without the world political power that was not even sought after by the USA during that period of time. It should be emphasized that such a situation of the absence of a recognized World System leader contributed in a very significant way to a very severe economic and political World System upheavals in the period between the two world wars and the start of the Second World War. In the 1960s one could observe the decrease of the economic role of the USA that led to the formation of three-center model of the economic leadership: the USA – West Europe – Japan. However, it is important to note that this system was formed under the political and military (recognized and desired) leadership of the USA.

This structure turned out to be rather viable for almost four decades. It works even now; yet, if it turns out to be impossible to restore the growth rates of the Western economies, its role will weaken (whereas one can observe a general trend toward the decline of the economic growth rates in all the three centers). Unfortunately, today those centers are not able to give much to each other as they have rather similar problems. Their chance to strengthen themselves is connected with their unification of forces in order to preserve certain advantages of the developed countries (that are also useful for the World System as a whole), see below. in a way that is similar to the one through which the West strengthened against the background of the expansion of the Communist Block and the disintegration of colonial empires when it got united militarily, politically, ideologically (and partly economically) in the 1940s and 1950s.

It cannot be excluded, of course, that the emergence of new revolutionary technologies could give a certain new impulse to the economic development of the USA (as this happened in the late 1980s and 1990s), and the West as a whole; however, firstly, such technologies do not seem to be likely to be developed in the forthcoming decade, and in this period the problems in the American economy will be aggravated; secondly, in order that new technologies could produce major results a rather long time (of an order of 15–20 years) is necessary, whereas meanwhile many things are bound to change; thirdly, even the new technologies are not likely to help to preserve military and political leadership.

Thus, it is evident that a place similar to the one of the present-day USA cannot be occupied in future by any other state or state alliance, that **there is no country (or even**
an alliance of countries) that will be able to concentrate several aspects of the World System leadership.

This function is not likely to be performed by China. It has not enough potential yet even to become the World System economic leader. Those who suggest China as such a leader do not appear to take into consideration that its economy is not innovative, that it does not develop on the basis of technologies of tomorrow (and, to some extent, even of today). In addition, it is too much export-oriented. And in this respect it is not sufficiently autonomous. There are no entirely autonomous economies in the world now, but some of them are more self-sufficient than the Chinese one. What is more, its dynamics, might, and successes appear to be based on its ties with richer economies, they depend on their fluctuations to a considerable degree. We believe that the economic center of the World System cannot be based on the exporting of non-innovative (and even not sufficiently highly technological) products.

In order to perform the World System center role, the Chinese economy should become innovative and highly technological (which is hardly compatible with hard industry, or conveyor industries). However, China does not possess necessary conditions for this. One would need no less than 20–25 years to become an innovation pioneer. We believe that it is India that is more likely to become a technological leader, but India does not have many other leadership components that China has.

Even those analysts who have rather optimistic moods with respect to China's capability to sustain extremely high GDP growth rates for long time in future note that China confronts the threat of the growing technological gap with respect to the USA, the EU and Japan (Mikheev, V. V. China // The World Economy: The Forecast till 2020 / Ed. by A. A. Dynkin. – Moscow: Magistr, 2008. In Russian [Михеев, В. В. Китай // Мировая экономика: прогноз до 2020 года / Ред. А. А. Дынкин. – М.: Магистр, 2008]). With respect to its scientific potential, China will not be able to become a pioneer in the field of fundamental research and to secure a vigorous current of new breakthrough technologies (Ibid. – P. 319). Yet according to some information, China has already moved to the third place in the world (after the USA and Japan) with respect to the absolute size of its R&D expenses (Meliantsev, V. A. Developed and Developing Countries… – P. 123–124. In Russian [Мельянцев, В. А. Развитые и развивающиеся страны… – С. 123–124]).


Incidentally, the explanation of a relatively small slow-down of the economic growth rates in China, India, and some other countries during the crisis needs additional research; yet, it is already quite clear that one should take into account first, a certain developmental inertia; second, state efforts aimed at the stimulation of the internal demand and very considerable financial infusions. In addition, one cannot exclude that those countries will become victims of the next crisis.

In this respect, some suggestions seem noteworthy (World after Crisis… – P. 46. In Russian [Мир после кризиса… – С. 46]) which state that in a decade India will almost achieve the USA level of human and scientific capital (as measured by the model of National innovational system), while China will almost achieve the USA in terms of state receptivity to business innovations. Although it seems dubious but is nevertheless revealing in terms of different development vectors of these two great Asian states. Substantial differences in the export structure of China and India should also be noted. While in the former 90 % of export growth is supplied by growing goods exportation, in the latter 40 % of export growth accounts for the growth in service exportation, particularly in the informational sector (Meliantsev, V. A. Developed and Developing Countries… – P. 107. In Russian [Мельян- цев, В. А. Развитые и развивающиеся страны… – С. 107]). The USA would most probably preserve for a long time its role of the innovational leader of the World System, accounting for the fact that the USA currently produce 40 % of global expenses for research and development (Ibid. – P. 60).
That is why the idea that in 15–20 years many countries will be more attracted by ‘China’s alternative development model’ rather than by the Western models of political and economic development, provokes serious doubts. The Western models may be criticized, whereas it is quite natural that China’s successes could hardly avoid bringing attention. But it is very unlikely that any country (with a possible exception of North Korea) will try to introduce the Chinese model. The point is that this model simply cannot be introduced. In order to do this one would need a totalitarian communist party. Even the USSR was unable to copy the Chinese model.

The issue of the restructurization of the model of the Chinese economy is tightly connected with the ability of China to preserve the current high growth rates, whereas the latter is extremely important for the ideological prestige of the Chinese administration (though it includes a fraction that believes that it is necessary to slow down the growth rates in order to decrease the social stratification and tension).

The transition to such an economic model that is oriented at internal consumption and technological innovation is further complicated by the following points: a) the growth of internal consumption implies the acceleration of the growth of the level of life and Chinese labor costs (that are growing anyway); b) the growth of the labor costs is not likely to be compensated by an adequate increase in the productivity of labor; c) consequently, the costs of exported commodities may increase, their competitiveness may fall, while the attractiveness of investments in China will then decrease. This may cause a slowdown of growth rates. Thus, transition to a new type of economy in China with simultaneous preservation of its leadership in economic growth rates is hardly possible. Even though home demand will continue to develop, either it will be incapable of sufficiently replacing the export demand, or this will mean a profound structural rebuilding of economy. Investments into infrastructure, housing construction etc can be locomotives of development only if sufficient resources from export are present, but combining the two directions simultaneously does not seem probable. Growth rate decrease implies a state revenue decline accompanied by the aggravation of unemployment and by an increase in state social commitments.

Moreover, it can be assumed that after the crisis Chinese economy growth rates will sooner or later invariably decline (regardless of whether the attempt to re-orient the economy from an export model to the model of internal consumption will turn out successful or not). As a result, the same processes may be observed in the model as in Japan after 1975. However, growth rates slowdown in an authoritarian country where remarkable population ageing is to be observed soon will lead to aggravation of social conditions and changes in state priorities, which may ultimately weaken the economic potencies. The developing impulse force is still great in China, while inertia is still powerful, but this all will most probably weaken quite obviously. At the same time, the opinions on life standards of the majority (at least) of Chinese population will be

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32 World after Crisis… – P. 8. In Russian (Мир после кризиса… – С. 8).
33 Those capable have already introduced it, e.g., Vietnam.
34 Before the crisis there has already been forecasted some decrease in direct foreign investments into Chinese economy during the next 15 years (Mikheev, V. V. Op. cit. – P. 311. In Russian [Михеев, В. В. Указ. соч. – С. 311]).
35 Economy re-orienteeering turns out to be very complicated even for such developed countries as Japan. Let us remember that attempts made in Russia during several decades to re-orient the export have been unsuccessful so far.
increasing at an advance rate. This is positive while this inspires energy and new search motivations in some part of the population, but this is negative, while it increases ungrounded claims to the state and decreases the competitiveness of Chinese economy.

2. Hypothetical and Real Alternatives

Thus, the future World System will not be able to possess the same structure as currently with an equally strong center. What can be an alternative to the modern ‘order’ of the world? Here we step upon unsteady and ungrateful soil of forecasts.

Let us first review the future structure basing upon the following probable but still hypothetical suggestion. Objectively, globalization stipulates the appearance of some new forms of political and economic establishments of supranational type. The EU represents just one variant of such a type, other types and forms have just been outlined or are currently being being outlined. However, they may emerge rather fast at beneficial conditions. Largest states (the USA, China, India) may for quite a long time rival with such supranational establishments, but still future lies in front of latter, not the former.

According to this hypothesis, new World System leader (if one emerges altogether) will hardly be a separate state, but rather a (potentially increasing) block of states. Will this alliance be headed by some of the largest states of the modern world, or will it arise from a coalition of states of medium size and power? Or such a coalition will emerge on some other bases? Obviously, neither China, nor India can unite around themselves some relevant group of countries on their political (for India also civilizational) specific features. In order to become such an integrating center, China must change its political regime.36 For China changing its political regime will most probably imply a severe shock (presumably even disintegration), while the preservation of the regime requires relying on the own capacities.

A more organic integration of the American region under the aegis of the USA (some kind of a pan-America) could theoretically revive the role of the USA as the world centre. However, the disposition of political forces in Latin America is too unstable, and the level of development differs too much among the states. Brazil has already itself stepped into the first line of the largest countries. Besides, quite a number of regimes are much tempted to play on confronting the USA. A union with Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), though supplying more than 85 % of the whole export for Canada and Mexico, is incapable of fulfilling such a role which could solve the abovementioned task.

Among all variants of the emergence of such hypothetical leading union the European variant has the largest (though still not too great) probability. Even though European expansion comes across natural geographical limitations, the possibility of Turkey with its more than 70 million population entering the EU someday should not be excluded. This would turn the EU into a supra-Europe union (we should also account for the strengthening ties between the EU and non-European Mediterranean states). If Europe could integrate with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, this would give a certain

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36 It should be noted that China has got some projections on more active integration with neighbors. In particular, the idea of free trade area ‘China+ASEAN’ and a united integrative space in North-East Asia with participation of Japan, China, South Korea, and possibly Russian energetic resources. However, taking into account the tense relations between China and Japan this hardly seems real (for further details see Михеев, В. В. Указ. соч. – С. 319).
impulse to restructuring the World System relations and even form some strong centre. In terms of practice, this is a highly complicated, but not impossible variant.

All abovementioned variants are unlikely. Thus, the most real alternative to the role of the USA is currently … the USA itself. That is why during the nearest one or two decades the USA will remain the most real leader if, of course, the Americans do not undermine their positions themselves (through a sharp change in foreign policy, strong devaluation of dollar, a default, or an economic collapse). In the current absence of an obvious leader countering the USA, the world will be obliged to support the preservation of the USA as an center having no alternative, though growing decrepit, as any weakening in the USA position can lead to the World System transformation, to a great extent uncontrolled. A certain ‘imbalance cycle’ arises, where imbalances support each other. On the one hand, this plays into the hands of the USA, but on the other hand, the absence of strong competition for leadership greatly weakens the capacities of the USA to renewal. There exists an opinion that, though the demand for the USA leadership remains high, the interest and readiness of the USA to play the leading role may decrease, as American voters will reconsider their attitude towards economic, military and other expenses of American leadership. To put it more exactly, fluctuations in foreign policy are more possible, along with variations of the struggle between isolationism and hegemony, as a result of which foreign political activity of the USA may decline for some time. However, state transition from the policy of sheer hegemony and external expansion to passive foreign policy has taken place a number of times in the course of history, in particular, in Japan, Germany, and in most recent times in Russia.

In uncertain conditions the number of probable scenarios can be great. Thus, the document prepared by the National Intelligence Council of the USA Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World considers four hypothetical scenarios: ‘A World Without the West’ when new forces press the West out of its leading positions in the geopolitics; ‘October Surprise’ – an ecological catastrophe; ‘BRICs’ Bust-Up’ – a conflict between India and China over the access to vitally important resources; ‘Politics is Not Always Local’ – when various non-state structures unite in order to develop an international program for the environmental protection and to elect a new Secretary General of the United Nations. All of them, though based on certain trends of the modernity, do not seem sufficiently real, which is admitted by the authors themselves.

Given the wide range of the variants of future, it is remarkably difficult to consider all variations. That is why it is better to select certain main parameters for the analysis of the hypotheses. Let us take such an important in our opinion parameter of future development as the degree of suddenness and sharpness of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Obviously, if the process proceeds gradually, it is accustomed to, it is put under influence, and the system somehow has time to transform. If the changes occur suddenly, for some time there arises a vacuum of the system and order, chaos, hasty construction of temporary and thus not always successful constructions.

37 World after Crisis… – P. 42. In Russian (Мир после кризиса… – С. 42).
38 Ibid. – P. 171.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. – P. 29.
Let us view two such hypothetical variants: one of gradual change and one of sharp change.\footnote{Though the process will most probably be uneven: slow uncontrolled changes will be succeeded by large but not fatal collapses and crises, inspiring the transformation process and even changing its directions.}

In the first one, the USA power would decrease not sharply, but gradually. In this case the USA, trying to preserve its leading position, would possibly be obliged to maneuver, enter some coalitions, give in sometimes in certain questions, and accept some global ideas in order not to lose leadership and to preserve the acceptable geopolitical balance. On the other hand, the USA would aspire to create something in a global scale, try to institutionalize the situation, seeking to strengthen the position of \textit{primum inter pares} in some commonly accepted international and interstate agreements and interaction systems (organizations, consultations, \textit{etc.}) at the same time no insisting on absolute or even evident hegemony which is present nowadays. Naturally, this would require great skill. This process would be more successful if the USA could, according to Brzezinski's recommendation, unite with Europe and Japan in important directions.\footnote{Brzezinski, Z. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. – Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otношения, 2005. In Russian (Бжезинский, З. Выбор. Мировое господство или Глобальное лидерство. – М.: Международные отношения, 2005).}

In our opinion, such uniting should take place in the maximum number of problems. Given the low growth rates in developed countries, the West is objectively interested in creating such an order which would institutionally formalize some of its advantages (to some extent this would be useful for the whole World System).\footnote{An example of such securing is the definition of the five leading states having the veto right in the UN Security Council. The disposition of powers in the world is changing, while this order is not easy to alter.} It is questionable whether this necessity could be realized in time, but the success of such an institutionalization greatly depends on whether this realization occurs sooner or later.\footnote{One of the possible outcomes for the West implies the quoting the economy growth rates in order to restrain the all too fast periphery development (on the possibility of such quoting see Grinin, L. E. State and Historical Process... In Russian (Гринин, Л. Е. Государство и исторический процесс...). If the limitations cannot be achieved through direct quotes on economic growth, they can still be pursued under the mask of struggling for the global ecology, for the rights of wage earners, against dishonest rivalry \textit{etc.}}

This would be, so to say, a scenario of 'planned rebuilding'.

The second variant occurs in case when the USA changes the position dramatically, that is as a result of sudden dollar collapse and especially as a consequence of the America's default (say, at sudden change in the global economy resulting from a crisis sharper that one of autumn 2008).

In this case the US public opinion may sway to folding up the global functions of the USA, which will additionally aggravate the vacuum of international governance. In this situation, the possibilities include anarchy (a less likely scenario) or hasty gathering (or ‘knocking together’) of some system capable of supporting the collapsing world order and solving the momentary tasks, offering certain palliative solutions and agreements which on the whole can turn out to be perspective further on.

However, among all hypothetical variants the two alternative ones seem most probable to me. The first one, which is naturally more preferable, is the expansion of the ‘club’ of leading global players up to a number which would allow them to somehow influence the course of world development (which will be considered further on). The second variant implies spontaneous uncontrolled development where main
players will be mostly concerned with domestic problems, the politicians will mind only the popularity ratings, while the global problems will be solved in passing. The Japanese society is a good example of such self-isolation (though even there some certain trends to integration can be observed, the EU also all too frequently reveals reticence with their own interests. For Western countries there exists a danger to become hostages to democratic system, when the position of politicians would not allow them to think about future, and this ultimately turns them into demagogues and state-mongers. Besides, incidents of protectionism and other anti-globalization measures are in no way excluded. In this case only unexpected shakes, such as the modern crisis, can wake the Western politicians and societies up. Surges of national, civilizational, and hegemonic pride are also useful.

3. Will the Deficit of Global Governance and World Fragmentation Increase?

We have already mentioned in our previous works that economic and financial globalization greatly advance the development of international law and political globalization. Will the political component of the World System lag behind the economic one even more in the decades to come? The answer to a great extent depends on what the economic development will be in the nearest future. Numerous economists and social scientists, presenting various arguments (sometimes basing on the dynamics of the famous Kondratieff cycles), suppose that in the next 15–20 years world economic development will most probably proceed at a slower rate than in the preceding period. We support this point of view. However, if this forecast comes true, will the political component of the World System not be able to catch up somewhat? Besides, the weakening of the US leadership and the absence of an alternative (in any case leader change is a lengthy and complicated process) must obviously lead to the international system transforming faster and in a more substantial way. Consequently, we are entering a period of searching for new structural and systemic solutions within the World System, which means a considerably complicated period awaiting us in the nearest future. Working out and stabilizing the model of a new political order within the World System will be a complicated, lengthy, and rather contentious process.

Somehow or other, global governance deficit is present, and in the next decades it obviously will not disappear. Supposedly, it will become more ideologically sensible, while the project of eliminating this deficit will become relatively feasible. However, global governance requires great effort and substantial sacrifices. To what extent will the states and non-state subjects wish or be able to endure the growing burden of global governance? A refusal to divide this burden will aggravate the situation


46 See Grinin, L. E., Korotayev, A. V. Global Crisis in Retrospective... In Russian (Гринин, Л. Е., Коротаев, А. В. Глобальный кризис в ретроспективе...).
of increasing institutional lack. Seemingly, countries ready to take some burden of international regulation by themselves will be few, in the same way as nowadays only a few states take obligations to make large contributions to international organizations including the UN. That is why for some time many countries will still be interested in the USA leadership even though, as it has been mentioned above, the USA itself in certain conditions may be not interested or incapable of continuing to be a leader. Certain large states rivaling the USA leadership will be most probably incapable of global governance as well.

Such situation may reveal the most important spheres the regulation of which will be profitable, as well as certain important fields where it will be compulsory to participate according to international obligations. This should strengthen the trend to various collective activities, formation of associations, and developing different types of cooperation. This will also transform the global governance towards new technologies.

American analysts suppose that a) in the nearest future politicians and the public will have to cope with the growing demand for multilateral cooperation; b) current trends are leading to the emergence in 15–20 years of a fragmented and contradictory world; c) multipolarity and lack of structure are the main features of the future system.

As regards the demand for multilateral cooperation, which is already high nowadays, it will continue to grow. It seems, however, that the growth of this demand a) gives an opportunity for certain regional states and unions to strengthen their positions; b) will contribute to faster emergence of various formats of multilateral cooperation. It should be noted that the new international order would best emerge with the formation of a sufficient number of supranational unions, coalitions, coordination centers, multilateral agreements and influential NGOs and net systems varying in type and scale, on the one hand, and with presence of de-jure (or at least de-facto) accepted institutionalized leading center of the World System.

Multipolarity (though this term is interpreted differently) became a geopolitical motto for some states and it seems to be forming. New centers of power (first of all, economic, but also military and political) are being established, causing new configurations within the World System. However, in any case multipolarity in the context of peaceful coexistence implies the presence of some order, so multipolarity and the lack of structures are opposites to each other.

Fragmentation increase would imply the World System disintegration (at least temporary). As regards the probability, we consider this to be unlikely due to some realities of a certain quasi-unity being customary for us. Even the crisis did not lead to disintegration, but united the world to some extent. Certain global conscience seems to be being formed.

Let us bring just one example of unexpected metamorphoses of in modern economic psychology. During the period of a particularly low fall of production indexes in 2008–

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2009 many economists were circulating the idea that the Chinese economy would pull the whole world out, and so thing are not too disastrous.

4. The Epoch of New Coalitions and Sovereignty Transformation

We have already written on the transformation process in the content of national sovereignty, i.e. on the decrease of the real volume of state sovereign powers, which is to a great extent voluntary. The necessity to pull up the political component of the World System and to strengthen the global regulation of financial and other agents contributes to the sovereignty transformation process, as the states must voluntarily limit themselves in some spheres, and sometimes undertake additional functions. The global crisis has revealed the sovereignty limitations more clearly, showing that even the USA cannot act without real support of other countries. ‘By 2025 a single “international community” composed of nation-states will no longer exist. Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken’. Indeed, the real composition of ‘international community’ will most likely be more complicated in the next decades due to the addition of some supranational unions, official or unofficial councils of leaders of states and unions, temporary or constant coalitions, and, possibly, NGOs.

However, sovereignty transformation within the new world order creation is not a unidirectional and unilinear process. Firstly, national state will for a long time remain the leading player in the world arena, as in the foreseeable future only the state will be capable of solving a number of questions. Secondly, sovereignty may even increase in some aspects, as the modern crisis shows once more that the fate of national economies to a great extent depends on the state strength. Thus, it is quite probable that the nearest future may reveal a certain ‘renaissance’ of the state role and activity in the world arena. In some countries sovereign powers may possibly be returned that had previously been (sometimes thoughtlessly) given away to supranational organizations, unions, and global capital. In long-term trends such ebbs and fluctuations are not only possible but unavoidable. Thus, the seemingly steady movement towards democracy in the first half of the twentieth century suddenly made a swerve towards totalitarianism; the development of free market trade in late nineteenth century was turned to protectionism. Thus, a return to etatism can be both rather lengthy and rather useful.

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that such a return to the increasing role of state cannot be performed on the former bases, when the benefits of a state (even within the fulfillment of undertaken obligations and the observation of common international norms) were accepted in international relations as the highest cause of its activity on the world arena. We suppose that the return of the state role cannot be successful without a substantial change in the state foreign policy ideology. In other words, we can suggest that purely egoistic interests of states will to a much lesser extent underlie the foreign policy

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50 World after Crisis... – P. 8. In Russian (Мир после кризиса... – С. 8).
concept and performance.\textsuperscript{51} Naturally, national egoism will not disappear altogether for a long time (if ever at all), but it will be more disguised by supranational interests and necessities than it is now. To put it more exactly, every action may require not only a real interest, but also an ideological grounding. Viewing the global arena as a ‘great chess board’ (Brzezinski) where the strongest one wins, while small pieces may be exchanged or sacrificed will possibly not be in demand any more. The world arena will rather be viewed as a common field of interests where rules advantageous for everybody must be stated and somehow supported. That is why it is sensed that gradually the mottos of common (regional, global, group) good will increase in foreign policy, though the ‘who-represents-the-global-interests-better’ formula may, as always, disguise egoistic causes.\textsuperscript{52} However, this will lead to substantial changes, generally positive. In any case, the countries continuing to roughly stand up for their national egoistic interests will eventually lose, sooner or later. Radical changes will be unavoidable in the policy of large states aimed at direct and rough domineering in global or regional scale (including the most independent and egoistic sovereign, the USA).

In this case national interests assertion, rivalry forms on the world arena, conflicts and litigations will acquire a different form from now. Rivalry will increase on directing the process of new world order formation. Rival forces will perform under mottos of a new, more honest world arrangement, for just and crisis-free global development, against national (especially American) egoism, etc. In executing such a politics, allies and blocks are obviously necessary. This, regrouping of forces on the world and regional arenas will invariably start. In the struggle for an honorary place in globalization and coalitions, in organization and functioning of a new world order the phenomenon occurs which we named the epoch of new coalitions.\textsuperscript{53} As a result, new force disposition may be outlined for quite a lengthy period.

Forms, particular aims and activity directions of the new coalitions will depend on numerous factors, in particular, on how far the process of making common decisions will go and what means and forms of common decision-making will be realized. Thus, it seems that the system of simple democracy (one state/participant – one vote) on the World System level will hardly be viable.\textsuperscript{54} China and India cannot be equaled to Lesotho or Tuvalu with 12 000 population.

Probably, for some time the mobility of partnerships within the World System will increase, the coalitions arising may turn out to be chimerical, ephemeral, or fantastic.

\textsuperscript{51} One of the numerous examples of such egoistic approach is the position of the USA on the question of greenhouse gas emission into the atmosphere.

\textsuperscript{52} For sure, in modern history different actions have been and are still carried out under the aegis of common interests, in particular, intervention into dependent countries (both on the part of the USSR and the USA), pressure upon certain countries under the mottos of defending the human rights, democracy, etc. It appears that ideological aspect will presumably substantially increase.


\textsuperscript{54} The EU experience shows that this substantially restrains the development process, while such rules in the global representations will simply block it up.
In the course of search for most stable, advantageous, and adequate organizational supranational forms various rapidly changing intermediary forms may occur, where the players of the world and regional political arenas will be searching for most advantageous and convenient blocks and agreements. For example, if population number and other parameters\(^55\) will be taken into account at decision-making (and quota distribution), countries and participants may block with each other basing on the relative advantages of everyone in order to accept a decision advantageous to them (similar to political parties). However, some of the new unions and associations may eventually turn from temporary into constant ones and accept specific supranational forms.

Some new imperatives of global law will start being worked out in the same process. This idea is quite supported by the events connected with the modern global crisis, in particular the G-20 meetings. Direction towards such supranational regulation forms is obvious, though it is unclear whether namely G-20 will become a constant organ, as 20 is possibly too great a number. However, as it has been stated above, some other variant of leading players' club expansion is possible. Bringing the number of ‘G club’ members up to at least 11, \(i.e.\) 7 plus BRIC countries could already make this organ more influential than it is today. However, presidential meetings once a year or even more seldom, and even ministerial meetings do not suffice. Such meetings bear more of a ritual than practical character. In order to make such an organ not just influential, but a real global one, at least de-facto, it is necessary to arrange the formats of negotiations, consultations, private agreements \(etc.\) on various levels and in different combinations.

The stability of new geopolitical and geoeconomic forms will depend on numerous factors. However, historical experience shows most stable ones to be those with not only particular advantages and objective necessity, but also with certain non-political bases for uniting \((i.e.\) geographical, cultural, economic, ideological, \(etc.\)).

Naturally, the movement towards the new world order will proceed on different levels. The regional level is very important. Regional leaders gather power very fast, consequently, their role will most possibly increase. Besides, some regional states will start playing the key role in the whole geopolitical disposition in huge territories. Nowadays, according to some opinions, Iran is starting to play such a key role. The eminent role of regional states will be revealed not only in geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects, but also, so to say, in geocultural aspect, which would be in no way less important than the first two. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, responding to the probable deficit of global governance, non-governmental actors will form networks concentrated on particular problems.\(^56\) However, the role of neither NGOs nor networks should be exaggerated. The main part in the formation of a new world order will most probably be played by states, while supranational unions of all formats and forms will be gathering strength.

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\(^55\) There exists an index of national power measurement which integrates GDP measurements, defense expenses, population and the state of technology. Some indexes may serve as a basis for institution at the counting of quotes and votes.

\(^56\) One could mention as examples of such networks the Financial Stability Forum, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, and the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (World after Crisis… – P. 161. In Russian \([Мир после кризиса… – С. 161]\)).
A coordination center is desperately necessary, without which the net world will become an uncontrolled conglomerate. Besides, there is a prevailing stereotype on the necessity of some global institutions, so they will be aspired to, more or less successfully. Thus, the question of the coordination-political center of the World System remains exceedingly important. If some collective political (coordination) center (with limited rights) could be created, the coexistence of other functional centers could become more possible and systemic, interactive. Namely states and especially supranational unions are most likely to be capable of moving towards the creation of such a center.

Thus, the future epoch will be an epoch of not only new coalitions, but also one of new global institutions, and new international technologies of multilateral (diplomatic, social, cultural) cooperation, on which much will depend. For example, the format of international congresses and multilateral agreements that originated after the Napoleonic Wars and reached its apogee in the 20th century is likely to be pressed by other formats which most probably will be based on modern communication technologies. Thus, some standing commission that works not at a bargaining table, but through the video conference format could become a convenient and rather cheap organ which could work permanently on solving certain problems. As Charles de Gaulle said, politics is too serious a matter to entrust politicians with it.57 The same may be said about the diplomacy in the globalizing world.

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GLOBALIZATION IN THE WEST AND EAST

CENTRAL EUROPE FROM A LINGUISTIC VIEWPOINT
Tomasz Kamusella

1. The Multilingualism of Central Europe

There are many definitions of Central Europe. For the sake of this article it is the middle one-third of the continent or the zone bordered by Italy and the German-speaking polities of Germany and Austria in the West and the multilingual Russian Federation in the East.

The general linguistic shape of Central Europe as we know it today coalesced between the arrival of the Hungarians (or rather a coalition of Finno-Ugric and Turkic ethnic groups) in the Danube basin in the tenth and fourteenth century founding of the Romance-speaking principalities of Walachia and Moldavia (that is, the predecessors of modern-day Romania and Moldova). In the middle of the region the East Romance languages of Moldovan and Romanian alongside with the Finno-Ugric one of Hungarian are spoken from the Black Sea to Austria, which is the part of the German-speaking zone. This multilingual belt separates the North and South Slavic dialect continua (that is, geographically continuous zones within which a language changes gradually from a locality to a locality; the cleavage of mutual incomprehensibility occurs where two continua meet). At present the former is identified with Polish, Czech, Slovak, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian, while the latter with Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Bulgarian.

At Central Europe's southern end terminating in the Mediterranean and the Bosphorus the Indo-European isolates (mutually incomprehensible languages, with no cognates) of Albanian and Greek brush side with Turkish which is part of the Turkic dialect continuum extending to Kazakhstan, Central Asia and eastern China. In the North the sole surviving Baltic languages of Lithuanian and Latvian are squeezed between the North Slavic dialect continuum and the Finno-Ugric language of Estonian.

2. Religion, Language and Identity

Well until the modern times people in Central Europe chose to express their identity through religion rather than a language. All the three monotheistic faiths come complete with their Holy Writs and respective traditions of literacy, most visibly expressed by various scripts (alphabets) employed to write in the ‘holy languages.’ Accordingly, Jews write in Hebrew characters of the Hebrew-language original of the Pentateuch and Muslims – in Arabic letters of the Arabic-language original of the Koran. In the case of Christians, these who pay allegiance to the pope in Rome (Catholics) write in Latin (Roman) letters of the Vulgate, or the official Latin translation of the Bible. Those who adopted Christianity from Byzantium, and at present consider the ecumenical patriarch

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in Constantinople (Istanbul) the highest authority in the Orthodox Church, were allowed a greater degree of multilingualism. Greeks (and earlier also Orthodox Slavs, Albanians and Turks under Constantinople's direct ecclesiastical control) write in Greek letters of the ancient Greek-language original of the New Testament. In the mid-ninth century the Slavs of Greater Moravia (today's Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) adopted Christianity from Byzantium but in the Slavic language of Salonika written in a specific script, Glagolitic. In the following century Cyrillic (developed in the Bulgarian Empire) replaced Glagolitic and the language, known as Church Slavonic, remains the language of liturgy among Orthodox Slavs (mainly in the eastern Balkans, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) to this day.

Regarding the issue of literacy, faith and identity in the context of Central Europe, it is necessary to mention Armenia and Georgia, which were the first two states to adopt Christianity as their state religion in the early fourth century. This event was coupled with the devising of the specific Armenian and Georgian scripts with the use of which the Bible was translated into Armenian and Georgian. With time the Georgian Church became part of the Orthodox Church, while the Armenian (Apostolic) Church retained its singular (monophisitic) character and organization. Christianity and the respective traditions of literacy, complete with their specific scripts, let the Armenians and the Georgians survive as separate ethnic groups when their lands were overrun by Byzantium, the Muslim Arabs, Zoroastrian and, later, Islamic Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia.

In the Catholic areas of Central Europe, due to the rise of distinctive and durable polities and reaffirmation of the secular power in them, people began to write in the new administrative languages of German (the twelfth – the thirteenth centuries), Czech (the fourteenth – fifteenth centuries), Polish (the fifteenth – the sixteenth centuries), and Croatian (the sixteenth – the seventeenth centuries), obviously, with the use of the Latin script. The only exception was northwestern Croatia's Adriatic littoral where the Catholic Glagolitic-based tradition of Church Slavonic liturgy survived until the mid-twentieth century. In the Orthodox zone of the region, Romanian began to be used for official purposes in the sixteenth century, and was written in Cyrillic until the mid-nineteenth century. The Cyrillic-based Slavic idiom of Ruthenian (seen as the common predecessor of Belarusian and Ukrainian) was the official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (coterminal with present day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine) until the end of the seventeenth century. In the Ottoman Empire Ottoman (Old Turkish) and Persian were employed for administration and literary endeavors, respectively, and predictably both were jotted down in Arabic characters. In the fifteenth century the need arose among Bosnia's Slavophone Muslims to write in Slavic, which was done in the Arabic script. Slavic publications in Arabic characters written and published there until the early 1940s are perceived as the beginning of the Bosnian language. Likewise, Muslim Tatars who settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fourteenth century followed the same practice to write in Ruthenian and Polish. In a similar fashion, ethnic Greeks and Albanians professing Islam wrote down their idioms in the Arabic script, too; and when beginning in the fifteenth century Jews developed their written tradition in the Germanic language of Yiddish and the Romance idiom of Spanyol (Ladino), they wrote both in Hebrew characters.

In the Catholic segment of Central Europe the development of new written languages in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries is connected to the Reformation, which appealed for translating the Bible into the ethnic languages of the faithful. Later,
the Catholic Church also adopted this approach in an effort to reform itself and reverse the spread of Protestantism. Hence, Protestant and Catholic translators made Hungarian into an official language in the Ottoman fief of Transylvania; ushered into being Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovenian; revived Czech and Croatian; and inspired Slovak. This last language was actually formed in the first half of the nineteenth century, mainly under the influence of the novel force of nationalism.

The splitting of the north and centre of Central Europe between Catholicism and Protestantism (mainly Lutheranism) was also reflected in scriptural practices. Catholics employed the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet, while Protestants – the Gothic type (Black Letter, or Fraktur). It was not an absolute norm, as Catholic German-speakers and Czech-speakers employed Gothic, while Calvinist Hungarian- and Polish-speakers Antiqua. In the nationalist nineteenth century the use of Gothic was gradually limited to the German language, though some Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian books were published in Gothic until the interwar period.

Another effect of the Counter-Reformation was an attempt to bring the Orthodox population of the Catholic polities of Poland-Lithuania and historical Hungary (coterminous with today's Hungary, Slovakia, southwestern Ukraine, northwestern Romania, northern Serbia and northwestern Croatia) into a union with the Catholic Church. As a result Uniate (Greek Catholic) Churches were founded. In the case of Transylvania's Uniate and Orthodox Romanians this change facilitated the adoption of Romanian as their language of liturgy, increasingly written in Latin characters.

3. Modernity, Language and Nationalism

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Napoleonic armies brought the idea of nationalism to Central Europe. German and Italian nationalists worked out the specifically Central European form of nationalism aptly qualified with the adjective 'ethnolinguistic'. This ethnolinguistic national ideology entails that all the speakers of various dialects construed as a single language form a nation. In turn the contiguous area inhabited by the members of such a linguistically defined nation should be organized into their nation-state. The success of the Kingdom of Italy (1861) and the German Empire (1871) built in this way from a multitude of polities encouraged the rise of various ethnolinguistic national movements across Central Europe. These movements endangered the existence of the multiethnic empires of Russia, Austria and the Ottomans among which the region was divided then.

In the Austrian Empire German replaced Latin as the official language at the close of the eighteenth century, but an outcry against this imposition in the Hungarian half of the monarchy led to the reinstating of Latin in the Kingdom of Hungary where it remained the official language until the mid-nineteenth century. The 1867 overhauling of the Austrian Empire into Austria-Hungary made Hungarian into the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary. In the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy German remained the most important language, but in the non-German-speaking crownlands (administrative regions) and communes Croatian (Serbo-Croatian), Czech, Polish, Slovenian, and Cyrillic-based Little Ruthenian (Ukrainian) (pressure exerted in the 1850s for coaxing Ukrainians to write and print in Latin characters eventually failed) were introduced as official, co-official and auxiliary languages. In the Hungarian half of the empire only Croatian was recognized as official in the kingdom's Croatian lands, though Serbian (Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian), Slovak, Romanian, and Cyrillic-based Rusyn were grudgingly accept-
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ed as media of education and pastoral service. In Bosnia, occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1877, apart from German variously named Slavic (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian) was employed in administration and print, in Latin characters for Catholics (identified as Croats), in Cyrillic for Orthodox (identified as Serbs) and in Arabic characters for Muslims (identified as Bosnians).

In the western provinces of the Russian Empire German and Polish were used as official languages. The former on the territory of present-day Estonia and Latvia, and the latter in what today is Lithuania, Belarus and central Ukraine. The formation of the Russian language began with Peter the Great's early eighteenth-century decree to use modernized Cyrillic (Grazhdanka, or civil script modeled on the Latin script, or its most popular form today, Antiqua) for the production of non-ecclesiastical books in Church Slavonic. In the second half of the eighteenth century Russian written in Grazhdanka was standardized on the basis of Church Slavonic and the dialect of Moscow. The use of Russian for literary pursuits and administration spread in the first half of the 19th century. In this century's other half Russian replaced German and Polish as the sole official language in the western provinces. A ban was placed on White Russian (Belarusian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian) because they were construed as 'unworthy peasant' dialects of the (Great) Russian language. The fledgling use of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Cyrillic-based Moldavian (Moldovan) in elementary schools was abolished until 1905. Then German and Polish were reintroduced as languages of instruction, as well.

In the Ottoman Empire the population was divided into non-territorial confessionally defined millets. Thus, Orthodox Greek-, Slavic-, Turkic- and Albanian-speakers belonged to the Orthodox millet and their Muslim counterparts to the Muslim millet. The administrative language of the latter millet was identical with the empire's official language, Ottoman written in the Arabic script. In the Orthodox millet archaizing Byzantine Greek dominated though some use of Church Slavonic was reluctantly accepted in low-key liturgy and elementary schools in some Slavophone areas. In the eighteenth century the sultan replaced local Romanian rulers in Walachia and Moldavia (southern and eastern Romania) with more loyal Greek administrators from Constantinople, which led to the replacement of Cyrillic-based Romanian with Byzantine Greek as the official language there. The Ottomans reversed this arrangement in the 1820s when the Greek War of Independence led to the founding of independent Greece (1832), where Byzantine Greek replaced Ottoman as the sole official language.

The period from the 1810s to the 1910s was marked by the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans due to the rise of autonomous and then independent (predominantly) Christian nation-states, encouraged by the West and Russia. Bulgarian, Montenegrin and Serbian national leaders wrote in Cyrillic-based Church Slavonic and marked the ethnic difference vis-à-vis one another referring to the tradition of medieval polities and Orthodox patriarchates pegged on them. These patriarchates continued to exist after the incorporation of the polities into the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century. The first Balkan nation-state founded purely on the basis of language was Albania (1913), or the polity for Albanian-speaking Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics.

In the 1880s the movement for the replacement of Byzantine Greek (Katharévousa, or 'purifying language') with modern-day Greek (Demotic) unfolded in Greece. Between 1917 and 1974 once Demotic and on another time Katharévousa was announced as the official language, before the former won the contest permanently. The two varie-
ties of Greek did not diverge into two different languages because the linguistic difference was not translated into an ethnic cleavage but political one. Greek conservatives side with Katharévousa and liberals with Demotic. On the other hand, liturgy in Greek Orthodox churches continues to be said in the ancient Greek of the New Testament.

Likewise, to this day Church Slavonic is preserved as the language of liturgy in Slavic Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. Modern Cyrillic and vernacular-based Slavic languages were earmarked for temporal matters. This new trend spread from Russia to the Balkans, where the tsar reaffirmed his international role as the protector of Christians. The codification of Bulgarian followed the Russian model of mixing elements of Church Slavonic and the dialect of Sofia. Serbian as employed in Serbia and Montenegro also developed in this direction (obviously, with the use of different dialects), but in the second half of the nineteenth century the idea of creating a common Serbo-Croatian language for the Slavic-speakers in the western half of the Balkans won the day. However, Catholics were to write this language in the Latin script and Orthodox Christians in Cyrillic. The Albanians were undecided whether to write their own language in Greek, Latin, Cyrillic, Arabic characters or a mixture of those before they settled for the Latin alphabet in 1911.

The significance of ethnic languages written in their specific scripts for individual (usually national) identification rose with the spread of popular literacy. Although full literacy was achieved among Central Europe's German-speakers and Czechs by the 1870s, elsewhere in the region the process was completed only after the founding of the communist regimes in the wake of World War II. Earlier, literacy was a privilege of the narrow elite (often only its male half), meaning nobility (later intelligentsia and middle class), ‘professional Ottomans’ (Muslim administrators) in the Ottoman Empire, and clergy. In the Catholic zone of Central Europe the elite employed Latin, the knowledge of which spread eastward among the Orthodox due to the rise of the Greek Catholic Churches. The eighteenth-century disavowal of Church Slavonic was accompanied with the elevation of Latin and German as the languages of learning and progress in Russia. Besides, beginning from the eighteenth century French emerged as the language of cultured discourse across entire Europe. It remained the main sociolect of Central Europe's and Russia's aristocracy and richer nobility until their destruction as a cohesive group by the Bolshevik Revolution, and then during and after World War II. The modernization of the Ottoman Empire, which commenced in the 1840s also made French into the language of choice among the elite there.

4. Linguistic Nation-States

Interwar Period

The Western Allies beseeched by delegations of various national movements agreed to create ethnolinguistic nation-states in this region, that is, polities for nations speaking their specific languages, not shared by any other nations or polities, namely: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary (or one-third of the former Kingdom of Hungary), and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (since 1929 Yugoslavia). The only non-national polity of interwar Central Europe was the Free City of Danzig, predominantly inhabited by Germans. Short-lived independent Belarus and Ukraine were divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. However, the administrative division of the latter polity was based on ethnonational union republics with their specific languages as official ones. Thus, Ukrainian was the official language of Soviet Ukraine. Soviet Belarus was
exceptional in the fact that apart from Belarusian and Russian also non-Cyrillic-based Yiddish and Polish were used there as co-official languages until 1938.

The Soviet authorities consciously used language as an instrument of politics and social engineering. For instance, in order to prevent the rise of a Turkicphone Muslim nation that, extending from the middle Volga to the Crimea and the Caucasus, and from what today is Kazakhstan to Central Asia, would have endangered the demographically dominant position of the Russians, the Bolsheviks banned the long-established Arabic script-based Turkic languages of Tatar and Chaghatai employed for widespread communication among Turkic Muslims. The use of Tatar was limited to Tatarstan and elsewhere it was replaced with the brand-new languages of Azeri, Bashkir, Crimean Tatar and Kazak, developed on the basis of local dialects. Chaghatai disappeared completely and in its stead Karakalpak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbek were created. Furthermore, in 1923 the Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet for writing these languages, as the latter script was perceived to be a ‘tool of progress’. In the 1930s Cyrillic superseded the Latin script for writing these languages.

The developments in Central Europe and the Soviet Union convinced the Turkish nationalists that their cause could be served only by giving up the Arabic-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire and overhauling the Turkish-speaking core into a Turkish nation-state. The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923. Ottoman replete with numerous Arabic and Persian linguistic loans was replaced with vernacular-based Turkish, intensively purged (‘reformed’) of non-Turkic elements especially in the 1930s and 1940s. Impressed by Soviet linguistic and social engineering, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin script for writing Turkish in 1928. This event triggered the Cyrillicization of the Latin alphabets of the Turkic languages in the Soviet Union, due to the Kremlin’s fear of opening a channel of Latin-script based communication that would allow for the flow of unwanted ideological influence from Turkey to the Soviet Union.

The normative imperative of one language for one nation-state was of such importance for statehood legitimization in Central Europe that the par excellence multi-ethnic polities of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes proclaimed Czechoslovak and Serbocroatian as their respective official and national languages. The two languages were a constitutional fiction as in reality, both, Czech and Slovak were used in Czechoslovakia, while bi-scriptural Serbo-Croatian and Latin script-based Slovenian in the Kingdom. After the 1929 proclamation of Yugoslavia, Serbocroatian became eponymously known as Yugoslavian.

The Communist Years

During the war and after it until 1950 vast border changes and huge multidirectional ethnic cleansing were carried out. About 47 million people were expelled or displaced. The most visible result of this exercise was the disappearance of German-speaking communities in Central Europe and of German as the region’s leading language of interethnic communication.

In this manner an unprecedented level of ethnolinguistic homogeneity was achieved in Central Europe’s nation-states. The postwar constitutional construct of the Czechoslovak people consisting of the two fraternal nations of the Czech and the Slovaks the latter saw as an instrument to the perpetuation of Czech dominance over Czechoslovakia. In 1969 the polity was overhauled into a bi-national federation with genuine full Czech-Slovak bilingualism. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania annexed by the Soviet Union
were made into union republics with their respective languages as official-cum-national ones; and unusually, Cyrillic was not imposed on these languages.

Neither the constitutional fiction of Yugoslavian nor the unitary character of state was possible to maintain in postwar Yugoslavia. The polity was federalized. The newly formed Cyrillic-based languages of Macedonian and Slovenian were excluded from the commonality of Yugoslavian and made into the official and national languages of the Yugoslav Republics of Macedonia and Slovenia, respectively. Officially named Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian was retained as the common language for other republics, but it was written in Latin characters in Croatia, in Cyrillic in Serbia, and in both scripts in Bosnia and Montenegro. However, the dialectal base of this language slightly differed in all the four republics, as provided by law. Furthermore, in Serbia's Autonomous Republic of Kosovo Albanian was made co-official, while in Serbia's other Autonomous Republic of Vojvodina this status was shared by Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Rusyn.

5. After Communism

Post-Soviet States

The fall of communism in 1989 also spelt the end of it as a viable ideology of statehood legitimization. This precipitated the breakup of the studiously non-national communist polity of the Soviet Union into 15 ethnolinguistic nation-states, including Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine in the case of Central Europe. The transformation into ethnolinguistic national polities was most successful in the case of the three Baltic republics where no official status was accorded to Russian, though Russian-speakers account for as many as one-third of Estonia's and Latvia's inhabitants. In Ukraine an Autonomous Republic of Crimea was founded with Latin alphabet-based Crimean Tatar and Russian as co-official languages. In Belarus, after the period of 1991–1995 when Belarusian was the sole official and national language, Russian was made into a co-official language, though de facto it is the dominant language, which effectively de-Belarusified the polity. Thus, at present Belarus is the only Central European nation-state that does not draw statehood legitimization from language.

In Moldova Cyrillic was replaced with the Latin script for writing Moldovan, which for all practical reasons made it identical with Romanian. This, coupled with a drive to unite the country with Romania, alienated Russian-speakers concentrated east of the Dniester River. In Transnistria Cyrillic-based Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian were made into co-official languages. In an effort to reestablish the territorial unity of Moldova, autonomy was granted to Transnistria, and Moldovan (constitutionally kept separate from Romanian) remains the state's official language. In addition the autonomous region of Gagauzia was established for the Gagauzes, or Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians, whose language is close to Turkish. In the Soviet times Cyrillic was used for writing Gagauz, but today the Latin script is employed for this purpose. In Gagauzia Russian is recognized as a co-official language, as well.

The Fate of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia

In 1993 Czechoslovakia split into the two ethnolinguistic nation-states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Interestingly, only when for the first time in history Czech was made into the sole official language in the Czech lands (earlier it had shared this role either with German or Slovak). The breakup of Yugoslavia was followed by bloody wars and successive waves of ethnic cleansing. Eventually, between 1991 and 2008
the process spawned seven polities, including six ethnolinguistic nation-states. The latter group is composed of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. In order to conform to the normative paradigm of ethnolinguistic nationalism the previously common language of Serbo-Croatian was split into Latin script-based Bosnian and Croatian, Cyrillic-based Serbian, and bi-scriptural Montenegrin. In reality about half of the publications produced in Serbia are in Latin characters. Latin script-based Serbian is used by liberal and pro-European Serbs, while the official Cyrillic version by nationalists and conservatives.

Bosnia does not conform to the usual paradigm of the ethnolinguistic nation-state, as this polity is composed of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic. In the former entity Bosnian and Croatian are employed, both written in Latin characters, while Cyrillic-based Serbian in the latter entity. Initially, in Bosnia not language but religious difference was used to differentiate between Bosnians, Croats and Serbs. It is only nowadays that the ethnoreligious difference is translated into the linguistic one. (Sometimes Bosnians and their language are referred to as ‘Bosniak’ and the label ‘Bosnian’ is reserved for referring to Bosnia’s entire citizenry, irrespective of ethnic, religious or linguistic difference.) Similarly, Serbia is not a model of an ethnolinguistic nation-state either, with its Autonomous Republic of Vojvodina, where after the split of Serbo-Croatian Croatian was added to the four co-official languages alongside the new statewide language of Serbian.

Kosovo is the sole non-ethnolinguistic nation-state spawned by the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the only recognized one of such a character in today’s Central Europe. The polity’s de facto official and dominant language is Albanian and Kosovo’s Albanian-speakers define themselves as Albanians. Hence, Kosovo is a second Albanian nation-state, which is in clear breach with the unspoken principle of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism that the speakers of a single language form a nation, which should live in its own single nation-state. The not yet promulgated Kosovan constitution of 2008 accords the status of a state co-official language on Serbian, while at the local level also Bosnian, Romani and Turkish are to serve as co-official languages.

6. Forgotten Languages

Romani

In the wake of the fall of communism Roma intellectuals and leaders from many Central European countries began to cooperate in order to address the dire economic and social plight of the Roma, but also to codify their Romani language and to create a Romani national movement. The first efforts to publish in Romani were undertaken in the interwar Soviet Union (in Cyrillic) and in communist Yugoslavia (also in Cyrillic). Despite many centuries of persecution at least half of the Roma continue to speak Romani. The traditional orality of their culture stands in the way of making Romani a written language. Various codifications of Romani, based on different dialects, and conducted with the use of either the Cyrillic, Latin or Greek script have been created in Central European polities. Interestingly, the Romani Wikipedia is available in Latin characters and the Indian script of Devanagari, which is a reflection of New Delhi’s 1970s policy to recognize and support the Roma as one of India’s peoples (ethnolinguistic nations). There are no regular schools with Romani as the medium of education, yet it is generally recognized as a minority language.
Minority Languages

In Central Europe small ethnic and regional languages abound in the borderlands of the erstwhile Kingdom of Hungary, all of them Slavic, namely: Cyrillic-based Rusyn (today in eastern Slovakia, eastern Hungary, southwestern Ukraine and Serbia's Vojvodina), and Latin script-based: Paulician (cognate with Bulgarian, eastern Romania), Bunjevacian (Serbia's Vojvodina), Ćakavian and Kajkavian (western Croatia), Prekmurjan (northeastern Slovenia) and Burgenland Croatian (eastern Austria). Two further languages belonging to this group already became fully recognized national languages complete with their respective nation-states, that is, Bosnian and Slovak. In the meeting zone between the West Romance and South Slavic dialect continua, the Slavic languages of Molisean (cognate with Croatian) and Resian (cognate with Slovenian) emerged in what today is northeastern Italy.

In southern Italy and Sicily Latin alphabet-based Arbëresh is spoken, while Greek script-based Arvantika in central Greece, both cognate with Albanian, or its Tosk dialect. The remnants of the Romance-speakers who used to be the link between the West and East Romance dialect continua, today are spread thinly across the Balkans from Greece and Bulgaria to Croatia's Istra. Their three distinctive groups go by the names of Aromanians, Meglano-Romanians and Istró-Romanians. (The two former groups are also referred to as ‘Vlachs’.) They write their languages variously in the Latin, Greek or Cyrillic script. In southern Bulgaria, and across the border in northern Greece, the Muslim Slavophone group of Pomaks live. They use Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet (and more rarely the Arabic script) to write their Pomakian language.

In the former meeting zone between the West Germanic and North Slavic dialect continua (after 1945 shifted by ethnic cleansing to the Oder-Neisse line) the following Slavic languages (with strong Germanic influence on lexicon, syntax and phonology) emerged: Mazurian (in present-day northeastern Poland), Kashubian (northern Poland), Sorbian (eastern Germany), Silesian (southern Poland and the northeastern corner of the Czech Republic) and Moravian (the southeast of the Czech Republic). At the confluence of the current Belarusian, Polish and Ukrainian borders the bi-scriptural, Cyrillic and Latin alphabet, Polesian language coalesced. In a similar manner Goralian (Pohdalanian) emerged in the Polish-Slovak borderland of the High Tatras.

In Latvia and Lithuania the use of erstwhile parallel dialectal bases of Latvian and Lithuanian has revived, namely: Latgalian in eastern Latvia and Samogitian in western Lithuania. Significantly, Latgalian- and Samogitian-speakers amount to one-third of all Latvian- and Lithuanian-speakers, respectively. Latvia protects the northwestern littoral of the Gulf of Riga, dubbed as the Livonian historical territory, which is more of cultural and touristic importance than linguistic, because the remaining speakers of the Finno-Ugric language of Livonian number less than 50. In Estonia southern Estonian, which used to be a former dialectal basis of the Estonian language, was also revived. Nowadays it comes in two closely related varieties, one used by the Lutheran inhabitants of the Estonian town of Võro and its vicinity and the other by Orthodox Finno-Ugric-speakers living across the border in Russia, who refer to themselves as Setus. Thus, it is usual to refer to this language as Võro-Seto.

Some of the mentioned languages are tiny, weak or even moribund, and thus usually of little or no political significance (Istro-Romanian, Livonian, Mazurian, Meglano-Romanian, Molisean, Paulician, Polesian, Prekmurjan or Resian). Some are fully or almost fully recognized as national languages of stateless nations (Aromanian, Sorbian
and Rusyn, the last one is also known as Lemkian in Poland). Others are recognized as specific of regional groups of a nation enjoying its own nation-state (Čakavian, Goralian, Kajkavian, Kashubian, Latgalian, Samogitian or Võro-Seto). Still others are construed as of separate ethnic groups which do not express any clear desire to overhaul themselves into nations (Arbëresh, Arvantika, Burgenland Croatian, Čakavian, Kajkavian, Kashubian or Pomakian). Some of the languages are also deployed for building political movements that may be qualified simultaneously as regional and national (Bunjevacin, Kashubian, Moravian or Silesian).

Interestingly, although the Silesians constitute the largest ethnic or national minority in today's Poland (according to the 2002 Polish census), neither they nor their language are recognized in the country. Similarly no recognition was granted to Goralian, either. In the emulation of the French example Greece does not recognize any minorities or minority languages on its territory, except Turks and Turkish. Bulgaria considers Pomakian a dialect of Bulgarian, though the Pomaks, also due to their language interlaced with numerous Turkicisms, are customarily excluded from the commonality of the Bulgarian nation. Romania claims Aromanian, Istro-Romanian and MeglanoRomanian as the southern dialects of Romanian, but the speakers of the three languages beg to differ. Although Čakavian and Kajkavian are more different from standard Croatian than this standard from Bosnian, Montenegrin or Serbian, anyway they are construed as dialects of Croatian.
STAKEHOLDERS OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Petr Blizkovsky

1. Globalization and Crises – Impact on Governance

Globalization is a critical phenomenon of the recent period. However, it is not automatically followed by a global approach on the governance side. Therefore, there is an asymmetrical situation.

This article addresses global economic governance from the stakeholders' angle. The paper first looks at the changing political and economic environment which is triggering new governance needs. Then, it follows with identifying who the stakeholders are and what is their role at various stages of the governance process. After that, it analyzes three case studies. Finally, the paper offers a European perspective and ideas and mutual global – European inspiration for economic governance.

Global governance could mean different things, ranging from the illusionary temptation of a global government to soft leadership or informal discussions. The starting point of this article is that we are living in a world where states are the masters of their sovereignty. They can voluntarily share this sovereignty with others, delegate it or keep it.

Let us start with the definition. The term 'global' refers to governance beyond the boundaries of a sovereign state on a large, global, scale (in practice, it is limited to a non-exhaustive list of countries which are relevant to the global economy). 'Governance' refers to 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceived to be in their interest' or more simply 'the setting of rules and their enforcement which differ widely according to the nature of competences'.

When discussing the stakeholders' involvement, it is important to distinguish, on the one hand, what actors can initiate, influence or try to influence the decision, and, on the other hand, the decision-making itself. The actors can include multiple stakeholders, while the decision-making is a narrow stakeholder issue. There should not be confusion between the increasing number of categories of stakeholders who are impacted by global governance, and the narrow group of public stakeholders involved in decisions. Of course, multinational companies, cities, regions, the media, and civil society in general are now

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more involved in shaping governance, and the frontiers for the free movement of people, capital, goods and ideas are more open than in the past, but it is the governments and parliaments which decide in the end.

On the global scale, the fast pace of globalization in the last decades has resulted in increasingly interdependent countries and regions. International trade and finance have grown faster than GDP and have been an undisputed source of growth and prosperity.\(^4\) However, it has also been shown that the sudden reversal in trade and finance can be very disrupting – economically, socially and politically. Indeed, globalization relates to international spillovers, and these can be both positive and negative.

David A. Mayer-Foulkes\(^5\) finds the long-term roots of the current economic crisis in the dynamics of globalization and in the link between the acceleration of the world growth rate, increases of inequalities in leading countries and a situation where the interest rate decreases if capital accumulates at a faster rate than technological change.

Global financial stability and global economic growth can in this sense be interpreted as global public goods. The strengthening of global safety nets and firewalls to deal with emergencies could be an example of such goods, and these require global fora and institutions to deliver them. Importantly, the need for such an international cooperation seems to be a broad-based desire by many stakeholders, including policymakers, analysts and private sector.

The traditional institutions involved in global economic governance were the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization. However, a shift took place with the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, where the G7 was unable to efficiently lead the way out of the crisis. Then the G20 was established, bringing together major advanced and emerging economies to stabilize the global financial market. Later, in 2008–2009, as a result of the financial and economic crisis, the G20 members were called upon to further strengthen international cooperation, and G20 Leaders' Summits were held for the first time.

At the EU level, efforts to deal with the euro crisis are to some extent parallel to those by global fora and institutions at the global level. Indeed, calls for increased governance in the EU have equally highlighted the need for strengthening stabilization tools and for stronger policy coordination (a reinforced architecture for the Economic and Monetary Union).

2. Who are the Stakeholders of Global Economic Governance?

The stakeholders in broad terms are the actors involved in the process of establishing global economic rules.

To understand the role of the stakeholders in economic governance in the last two decades, it is worth mentioning two key developments – globalization and democratization. Globalization has increased the interconnectivity of the global economy and thus the need for global rule-setting. Interdependence and the need for a common vision have increased. By the democratisation of the global scene, we mean both the falling of the iron curtain with the subsequent establishment of democratic and market-based societies in Central and East Europe, and the process of liberalization of the Chinese and other Asian economies and societies. These two processes have also changed the rules of the game for global economic governance.


Long-term global economic governance is shaped both by markets and democracies. Thus, the balancing act is between the ongoing pressure from investors expressed by the evolution of share indices and other financial indicators, on the one hand, and the slow and complex decision-making of parliaments and governments in the multilateral framework, on the other. There is an obvious gap between the speed of pressure and the collective action in economic governance, especially in times of crisis. This could be witnessed in the G20 process as well as during the financial crisis in the EU at the regional level.

A short-term trigger for global economic governance was the economic crisis. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the 2008 mortgage and banking crises and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in some EU countries triggered global economic governance changes – both procedurally, by creating new regional or global institutions or fora, and by adopting new rules in substance.

Global economic governance thus gained momentum due to long-term (globalization, democratization) and short-term (financial crisis) factors and increased the role of the public sector involvement (‘the state is back’) – the process is a multi-stakeholder one.

The process of rule-setting typically happens in four stages: signalling, initiating, shaping and deciding. The stakeholders vary at each stage, with the general pattern of narrowing them down (Table 1).

At the signalling stage, the wide range of stakeholders are signalling failures or putting the existing cross-border rules (or their absence) under scrutiny. This comprises the evolution of stocks and shares of companies in various sectors, bonds of sovereigns as well as the sentiment and opinion presented by the media and civil society, including the non-profit sector. Typically, the number of identified issues is very wide and it is for the stakeholders at the further stages to decide which they will prioritize as a subject for governance.

At the initiating stage, the problem is identified and the cross-border spillovers should be demonstrated in order to advocate the case of collective action. The stakeholders in this stage are broad, ranging from the private sector and their lobbyists, the media, NGOs, the academic sphere and public sector.

At the shaping stage, the range of stakeholders narrows down. The rules are drafted by the relevant international bodies according to their rules. Input is provided by private, technical or public actors or their combination. Case studies for each of these cases are provided below.

At the deciding stage, the stakeholders involved are limited further to the competent authority which makes the decision. They are exclusively public authorities once the normative rules are established.

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6 Mayer-Foulkes, D. A. Long-Term Fundamentals...; Frieden, J. Global Economic Governance after the Crisis. Paper based on a lecture delivered to the German Economics Association (Verein für Socialpolitik), Frankfurt, September 5, 2011. – Harvard University, Department of Government, April 2012.


Table 1

Stakeholders of global economic governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signalling</td>
<td>Financial market signals, press reports, citizens' initiatives</td>
<td>Market economy, democracy, transparency, accountability</td>
<td>Broad range. Private, semi-private, public sectors. Stock exchange, media, rating agencies, reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating</td>
<td>Opinions, analysis, proposals</td>
<td>Legitimacy of private, semi-private and public sectors</td>
<td>Wide range. Private, semi-private, public sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping</td>
<td>Proposing rules</td>
<td>Expert competence, technical mandate</td>
<td>Medium range. Public authorities, international agencies. Feed-back from shaping-stakeholders possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding</td>
<td>Adopting rules</td>
<td>Democracy, transparency, public accountability</td>
<td>Narrow range. Public authorities (possibly delegated to private or technical level)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The involvement of categories of stakeholders is becoming complex due to three factors.

First, the complexity of the issues to be subjected to global economic governance and the effect of the rules on the various actors are high. This is becoming clear in the banking and financial sector, economic coordination, monetary dialogues, trade rules, accountancy, tax evasion and other areas. One example of the multi-stakeholder theory at the initiation stage is the Davos Forum process (World Economic Forum). Its character is of an informal exchange of views involving governments, global private institutions, local industry, international and regional organizations, NGOs and academia. Its impact on real governance is limited but it certainly plays a catalyst role.

Second, the geographical scope of multilateral economic governance is widening. With globalization and the emergence of new global economic players, such as BRIC countries, not only the number of national actors is growing but new regional organizations are also involved.

Third, the emergence of new actors is also coming from the fact that the role of states is changing. In the globalized world there are tasks which the states delegate to the higher level (macro-regional or multilateral cooperation) or below to the sub-national level or even private actors. The examples of multilateral cooperation are sectoral agreements (such as the WTO for trade) or geographical agreements (such as the European Union, African Union, ASEAN and others). An example of a sub-national delegation is the case of accountancy standards, where the private sector is a key actor and the public sector follows their decisions.

3. Stakeholder-Driven Global Governance: Three Cases

As shown above, at the first two stages – signalling and initiating – the variety of stakeholders is large. This implies that their relative power in the shaping of the final rules is smaller. This does not mean less power in governance. They key role is to make the decision-makers move, so this is the key role of policy-triggering.

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Once it comes to the two later phases – shaping and deciding – the power of the stakeholders in the concrete form of rule-setting increases. In the text below we look at three cases of global economic governance according to the nature of stakeholders: private, technical and state. Subsequently, we can establish three models of stakeholder governance: private sector-driven, technical sector-driven and state-driven.

To analyze these models, we will look at three recent cases.

3.1. Private-stakeholder governance: the case of international accounting rules

The first case refers to accounting rules. The rationale for their harmonization at the global level comes from the fact that the possible differences in accounting systems across jurisdictions creates biased information for market participants, such as in the capital markets and in the area of tax harmonization. The possible negative impact is amplified in times of banking crises which was clearly the case in 2008. The objective of setting globally recognized accountancy standards is to create cross-border, transparent and comparable standards to be followed by the economic agents and thus create a level playing field.

The process is run by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which developed the set of accounting rules called the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). They are used by many countries, such as the members of the European Union, India, Russia, Australia, South Africa and Hong Kong. As of August 2008, more than 113 countries around the world require or permit IFRS reporting and 85 require IFRS reporting for all domestic listed companies.

The IASB is an international private organization. Globally, there are only two major accounting standard setters: the IASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the USA. Convergence or the lack of it, between their standards is a key signal for more local standard setters which follow track and for countries planning to adopt IFRS for their laws on mandatory financial reporting.

The International Accounting Standards Committee10 was reorganized in 2001 and became an independent international standard setter, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB structure comprises the IFRS Foundation, which is an independent organization with two main bodies – the Trustees and the IASB – as well as the IFRS Advisory Council and the IFRS Interpretations Committee. The IASC Foundation Trustees appoint the IASB members, exercise oversight and raise the funds needed, but the IASB has responsibility for setting the IFRS. The Standard Advisory Council has approximately 45 members. From 2012, the IASB currently has 16 board members, of which one is appointed as Chair and up to two as Vice-Chairs. To ensure broad international diversity, from July 2012 there are meant to be: four members from the Asia/Australasia region; four from Europe; four from North America; one each from Africa and South America; and two appointed from any area, subject to maintaining overall geographical balance. A unanimous vote is not necessary to publish a Standard, exposure draft, or final ‘IFRIC’ Interpretation. The Board’s 2008 Due Process manual stated that approval by nine of the members is required.

Who are the stakeholders?

The stakeholders of the IASB process are from both the private and public sectors. The private side involves businesses, such as investors and business leaders. The other private stakeholders are analysts, the accountancy profession, suppliers, customers and employees. The public stakeholders comprise governments, their agencies and the accounting regulators.

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10 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established in 1973 with the goal of developing accounting standards and promoting them internationally.
In spite of the fact that the initiating and drafting stages of the governance of accountability rules is driven by the private sector, the political sphere is also involved. Since the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, the G20 leaders have called for convergence between the IASB and FASB. The G20 leaders also encouraged the IASB to ‘further improve involvement of stakeholders’, as there has been a tension between the IASB’s technical legitimacy as standard setter and the political perception, especially in the EU, that users of such standards were insufficiently heard and represented in the IASB’s governance.

There was a two-way interference between the EU and global governance in this field. At the first stage, the EU was involved in shaping the drafting of the global technical rules. This happened both bilaterally, while having discussions with the IASB representatives and the EU Finance Ministers, as well as via the EU positions within the G20. On the other hand, once the IASB norms were settled, these global norms became binding inside the EU.

**Top-down impact of global governance in the EU**

This type of governance has a direct impact on the EU governance. It is organized in such a way that an EU law requires listed companies in the EU to adhere to the IFRS for financial statements commencing as of 2005 when preparing their consolidated accounts. Whilst IFRS as such are not legally enforceable, they should be incorporated into the EU regulatory framework.

In the EU, the adoption of a new accounting standard follows a comitology process. This has two stages: drafting and deciding. The drafting stage involves the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), a private sector body established in 2001 by prominent European organizations within the European capital markets to assist the European Commission with the endorsement of IFRSs, through its provision of advice related to the quality of such standards. Then the Commission prepares a draft Regulation on the basis of the EFRAG's advice. The Accounting Regulatory Committee subsequently votes on that draft Regulation.

At the deciding stage, the EU co-legislators (the European Parliament and the Council) within the framework of a regulatory procedure with scrutiny can object to adopting the Commission regulation. In the opposite case, the draft regulation becomes a normative legislation.

**How long does it take?**

The time span between the identification of a regulatory issue at the initiation stage to the adoption of the binding rules varies considerably.

In difficult cases, governance fails. This is the case of the IFRS on insurance where the work has been ongoing for 15 years and has not yet finished. Similarly, in the case of the IFRS 9 for financial instruments, the endorsement process in the EU was stopped right after the EFRAG draft endorsement advice of November 2009 and has been stalled ever since.

In more successful cases, such as the IFRS 10 for consolidated financial statements, the timetable was three years between the publication of the draft by the IASB and the effective implementation date. This is a politically sensitive case where political pressure generated by the financial crisis helped deliver the final standard fairly swiftly.

The implementation of global standards into EU law takes approximately 8 months if the endorsement process runs smoothly. Concretely, the EU legislative process for the adoption of individual accounting standards is based on comitology and runs through the following steps:

- The IASB issues a standard;
- The EFRAG holds consultations and endorses advice and impact assessment (approximately 2 months);
- The Commission endorses the draft Regulation (1 month);
- The Accounting Regulatory Committee votes (2 months);
The European Parliament and Council have a scrutiny period (up to 3 months); The Commission adopts and publishes the Regulation.

3.2. Technical-stakeholder governance: the case of regulating bank capital

Regulating bank capital adequacy is a typical case which calls for global governance. The globalization of the economy and related financial integration create interdependency across jurisdictions. The risk of negative cross-border spillovers in the case of a default of a systemically relevant financial institution is important, as was seen during the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, there is a case for the good of the public to enhance financial stability of the individual credit institution where banks would be required to hold more capital and liquid assets. Due to the international character of the global financial sector, global regulatory setting is required. At the same time, the rule-setting has important financial accounting – up to 20–25 per cent of the total impact on the output of the banks. An OECD study estimates that the medium-term impact of the Basel III implementation on GDP growth is in the range of −0.05 per cent to −0.15 per cent per year.

Who are the stakeholders?

This governance process happens within the so-called ‘Basel Process’. The key stakeholders in this case are the regulators, who can be seen as experts and technicians supervising the banking sector. They are accompanied by private, public and mixed actors (Table 2). The scope of the stakeholders in this case coincides with that of the most prominent formal structure through which the global agenda of financial regulation is set: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, seated in Basel) and especially its committee – the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).

Table 2
Stakeholders of the Basel Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supranational</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G10\textsuperscript{13}</td>
<td>‘Core banks’, financial markets, hedge funds, ‘financial engineers’, financial risk analysts, credit rating agencies, mass media</td>
<td>Banks and investment firms, risk management and credit rating agencies, professional economists, G30\textsuperscript{22} and II\textsuperscript{23}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20\textsuperscript{14}, G7\textsuperscript{15}, European Union, BIS\textsuperscript{16}, BCBS\textsuperscript{17}, Basel Senior Supervisors Group, Financial Stability Board, IMF\textsuperscript{18}, World Bank, IOSCO\textsuperscript{19}, IASB\textsuperscript{20}, FASB\textsuperscript{21}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{13} Group of Ten (economic) is a group originally of ten, now eleven, industrial nations.

\textsuperscript{14} The Group of Twenty major economies comprises 19 countries plus the European Union that account for more than 80 per cent of the world product/trade and two-thirds of the world population.

\textsuperscript{15} The Group of 77 at the United Nations is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{16} The Bank for International Settlements (BIS, seated in Basel).

\textsuperscript{17} The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – the BIS committee.

\textsuperscript{18} The International Monetary Fund.

\textsuperscript{19} The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an association of organizations that regulate the world's securities and futures markets.

\textsuperscript{20} The International Accounting Standards Board.

\textsuperscript{21} The Financial Accounting Standards Board.

\textsuperscript{22} The Group of Thirty is an international body of leading financiers and academics which aims at deepening understanding of economic and financial issues and to examine consequences of decisions made in the public and private sectors related to these issues.

\textsuperscript{23} The Institute of International Finance.
This mostly technically driven process has been politically endorsed by the G20 leaders. At their 2010 summit in Seoul, the G20 leaders endorsed the Basel III regulatory framework. In November 2011, the leaders, at their summit in Cannes, emphasized the importance of implementing Basel III.

**Top-down impact of global governance in the EU**

In the EU, the financial crisis prompted a regional EU and international effort to develop effective policies to tackle the underlying problems. The need for new capital had been caused by capital leveraging, capital quality, credit growth, liquidity buffers, risk governance and oversight of the banking sector.24

In the EU context, the extent of the financial crisis has exposed unacceptable risks pertaining to the regulation of financial institutions. According to the IMF estimates, crisis-related losses incurred by European credit institutions between 2007 and 2010 were close to €1 trillion or 8 per cent of the EU GDP.

In order to restore stability in the banking sector and ensure that credit continues to flow to the real economy, both the EU and its Member States adopted a broad range of unprecedented measures with the taxpayer ultimately footing the related bill. In this context, in October 2010 the European Commission approved €4.6 trillion of state aid measures to financial institutions, of which more than €2 trillion were effectively used in 2008 and 2009.

On the rule-setting in the EU, the result of the Basel process is a starting point for a legally-binding legislative process which ensures the implementation of the Basel agreement.

The process is top-down. First, the EU legislation stipulating the legally binding rules is adopted and then, in the second stage, the rules are transposed into national law. In this case, the EU regulation takes two forms: firstly that of a directive which is not directly applicable and needs to be implemented via national legislation through national parliaments; and secondly, that of a regulation which is directly applicable in national jurisdictions. In both cases, at the EU level, the legislators are the Council and the European Parliament. Eventually, the Member States need to do further legislative actions at the national level in order to make the EU laws fully effective.

On the implementation in the EU, the European Supervisory Agencies (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA) and the ESRB would be charged with implementing the supervisory tasks of the new capital requirements framework. At the national level, the implementation (supervision of institutions covered by the CRD IV legislative package) would be taken care of by the national competent institutions.

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There is a prominent example of technically driven governance in the European Union, namely the De Larosière report. In October 2008, the European Commission asked Mr De Larosière to put together, with a group of prominent experts, advice for the European Commission on the future regulatory approach on financial regulation and supervision in the European Union. This input was eventually closely followed in the subsequent Commission legislative proposals, as well as in the laws adopted by the EU legislators.

How long does it take?

The technically driven governance of the Basel process takes some 7 years from the identification of the problem to the adoption of the legally binding rules (Table 3). Four years were needed for the technical agreement to be made at global level, around two years are needed for adopting the EU legislation and further time will be required for the transcription of the EU law into the national legal system and its factual implementation.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governance action</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Identification of the problem</td>
<td>Beginning of the sub-prime mortgage crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 April</td>
<td>Global governance – political level – G20</td>
<td>Commitment to address the crisis with internationally consistent efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 September</td>
<td>Global governance – technical level</td>
<td>Agreement of the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision on measures to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 November</td>
<td>Global governance – political level – G20</td>
<td>Formal endorsement of Basel III accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 December</td>
<td>Global governance – technical level</td>
<td>Publication of Basel III accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 July</td>
<td>Regional (EU) governance – technical level</td>
<td>Publication of European Commission proposal on revised capital requirements rules (CRD IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 November</td>
<td>Global governance – political level – G20</td>
<td>Commitment to start implementing Basel III as of 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(possibly) 2012</td>
<td>Regional (EU) governance – decision level</td>
<td>Adoption of EU legislation on CRD IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>National (EU) governance – implementation</td>
<td>Enforceability of national law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. Public sector-driven governance: the case of coordinating economic policies

The global financial crisis which started in 2008 revealed the need to develop the process of some level of coordination of economic policies among the major global economies. The objective is to set common objectives and put forward policies for
reaching these objectives and a common assessment of progress. The overall rationale of this case of global economic governance is to limit as much as possible the accumulation of imbalances.

The G20 pledged at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit to work together to ensure a lasting recovery and strong and sustainable growth over the medium term. To meet this goal, they launched the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth (FfG). But each country's ability to achieve its goals depends partially on the actions of others. The FfG is a shared recognition among the G20 that they will need to work together. It is recognized that national measures benefit from a common international approach. Identifying best practices and taking into account spill-over effects of structural policies in one country or group (of countries) can improve the impact of those policies on growth and job creation. The backbone of the FfG is the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). The MAP is the tool directed at monitoring and coordinating domestic economic policies. In this context, countries are meant, among other things, to avoid and gradually correct global imbalances, consolidate sustainable and balanced growth, accelerate job creation and promote structural reforms.

Policy coordination of this kind at the global level is a new concept. Bearing in mind that economic policies are at the core of the states' sovereignty, it can only progress in small steps and with soft means.

In practice, the FfG process can only be successful if supported by balanced policy analysis. This is why the G20 asked the IMF to assist with the analysis of whether national policies are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced growth. The IMF has been asked to provide technical support to help develop indicative guidelines to evaluate imbalances and to assess progress towards commitments made by the G20 members. Similarly, the World Bank was asked to give advice on the progress in promoting development and poverty reduction as part of the rebalancing of global growth.

Who are the stakeholders?

The stakeholders at the shaping and deciding stages of this type of governance are public actors. They include states and monetary authorities. The reason for the involvement of public authorities is that the subject of governance is macroeconomic, monetary and structural policies. These are under the responsibility of elected actors via the parliamentary process and are executed by governments and central banks.

The nature of this type of governance is soft. It has no legally binding nature. It is rather a political commitment. A final communiqué is issued at the end of the each G20 Ministerial (and Summit), containing the agreed work streams and members' joint commitments. The G20 has furthermore neither a founding treaty nor a permanent secretariat. Most of its working methods at the Leaders' level have been transplanted from the G7/G8.

Top-down impact of global governance in the EU

The interaction between the global and EU regional governance in this area goes both ways. The EU has been actively pushing for global coordination in this field at the G20. On the other hand, since the global agreement was established, the EU and its members have been subjected to it.

The EU might serve as an inspiration for global governance in this area. Since the economic crisis of 2008, it has actually implemented various measures going in the same direction. We highlight two measures. The first measure is of a compelling nature (this would not be possible at the global level). It consists of the excessive imbalance proce-
dure. In this procedure, the Commission evaluates macroeconomic imbalances within the 27 EU Member States and suggests measures to the Council. The Council decides on the measures to be taken by the Member States. In case of non-compliance, sanctions are foreseen for the euro area members. Another example of legally binding rules, this time of an intergovernmental nature, is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. This specifies the obligations of the contracting parties – the euro zone members – amongst others in the fiscal area.

The second measure is non-binding. It consists of political commitments towards growth measures including avoiding imbalances. This is done via the Euro-Plus Pact, which is a political agreement between 25 EU members.

On the recipient side of global governance, the EU and its members are subject to the G20 procedure. The G20 sets high-level objectives and guidelines to which member countries and international financial institutions adhere. Direct support to the G20 is provided by the IMF for macro-surveillance and by the FSB for micro-prudential, regulatory and supervisory issues.

The implementation of the FfG in other G20 members is a shared responsibility to adopt policies that promote a resilient international financial system. To this end, strategies will vary across countries. In the euro area, a comprehensive crisis response strategy is being implemented based on consolidation and reform directed at restoring sound public finances and the adjustment of competitiveness.

**How long does it take?**

It took five years to define the political commitments governing these types of policies globally (Table 4). It took two years to establish the principles of global governance in this area. At the moment, leaders are yet to agree on a common approach for measuring progress. However, no hard implementation occurred and the real impact of this governance model is rather weak. The monitoring of the implementation of the commitments is work in progress. It involves the technical support of the IMF.

**Table 4**

Timetable of the implementation of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governance action</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Identification of the problem</td>
<td>Due to the crisis, recognition of need for coordinated policy action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>G20 Pittsburgh Summit</td>
<td>Launching of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth (FfG) and the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>G20 Seoul Summit</td>
<td>Commitment to address the key imbalances that jeopardize growth. Commitments for an enhanced MAP and the identification of policy actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>G20 Cannes Summit</td>
<td>Agreement on: (i) the key indicators (public debt, fiscal deficits, private saving rate, private debt and the external balance); (ii) indicative benchmarks to identify the presence of large imbalances; (iii) the Cannes Action Plan for Growth and Jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governance action</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>G20 Los Cabos Summit</td>
<td>Growth and Jobs Action Plan agreed, with leaders committing to: (i) adopt measures to strengthen demand, support global growth and restore confidence, address short- and medium-term risks, enhance job creation and reduce unemployment; (ii) strengthen peer review process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarize these three cases of stakeholder-driven global governance, a few comments can be made. Most importantly, in the earlier stages of global economic governance, there are many stakeholders. However, the final decisions remain for the sovereigns, meaning national states. Due to the complexity of economic governance, innovative ways of involving global stakeholders have emerged.

The sovereigns delegated the power to shape the global standards to other stakeholders. In the case of global accountancy rules, the sovereigns allowed the private sector to define the global standards and commit the sovereigns to make them legally binding. In the case of capital requirements for banks, the sovereigns gave the responsibility to technical stakeholders, including national supervisors and central bankers to draft global rules which the sovereigns transposed into normative rules. In areas such as macroeconomic coordination, the sovereigns are not globally ready to delegate their power to other stakeholders and the sovereigns so far committed only in a limited way to the global coordination of their own policies.

In all three cases the European Union is part of global governance both as an agent shaping global governance as well as a transmission mechanism for making global rules applicable in their member states.

4. Stakeholders of the G20 Process

The G20 plays a prominent role in global economic governance. The stakeholders are states, regional organizations and international institutions.25

In terms of its outreach, this can already be seen in the efforts by Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) such as the BRICs, which are using the G20 in order to leverage their power in international organizations such as the IMF. The G20 called on the IMF Quota and Governance reform. Once completed, this reform will shift more than 6 per cent of quota shares from over-represented to under-represented member countries and more than 6 per cent of quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries. With these realigned quota shares, China will become the 3rd largest member country in the IMF, and the BRICs will be among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund.

The role and position of the European actors in the G20 are important. In terms of membership, in the G20 there are four EU members (Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy) and the EU itself. The reasons for this ‘double representation’ are historical (the four countries used to be G7/8 members) and legal. The Presidency (President of the European Council at the summit level and the Council Presidency at the ministerial level) together with the European Commission and the European Central Bank, represent the EU competences, while the four European countries represent their own in-

terests on matters which are not part of the EU competence. The possibility for unified external representation of the euro area in international fora for issues concerning the economic and monetary union is foreseen in the TFEU, Article 138, but has not yet been fully implemented.

The G20 outreach and transparency are issues influencing the G20 legitimacy and impact on global governance. Interacting better with non-G20 members and including non-state actors would increase the legitimacy of the G20. In this regard, the G20 has been inviting non-member countries to its summits since the first summit. Most of the invitees represent international organizations which they chair (see Table 5).

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-G20 member countries invited to G20 summits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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At the Seoul Summit (2010), the G20 leaders explicitly recognized for the first time ‘the necessity to consult with the wider international community’ and pledged to ‘increase (…) efforts to conduct G20 consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnerships with international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, trade unions and academia’.

Under the G20 Mexican Presidency in 2012, non-state actors had a greater degree of inclusion than at any previous summit. This happened both in the preparatory process (where the G20 Presidency met with representatives of the business, labour, academic and civil society spheres) and during the summit itself. The involvement of private and civil sector stakeholders resulted in the B20 (Business 20), L20 (Labour 20), CS20 (civil-

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<sup>26</sup> Representing the African Union.
<sup>27</sup> Representing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
<sup>28</sup> Representing the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
<sup>29</sup> Representing the New Partnership for Africa's Development.
<sup>30</sup> Representing the Global Governance Group.
<sup>31</sup> Representing the Gulf Cooperation Council.
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il society) and the Think Tank–20 (dialogue among think tanks). Other dialogues included the G20 Young Entrepreneurs Summit, the Youth 20 and the Rethinking 20, and also the G(irls) 20. This amounts to a comprehensive representation of global stakeholders in the discussion stage of the global governance process. In terms of input for the decision-making level, these non-state actors delivered position papers, recommendations and thematic reports to the G20 presidency, via Sherpas and/or working groups. These non-state actors figure explicitly in the Los Cabos declaration.

Regarding international organizations as stakeholders, it is interesting to note how the G24 – which coordinates the position of developing countries on monetary and development issues – was, at the G20 Deputies meeting in September 2012, one of the most critical of the EU on the topic of the IMF’s reforms. The G24 includes Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, also members of the G20, and has China and Saudi Arabia as observers.

5. Stakeholder Involvement in Global Governance: The Case of the EU

The European Union can be seen as a laboratory of regional economic governance. It is the only regional governance which applies a normative approach. It involves, on the one hand, the creation of legally binding rules. In this case, the four stages of governance as described in Section 2 apply as well. The signalling and initiating phases involve multiple stakeholders including the private sector, media, regions, civil society, academia and others. The shaping of the rules phase is solely conferred to the EU institution called the European Commission. The process here typically comprises a consultation by the Commission with the stakeholders (private sector, consumer associations, NGOs, international partners, and universities).

Based on this, the Commission publishes a ‘green paper’ (a discussion document) for public consultation of all interested parties. If the Commission decides to continue with the process, it usually publishes a ‘white paper’ (an official set of proposals).

In the next stage, the Commission proposes a legal text to be adopted by the legislators, according to the given procedure defined in the Treaties. In the case of an ordinary legislative procedure, the legislators are the European Parliament and the Council. The Commission proposal represents the interests of the EU as a whole. At the level of legislators, the Council scrutinizes the draft according to the individual interests of the EU Member States, while the European Parliament typically represents the EU’s interests. This law-making mechanism ensures the balanced power between the national stakeholders and the EU as a stakeholder.

Other governance methods used in the EU are soft, non-binding ones: the open-method of cooperation, coordination or peer pressure. The EU governance is subject to reflections and improvements.

In the EU governance process, the public stakeholders (i.e. the states) are therefore a key player. They are both legislators and designers of the strategy to be adopted by the EU. The last task is ensured by the European Council. A typical feature of the states as stakeholders is their evolution due to the election process in the democratic systems. The EU is therefore always keeping an eye on the preferences of the national governments and parliaments. This is a complex process. With 27 Member States and various regional, national and supra-national elections, there are elections coming up very often. On average, an EU citizen votes more than once a year.

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33 Cloos, J. ‘Incentive’ Governance...

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the European Council has become an institution of the European Union with its fixed President. This increased the involvement of the heads level in the strategic orientation of the EU. During the economic crisis, this proved to be a useful development. The financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent sovereign debt crisis in some of the EU Member States, including the euro area's exposure to stress, put leaders in the driving seat. The number of their meetings increased as did their focus on economic governance (see Table 6).

**Table 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of pages</th>
<th>Number of pages on economic policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On top of this, new stakeholders emerged in EU governance. In addition to the Member States and the EU, the euro area, to which eventually other members adhered, became a more active actor due to the crisis inside the euro area. The euro area members and some others decided to move forward further in some cases on an intergovernmental basis outside of the EU (EFSF – European Financial Stability Facility, ESM – European Stability Mechanism, TSCG – Treaty on Stability, Coordination and

35 Note the number of pages of written conclusions do not correspond necessarily with the focus of the meeting.
Goverance in the Economic and Monetary Union). This was not in conflict with the EU, but rather a supportive measure. The number of meetings on economic issues during the crisis increased as did the variety of meetings (formal/informal EU meetings, informal euro area meetings, intergovernmental meetings).

If we look at the interplay between the global and EU economic governance, we see a case of inter-dependence and mutual influence. The EU and its Member States have been proactive stakeholders of global economic governance and have thus shaped the global economic rules. On the other hand, the EU has been a recipient of the global economic governance and implemented what has been decided at the global level.

It is worth comparing the approach taken at the global and EU levels in different segments of economic governance (Table 7). The table shows that there has possibly been mutual inspiration. In some cases, the practices of the EU could have been of interest for the broader scale in the case of macroeconomic policy, structural policy and possibly tax coordination. The global example was possibly an inspiration for the EU/euro area in fields such as financial assistance and financial stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Global governance</th>
<th>EU governance</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic policy</td>
<td>G20, G7/8</td>
<td>FfG, dialogue</td>
<td>EU coordination more advanced (normative governance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-17</td>
<td>Policy guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eurogroup, Euro Summit</td>
<td>Treaty (TSCG)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>Euro Plus Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary policy</td>
<td>G7, G20</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>EU area governance fully harmonized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU, ECB</td>
<td>Single currency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 The Stability and Growth Pact.
39 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Forum</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Forum</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Structural policy</td>
<td>G8, G20</td>
<td>FfG, dialogue</td>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>EU Treaty, SGP, ‘Six-Pack’, ‘Two-Pack’</td>
<td>EU coordination more advanced (normative, coordination, peer pressure)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-17, Eurogroup, Euro Summit</td>
<td>Policy guidance</td>
<td>Source of inspiration for global governance</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>Treaty (TSCG) Euro Plus Pact</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>EU-23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial assistance</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>Loans for non-euro members</td>
<td>Global governance source of inspiration for euro area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU-17</td>
<td>EFSF[^40], ESM[^41], loans for euro members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stability</td>
<td>G20, G8, FSF</td>
<td>Risk identification</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EFSF – risk identification</td>
<td>Global governance source of inspiration for EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial regulation</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Political commit-</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Legal obligations</td>
<td>Binding EU governance in line with global political commitments</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Capital requirements of banks</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Political commit-</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Legal obligations follow Basel process</td>
<td>EU governance follows global governance</td>
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<td>Rule-setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Political commit-</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Legal obligations follow IASB process</td>
<td>EU governance follows global governance</td>
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[^40]: The European Financial Stability Facility.
[^41]: The European Stability Mechanism.
### Table 7 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Global governance</th>
<th>EU governance</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum</td>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>Forum</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IASB</td>
<td>Rule-setting</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>Tax coordination</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>EU</td>
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### 6. Conclusions

The present article has analyzed the global economic governance from the stakeholders' perspective. We can conclude that:

- Globalization is creating an asymmetric situation in which economic realities are evolving globally but the governance of global processes is lagging behind.
- The subject of global economic governance should be treated extremely carefully. It should not be confused with global economic government. However big the inter-dependence of the global economy, the accountability for rule-setting is driven by sovereigns.
- Global governance typically proceeds in four stages: signaling, initiating, shaping and deciding. Concerning the number of stakeholders involved, a pyramid structure can be observed: at the beginning (bottom) of the process, there are many stakeholders, whereas at the top there remarkably fewer.
- The early stages of global governance, a multi-stakeholder process, involve the private sector, civil society, media, academia and public sector. The number of stakeholders is increasing over time due to the process of globalization, market economy and the increasing inter-dependence of global economies. The recent economic crisis in various parts of the world served as a trigger for more global governance and a new procedural and institutional set-up.
- The decision-makers, meaning the sovereign states, stay at the top of the pyramid of the decision-making stage of global governance. They are the ones who make or delegate the decision.
- The EU is both an actor and recipient of global governance. The division of labour between the competences of the EU and those of its Member States makes the EU participation in global governance complex.
- In the EU, the sovereign debt crisis in some EU Member States triggered new stakeholders (the euro area) as well as new processes and rules.
- The EU can be seen as a laboratory of economic governance and its complexity. As such, it is worth looking at the elements which work well and which can serve as inspiration for global governance. This includes the well-established rules and practices for the involvement of the stakeholders in the rule-setting process as well as the split between the drafting and deciding stages of the process. Global governance, on the other hand, is an inspiration for the EU regional governance.
Value systems – although they come across today in a legalised way as a ‘rule of law’ in Western societies – have their origins in religious traditions. Christian ideas and values still form the basis of Western societies, although now mostly in a secularised fashion; hence they can be called post-Christian values. Moreover, the ‘West’ (Europe and North-America) has successfully universalized its originally Christian based value system. Comparing the impact of Confucianism in East Asia to that of Christianity in the West, one can regard Confucianism – even though it is not a religion in the strict sense – as a functional equivalent of the Christian faith: Confucian values have exerted a profound and lasting influence on China (and East Asia) over a period of even more than 2000 years. As ‘post-Confucianism’ it still forms the ethical basis of the Chinese society.

Considering these differences, the basic methodological aspects concerning a cross-cultural dialogue between China and the ‘West’ will be explored. They include: the relation between partners who participate in a dialogue; asymmetry in the use of language (mostly English nowadays); different historical experiences (collective memory); different kinds of cultural framework (i.e., the symbolic orientation which, apart from language, is the basis of cultural identity), and others.

Considering these general conditions and impediments, a dialogue between cultures could deal with the following four aspects: 1) historical reflection and sensitivity; 2) getting to know the respective other culture; 3) search for common concepts; 4) openness towards the other and willingness to be informed by the other.

Centring, in the following, on intercultural dialogue as a means of defusing potentials for conflict in the international arena, I shall proceed from a few basic assumptions.

First of all, the notion of culture: I understand culture here with Clifford Geertz as inherited systems of meaning which convey identity and orientation in life. Its core is the value system (according to the ‘iceberg-model’ of culture, the one which is invisibly lying beneath the water surface but which is its determining part). In Charles Taylor’s terms we might also call this value system the ‘horizon of significance’. Taylor’s notion is connected to the idea of cultural identity: in his view, defining our identity presupposes a sense of what is significant outside or beyond ourselves; in other words, we need a ‘background of intelligibility’ in order to make sense of our identity.

We should keep in mind, though, that cultures are not static entities but that they are changing over history – intra-culturally and inter-culturally – and are thus dynamic.

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They also allow for considerable differences within themselves. This dynamic of understanding cultures should not lead us, however, into other extremes, such as we often find in post-modern discourse, that is to proceed from a principal and fundamental hybridity of all cultures. In contrast to this fashionable viewpoint I want to emphasize the slowness of cultural changing processes – or the inertia of cultures. For historical processes are by nature quite long, and there is a certain resistance to sudden changes in value systems. Therefore, we can – statistically, as it were – often discern a certain mainstream or centre of gravity in cultures.

Second, being fully aware of the dangers of simple dichotomies, which have become close to being politically incorrect in an era of multi-culturalist creed and ideological anti-essentialism, I still consider simplifications as models to be useful, if not indispensable, namely for the purpose of making basic comparisons. For this reason, I shall refer to certain cultural models which have evolved through history at different ends of the world, such as the Sinic model of East Asia with China as its cultural centre or the Western, European-American model.

Third, cross-cultural dialogue is a hermeneutic attempt of understanding the other, in Hans-Georg Gadamer's terms of getting different horizons to overlap or to merge (‘fusion of horizons’).² This attempt of intercultural understanding has, of course, also its limitations. An intercultural point of view tries to assume a virtual standpoint between cultures; but we cannot, strictly speaking – even in the social sciences – completely step out of our horizon of expectations, which is shaped by our value system, in addition to our individual experience, history, readings, Zeitgeist related preferences and such. Understanding, after all, might be seen as just another form of misunderstanding. For this reason, my following musings will in the end offer nothing else but a probably very subjective and thus mistaken interpretation of cultures and the dynamics between them – I could also call it in the Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi’s words a ‘well-frog view’ of cross-cultural hermeneutics.

**The Dialogue between Civilizations: Methodological Considerations**

How should we approach an intercultural dialogue between the East and the West? Which parameters influence it, what kind of conditions are favorable for it and what should it deal with? First of all, we have to be clear about certain basic conditions of dialogue in general that we are unaware of most of the time. Therefore, I would like to propose in the following a few methodological considerations.

- There is, to begin with, the question of the relation between the two partners who participate in a dialogue. Although our understanding of a dialogue presupposes a fundamental equality of partners, the actual relationship due to different political, economical, cultural and military power or due to a different standard of development is in fact often asymmetrical.
- The decision which language to use in a dialogue – being mostly American English nowadays – also results in asymmetry.
- Different historical experiences are decisive factors for the evaluation of certain contentious issues. The political discourse in Europe, for example, has been moulded by devastating religious wars, fierce national rivalries, the conquest of new worlds, genocide and the philosophy of Enlightenment, while in the history of East Asia we can hardly find any equivalent for these experiences. In the West, we most naturally pre-

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suppose that East Asian partners in a dialogue share our position of critical rationalism (and a critical public sphere) without considering that this approach has its very specific foundation and realizations in the European Enlightenment. These are decisive factors for the evaluation of certain contentious issues and are related to what Jan Assmann has called collective or ‘cultural memory’.3

- The symbolic orientation which, apart from language, is the basis of cultural identity, is very important. This includes different kinds of cultural framework with regard to myths, images, allusions as well as references to literature, art, religion and philosophy.

- A great impediment for intercultural understanding is an ethnocentric attitude which, however, is very common in all cultures; what counts is only what one knows.

- Yet, ethnocentrism still has another side: from the viewpoint of cultural hermeneutics, we, first of all, need a firm ‘centre’, a framework for our orientation, before approaching the other. A ‘reflected’ ethnocentrism is aware of this necessity. An uncritical ethnocentrism, however, treats cultural manifestations as mere superficial phenomena and neglects their foundation in the history of ideas (e.g., the attribution of a ritualized politeness to the Chinese which in the West is looked upon as something negative nowadays, without knowing its roots in Chinese ethics and without having an idea of its inherent positive meaning).

- Another pitfall is to judge the reality of the other according to one’s own ideals without considering historical developments and processes or allowing the own reality being judged by the ideals of the other.

- It is also common to view inconsistencies in the other culture as logical mistakes instead of accepting them as natural ambivalence (or being aware of contradictory phenomena within one’s own culture).

- People easily fall into the similarity trap, assuming that, because of superficial similarities, what one deals with is one and the same (this fallacy has first been encountered in language learning; in terms of cultural phenomena, see the just mentioned example of politeness).

- Some of the most ardent proponents of inter- or cross-cultural dialogue in the West take it as a means – according to their ideological universalistic convictions – to level all cultural difference, the sooner the better. This is not very useful when we want to pursue a dialogue with one another.

- We have to be aware of different stages of development between the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ of the world (e.g., in the implementation of basic rights). The consequence of this assessment is not a cultural relativism but a historical relativism.

- Intercultural dialogue cannot be understood as one side (the student) accepting the views of the other (the teacher). Much rather it should be based on equality, mutual enrichment, enhancing mutual understanding.

Considering these general conditions and impediments, an intercultural dialogue could deal with the following four aspects:

1. Historical reflection and awareness of our own standards.

2. Getting to know the respective other culture, in particular, the logics of its value system.

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3. Search for common concepts.
4. Openness towards the other and willingness to be informed by the other.

1. Historical reflection and awareness of our own standards

We engage in cross-cultural dialogue quite naturally on the basis of our own (political) standards and values, that is, if we take the American model as the de facto norm for so-called ‘modern societies’, from the standard of a post-industrialized, individualistic, pluralistic, libertarian, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic immigrant society. But if we do so, we forget not only that the majority of people across the globe neither live in such societies, nor that they would necessarily find such a standard as desirable as we do, we also forget the historical process and shaping factors that led to our standard.

Value systems as the core of cultures have their origins in religious traditions. As to our own so-called Western culture, whether we like it or not, Christian ideas and values still form the basis of Western societies, although now mostly in a secularized fashion and therefore not easily recognizable; hence we might better call them post-Christian values.

Hence, on a bedrock of Christian value orientation, a set of secular ideas and values developed: the combination of individualism, rationalism, scientism and ideology of progress. It became the driving force in turning Western-style modernization into an endeavour with a tremendous global or universalistic impact. In the course of this development not only half of the globe was colonized by the Europeans but a ‘one-dimensional order of progress’ was superimposed upon the world with its multitude of peoples. As the Korean scholar Yersu Kim, a philosopher formerly in charge of the UNESCO ‘Universal Ethics’ project, remarks:

The synthesis had such a pre-eminence in the minds and affairs of men that nations and societies were practically unanimous in accepting Westernization as the only means of ensuring a viable future. Under the banner of modernization, they abandoned customary truths, values and ways of life, and accepted their degree of Westernization as their measure of progress and regress.4

Thus, the ‘West’ (Europe and North America) has successfully universalized its originally Christian based value system. This was achieved in the age of colonialism and imperialism with the development of science and (military) technology and driven by a quest for discovery. The new Western post-Christian ‘civil religions’ (the ideals of civil society, liberalism etc.) have inherited the universalistic ideals, the original missionary zeal and absolutist claim of its religious predecessors.

If we compare the impact of Confucianism in East Asia to that of Christianity in the West, we can regard Confucianism – even though it is not a religion in the strict sense and historically as heterogeneous as Christianity – as a functional equivalent of the Christian faith: Confucian values have exerted a profound and lasting influence on China (and East Asia) over a period of even more than 2000 years. Confucianism as an institution, unlike the Christian churches, disappeared with the end of imperial Chi-

It formed and, to a certain extent as ‘post-Confucianism’, still forms the ethical basis of the Chinese society.

2. Getting to know the respective other culture, in particular, the logics of its value system

Themes for a cross-cultural dialogue might, first, be the respective philosophical and religious traditions. Although the influence of religions has ceded considerably in the European secular societies, it would be impossible to properly understand the post-Christian value system without taking into consideration the transformation process through which religious values have become secularized into socio-political ideals or morals turned into codified law. The ‘habits of the heart’ are shaped by traditions whose working, in general, eludes our awareness.

The Chinese (and East Asian) traditions are, of course, just like those of the West, very diverse, and yet we can find some common traits that are, collectively speaking, different from their occidental counterparts:

1. More important than faith in revelations or ‘teachings’ believed to be true (orthodoxy) is right practice (orthopraxy) among men.
2. Not the transcendent is the sacred but the secular (Herbert Fingarette), the common or worldly, such as fulfilment of interpersonal duties (in Confucianism) or the natural (in Daoism/Zen-Buddhism).
3. The different schools do not compete with one another, nor do they try to oust each other; they tolerate one another and thus form a syncretistic unity.

This shows that Chinese religious/philosophical thought – different from the Western mainstream – does not pursue quasi-transcendental or epistemological questions (relationship between the world of senses and the metaphysical world); its focus, apart from being more inclusive than exclusive, is rather worldly and rationally pragmatic.

The different religious traditions in China have also led to a specific political culture with other priorities for the common good and living together in society. China and most of the East Asian countries give top priority to social harmony and stability. This preference is grounded in Confucian thought which, as is well known, has spread from China to Korea, Japan and Vietnam and which sees society or state modelled after the family, with consensus and harmony being essential for the survival of both. We thus find here rather a culture of consensus, built on the social cohesion of families and relationships, in comparison to Western societies which, particularly in the modern age of liberal democracies, are based on a pattern of conflict and have the individual as their fundamental element. According to the latter, history, politics and society develop through conflicts between antithetical forces (election fights, labor disputes, class conflict, lately also gender war, etc.) and progress towards a liberated world of autonomous individuals.

Next to individual liberty, the main battle-cry of the French Revolution was equality. Its backdrop was a class society in the ancien régime in which the majority of the bourgeois was dominated by a minority of nobility and clergy. In modern Western societies, equality is vigorously defended by the secular offspring of Christianity and is called, in today’s terms, social justice. In the Chinese society, patterned after the Confucian model of the family, in which we have a natural hierarchy between parents and

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children, equality was hardly ever an issue (apart from the Cultural Revolution). Instead, men and women were and largely still are seen in a network of relationships in which there is higher or lower status, mostly according to the principle of seniority or academic merit. We could thus characterize Chinese culture as a status-oriented culture, as compared to an equality culture in the West.

Lastly, the Chinese society is more shaped by particular relationships and networks, emphasizing the principle of reciprocity as well as duties and responsibilities (this applies as well for other East Asian societies). This is in contrast to the Western tradition which, with claims and rights in accordance to natural or positive law, sets universal rules and codes for everyone alike. For this reason we may follow Fons Trompenaars's distinction of universalistic vs. particularistic in describing Western and Chinese cultures respectively.6

As already mentioned, such a black-and-white dichotomy is – as a model – rather simplified. And yet, not only statistically speaking, but also because it highlights certain traits and trends, it is still justifiable, if treated with due caution. To give an example, the value of social harmony might well be questioned by pointing out the many instances – from the earliest times until the most recent past – when harmony or consensus does not seem to have played a significant role in China. We should not overlook, however, that certain ideals (which is not the same as essences) do play a decisive role in the history of a civilization, even if these ideals – by nature – can never be fully realized. Regarding Western civilization, one might meditate for a moment on the notion that ideals such as charity, peaceableness, equality and the singularity of every person before God, have in their secularized or politicized forms – as social welfare, peace missions, equality before the law, human dignity and rights – moulded our thought and practice in an undeniable way, although the 2000-year long history of the Christian Occident seems to have been a far cry from charity and peace. This is to say, we should be cautious dismissing the shaping power of certain ideals through history by pointing out singular incidents of non-congruence.

3. Search for common concepts (trans-cultural universals)

Simply put, while making comparisons, we can either highlight the similarities or the differences. Having just focused on the differences, we should now look for the similarities. In fact, the search for common concepts in different cultures has been the mainstream of cross-cultural endeavours for quite a while. These concepts are sometimes called trans-cultural universals. There is, for example, in the Confucian as well as in the Christian tradition the concept of the Golden Rule (in its positive and negative form); in Mencius we find ideas of an inborn goodness of human nature which correspond to those of Aristotle as well as to natural law and the modern notion of human dignity. Mencius also has the idea of ‘humane government’ (ren zheng), giving priority to the people and not to the ruler in the polity. Finally, we also find the ideal of the morally autonomous person, all of which has certain parallels in the history of Western thought.

We have to take into account, however, that these ideals exerted a different impact and led to a different philosophical and socio-political history. For example, the idea of moral autonomy of man did not bring about the notion of emancipation of the subject in the sense of Western philosophy, but a so-called ‘personalism’ (gerenzhuyi), meaning

that personal moral cultivation should lead to a heightened sense of responsibility for the common good – an attitude which we find, for example, in the tradition of the qing guan (incorruptible official) and which is exemplified in the words of the great Song dynasty reformer Fan Zhongyan: ‘To be the first to worry about the world's worries and to be last to enjoy the world's joys’. In short, what was called for was not self-assertion but the overcoming of selfishness; not self-realization, as it is fashionable today, but self-transcendence, in other words, cultivation of oneself from a small, egocentric self to a large, all encompassing self (similarly to Buddhism where the recognition of the fictitiousness, the illusion of the self is, in fact, enlightenment).  

Hence, we have to be aware of the similarity trap and keep in mind that these similar philosophical or political ideals developed in a different context, the main difference being that in Western thought there evolved around the Enlightenment and French Revolution an antagonism between state (government) and individual (citizen). This antagonism brought about the concepts of civil society and public sphere with the notion of citizens or intellectuals being critically and independently opposed to the state. In the Confucian tradition, however, the intellectual should be concerned about the welfare of the people and was always supposed to serve within the government; at the same time he ought to be a loyal critic of moral misconduct, an attitude which is certainly still alive and well in East Asian societies.

Neglecting this context, Western universalists mostly try to find traces of Enlightenment thought such as individual autonomy or notions of individual human rights, dignity, pluralism or democracy in the history of East Asian ideas, often combined with the reproach, that the Chinese, for example, are not maintaining their own traditional standards and would contradict their own tradition. According to such logic, a Chinese universalist could argue that Europeans or Americans find the ideals of charity, equality, justice and fraternity in their tradition but that they are not living up to them, for example, in their relationship to people or countries from the Third World. Apart from that, East Asian universalists might rather look for other trans-cultural universals, perhaps, the idea of accountability, unselfishness, altruism, etc. This means, we have to proceed with caution while looking for such universals. It should not lead us to find logical mistakes or contradictions between tradition (or ideal) and reality in the other culture.

4. Openness towards the other and willingness to be informed by the other

Other than Europe and America, East Asia can refer to an already a century-long history of intercultural learning from the West. The following assessment made by an African might just as well hold true for East Asian intellectuals:

Which European could ever praise himself (or complain about) having put as much time, studies and effort into the learning of another ‘traditional’ society as the thousands of Third-World intellectuals who have studied in the school of Europe?  

This is a remarkable advance in terms of mutual openness and readiness to learn from each other. It might give us an idea of what we as Europeans (and, perhaps, also Americans) have to catch up with in terms of cross-cultural learning.

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In this context, the Sinic model might serve as a critical reflection of our own Western blueprint of the ‘good society’. Such a critical reflection would entail a stock-taking as well as an extrapolation of the global implications of Western civilization into the future. In other words, we would have to ask what a civilizational blueprint for the twenty-first century could be like. By now it has become clear that the Western model – although having been an unprecedented success-story and being copied worldwide – has serious deficiencies and would not, in many ways, stand up to the standards of a civilization, at least not in the sense the word ‘civilized’ is commonly used today. (This insight prompted Mahatma Gandhi’s celebrated quip: asked ‘Mr. Gandhi, what do you think of Western civilization?’ he responded ‘It would be a good idea.’) We know by now that the ideology of progress and growth (built on the positive understanding of self-interest) underlying the present global capitalist system will sooner or later arrive at its economical and ecological limits simply because of the limitations of the natural resources and a growing world population. The risks inherent in a global (i.e., universalistic) market with quick and unlimited capital flow between different regions of the world have also become apparent, having led not only to the ‘Asian’ financial crisis in 1997 but also to the most recent and far more serious ‘American’ financial crisis. The development of science has brought about a tremendous material progress; but the belief in scientism, as Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out, has also led to a separation of the true from the good in the social sciences, apart from the problem of their grounding in eurocentric presuppositions. We consider social pluralism to be a great emancipatory leap forward but are also becoming more and more aware of the social fallout, of the waning of solidarity and the rise of social anomie, the break-up of families or other traditional institutions which used to lend stability and cohesion to our societies – in short, the weakening of the social fabric. We may reach a point where our generation will have to apologize to the later-born for the squandering, not only of natural but also of social and ethical resources – squandered in the spirit of après nous le déluge. Where are the cohesive forces in our societies, in which its members are only seen as standing in contractual relationship with one another? Such questions, I assume, will be at the top of the agenda of the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

Because of basic ethnocentric attitudes, we find universalistic impulses regarding value systems in cultures or civilizations all over the globe. Having successfully universalized its originally Christian based value system, the ‘West’ shows particularly strong universalistic traits. There are for sure important universal messages in the Western (Christian and post-Christian) tradition, but there are just as important elements also in the Confucian tradition, not to mention contributions from other cultures. Particularly in view of the global dominance of Western secular values, they fulfil at least a locally valuable compensating or complementary function. Both the social problems in Western countries and the ecological crisis which we are facing today due to the dominance of the eurocentric development model should make us aware that the whole world might benefit considerably from alternative ways of thought, and we should therefore welcome the

11 Wallerstein, I. Eurocentrism and Its Avatars... – P. 98. Ibid.
contribution of intellectuals from other cultures to offer their views on the solution of those problems that concern us all. For human flourishing on this planet, these non-Western values are probably just as important as our Western priorities. Apart from that, universal values – such as human rights – cannot be postulated a priori, as they have, in terms of their implementation, historical differences of development that have to be taken into consideration. For this reason we should entertain more the idea of *negotiated universals* – instead of postulated universals.

To open up to any other cultural tradition through intercultural dialogue means to become aware of the own conditioning through collective memories, experiences, history, *zeitgeist*, that is culture, and to be able to view one's own standards as only relative – or better, as merely provisional and incomplete. In other words, intercultural openness and dialogue might help us – and this, of course, also holds true for people from other cultures – in making us aware of the blind spots in our respective cultural, political and ideological orientation.

What may be needed then in terms of intercultural understanding is neither a theoretical nor an ideological but rather a pragmatic and hermeneutic point of view. In merging Charles Taylor's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's metaphors we could put the task like this: To approach the horizon of significance of the other culture in full consciousness of one's own horizon of significance. If this endeavour is pursued in an open-minded fashion, we may actually arrive, if not at a fusion, then at least at an overlapping of horizons. This would possibly enable us to regard the other concept of the human *telos*, coloured by a specific cultural background, as not simply a different but rather an enriching concept of the human enterprise on this planet.
In the coming decades in the process of globalization the position of the USA and Europe will weaken, while the role of developing countries will increase. The role of the two largest emerging economies – China and India – will be of special significance. What future will these fast-growing giants face? The demographers agree that pretty soon India will lead the world in population and thus surpass China, while China will encounter serious ageing population problems. But economic and political scenarios of the future are quite different: from resounding success and world leadership to collapse caused by demographic and socio-political troubles. Which of them is more feasible? In the present article I analyze the Chinese and Indian development models separately and comparatively and make a forecast of their perspectives in the twenty-first century. Such an analysis could be helpful for understanding Russia’s ways of development.

Introduction: Globalization Closes the Developmental Gap between the States

It is obvious that in the next decades the global political landscape will undergo dramatic changes. The role of the USA and Europe will diminish while that of the developing countries (especially of the large ones) will increase. Numerous reasons determining this process have been defined. They have been analyzed in other works of mine. In any case the diversity of opinions cannot suppress the fact that it is globalization...
that makes this tendency inevitable. Having emerged in the world with a deep developmental gap between rich and poor countries, later it contributed to closing this gap. I think that globalization itself presupposes that developing countries should advance faster than the developed ones,\(^3\) because it strengthens economic openness which, in turn, brings into effect a kind of ‘law of communicating vessels’. As a result, the development of the periphery has accelerated, and that of the core has slowed down.\(^4\) No doubt, this is one of the most significant results in the past two decades. The gap will keep on narrowing (of course, to a certain extent) in the next decades. It will involve economic expansion, as well as poverty reduction and rapid growth of the middle class in the developing countries.\(^5\)

In the 1960s and the 1970s, many economists had no illusions that in the near future the Eastern and South countries would overcome backwardness and depression. They fairly considered those peoples' unwillingness to have a better life as the main obstacle. Poverty did not oppress them; they did not consider it as an unbearable state.\(^6\) Such a mentality is still typical for peoples in the underdeveloped regions, especially in Tropical Africa.

But in many developing countries the situation has changed, and now the inert Third World is turning vibrant. One of the main transformations seems to be the change of life priorities of hundreds million of people who increasingly aspire to break out of poverty and illiteracy to a different life.

Thus, to awaken population of poor countries to activity (that demands great efforts for initial modernization and education) appears to be the major obstacle to a breakthrough. When the desire for better living conditions eventually appears in the undeveloped countries, there starts to work a sort of ‘engine’. It may lead to a qualitative result (though such a ‘Brownian motion’ always entails all kinds of iniquities, abnormalities, nonsense, and injustice, etc.). Once started, the movement for the better will generate social energy for many decades. Furthermore, if people's and authorities' efforts are consolidated, the emerging synergy may bring a resounding success. That was the case in China, India and a number of other developing countries. In wealthy societies with all their advantages in culture, education and qualification, this resource of development ran short long ago. With the account of population aging, opportunities for rapid development are seeping away. This state of affairs defines the system of globalization ‘communicating vessels’. In order to reduce production costs, the developed countries move their capital and production capacities to the developing ones where millions of young people seek for jobs. The engine of the world economic growth, consequently,

\(^3\) It is impossible to substantiate this idea within the present article. We hope to do this some other time. But it is evident that it would be more difficult to narrow the gap without this process.

\(^4\) Thus, developing countries generally benefit globalization despite all the statements about the growing disparity between developing and developed states. We should note that Jagdish Bhagwati appears to be right when advocating globalization against its critics (Bhagwati, J. In Defense of Globalization. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

\(^5\) See, e.g., National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030...

moves from the core to the periphery. Thus, the role of developing countries in the world economy (especially in its surplus production) grows.

At present, the role of the two largest economies – China and India – is especially significant, and their impact will continue to grow in coming decades. It is not surprising, as in 2030 these two countries will account for one third of the world population and, perhaps, 35 per cent of world energy consumption. In the present article I analyze the Chinese and Indian development models separately and comparatively. Such analysis allows detecting some commonalities of all the fast growing countries whose joint influence in 2030 will be great as well.

1. The Chinese Model. Three Drivers: Investments, Export, and Competition between Provinces

1.1. The Chinese Model: General and Specific Features. Growth Factors

The East Asian model of economic development. Many analysts suppose that China generally follows the East Asian development path. This model originated in post-war Japan and then it was implemented in the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Later it spread to South East Asia and to the Pacific Basin.

Despite various peculiarities, the following features of the model are inherent in each country and fully realized in China as well: a) export-oriented economy, especially industry; b) cheap labor force; c) mobilization of foreign investments and creation of favorable business environment, as well as an active import of technology; d) high investment rates (accounting for 30 to 40 per cent of GDP and even more); e) an active participation of a more or less authoritarian state in economic development; f) creation of special economic zones (in China and some other countries).

This model generally provides a high economic growth rate over a long period, while the involvement of capital and technologies allows raising technological level and labor productivity. However, some analysts assume that after per capita GDP in the country reaches $10,000, China's development rate will slow down as it was the case in Japan and other countries.

Specific features of the Chinese model. In comparison with other countries following the East Asian pattern, China has unique (and at the same time fundamental) features of the development model such as enormous population and the greatest (if compared with other countries) role of the state governed by the Communist Party. In China, it is just the great role of the state that provides an extra high savings rate in GDP (see Diagram 1) and makes it possible to invest huge capital and maintain high growth rates.

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8 For the detailed analysis of the Chinese development model see Grinin. Chinese Joker…
The Chinese overseas capital, accumulated mainly in states and administrative districts with the ethnic Chinese populations (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and most of Singapore) also plays an important role. This capital is the source of the vast majority of FDI.

Factors and sources of China's growth (at present their potential is depleting, so these factors can also be considered as potential weaknesses).

- A huge pool of cheap labor and the so-called demographic dividend (connected with reducing birth rate and ‘young’ structure of population). The policy of birth control also reduces expenditures on the growing generation;
- low-cost social policies introduced when there was a young age structure (an opportunity for the state to disregard its obligation with respect to pensions and benefits for a huge part of the population; paid education and medical service for the population; low level of safety at work, etc.);
- plentiful supplies of some mineral resources (coal, iron, oil, rare metals, etc.);
- ‘cheap ecology’ (lack of proper care for environmental protection);
- low exchange rate of yuan, favoring export.

The driving forces of the Chinese development. In China a unique system of forces driving development has emerged in which, unlike in developed countries, it is not domestic private capital but foreign business, local authorities of different levels of administrative division and national corporations that play the major role.

The role of foreign investors in the Chinese economy is extremely significant, and in this very sector, dealing with foreign capital, a major part of export and innovative goods are produced. China has become the world workshop for the processing of raw materials and for the assembly of finished products. This means that local and foreign manufacturers import into China enormous amounts of raw materials, accessory parts, intermediate goods and, after processing or assembling, the finished or semi-finished products are exported. This specialization explains the fabulous figures of the Chinese export and import reaching four trillion dollars. There are only few large corporations in the world that are not represented in China. Foreign capital activity is essential to understanding the sources of China's miracle.

As regards a pure Chinese constituent of the miracle, one should point out the special and extremely effective mechanism of state participation for achieving such a high economic growth rate in production development – that is, a strong competition for investments and high annual growth rates at all provincial and local levels.¹¹ According to the estimates of economist John Lee, domestic investments make up 40 per cent of China's growth, while export sector and foreign direct investments contribute approximately 30 per cent.¹² In my opinion, the successful stimulation of the administrative machinery's interest in economic growth is the key explanation of Chinese development phe-


nomenon. Another powerful source of growth comprises large-scale (including monopolistic) national corporations, tending to invest their benefit in new projects.

**Limitations and drawbacks of the Chinese model.** In spite of the fact that its technology and innovative level is increasing, the *Chinese economy remains generally extensive*, based on extremely huge resources and capitals involved. At the same time *it still remains: a) too resource-intensive; b) too energy-intensive; c) extremely polluting; and d) too export-oriented.* Despite a proliferation of patents the economy generally remains non-innovative.

The Chinese leaders are quite aware of the drawbacks of the existing developmental model. They continue to set the objectives of its transformation and make some efforts in this direction. Nevertheless, despite a certain progress the results fall short.

**1.2. Growth Limits**

Within the current model of development the constraints on China's extreme economic growth have clearly shown up.

1. **Scarcity of energy resources and raw materials** sharply manifests as China is unable to supply itself with energy and raw materials any more and depends heavily on import. At the same time, the increasing import of fuel, mineral and other resources drives the world prices which raise the cost of Chinese export products. Within the current unprofitable export-led model the reliance on energy and resources consumption will only increase.

2. **The coming labor shortage and its increasing cost.** Despite high unemployment rates one can also observe labor shortages. After 2013–2016, labor shortage is supposed to gradually increase, while work-force size – to decrease by 2 million people a year. Due to the existing unemployment and number of rural migrants, the labor shortage will not be sharply perceived at once, but even now in some provinces it leads to a continuing rise in wages. With a limited labor force and wage-push, it will be very difficult to maintain rapid growth.

3. **An inevitable appreciation of export production and risk of capital inflow reduction.** The severe restrictions like the costs of energy, raw materials, labor, and other expenditures, a probable revaluation of the yuan and rivalry of the states with cheaper labor force will be an obstacle for sustaining export growth. But once growth decelerates, the investment flow will also decrease, as it is mainly joint ventures with foreign capital participation that are engaged in export. In 2012, one could observe the export growth deceleration and reduction of foreign investments. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China declined by 3.7 per cent. Moreover, FDI in the production sector

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fell by 6 per cent. The cause is in the growth of labor cost, protests against environmental pollution and, perhaps, anti-Japanese sentiments, forcing Japanese companies to move out to other countries. This tendency continues in the beginning of 2013.

4. **The decline of return on investment.** Today the investment rate in China approaches and even exceeds 50 per cent of GDP (see Diagram 1). This provides a huge share of growth. Since the early 2000s, the investment return has sharply declined and, despite all efforts, remains generally low. At the same time the burden of maintaining unprofitable facilities and the value of potentially unrecoverable debts is increasing. China has an enormous number of excessive facilities in almost all sectors of its economy. The government quite often forces closures of excessive facilities; nonetheless, their number keeps growing. This results both in wasted expenditures and in excessive competition which reduce profit. Of course, this cannot go on endlessly, and sooner or later the investments will decrease, accompanied by a lower growth rate.

5. **Environment.** China takes the lead in the whole world with respect to water, air and soil pollution, acid rains, and the number of sick people suffering from pollution effects. The 12-year plan proposes considerable efforts for a better environment, but the solution to these problems requires huge funding over a long period which will raise the production and export values and affect the growth rate.

6. **The increasing social expenditures.** The population ageing, rising living standards, necessity to maintain social peace and to prevent the development of an extreme gap in living standards and an abnormally high Gini coefficient, as well as concern for an increase of domestic consumption will lead to the growth of the state's responsibilities. Every year China will have to spend more on social needs; that has already had a certain impact, and in medium- and especially in long-term perspectives it will become a heavy burden.

7. **Growing disproportions and the necessity to restrain the growing inequality and to control inflation** have a severe impact on economic policy and growth rates because they constantly threaten the stability of the Chinese society. A too wide income gap contradicts the very idea of ‘building a harmonious society’. Permanent changes of monetary policy in connection with inflation risks also lead to business loss.

**The inevitability of the growth slowdown.** It is difficult to change the existing growth model due to influential forces interested in its maintenance, namely, different authoritative levels and large-scale state corporations. For decades they have made great progress in production expansion as well as in manipulating statistic figures. Moreover, the Chinese bureaucratic and social system is actually unprepared to switch to a new development model. For example, there is the only instrument to avoid overinvestment that every year creates additional excessive capacities in China – the restrictive directives. But this means to tie the provinces’ hands, and, in fact, to stop the major engine for growth.

Taking into account the above-mentioned limitations, one can suppose that despite all the Chinese authorities’ efforts, the growth rates will gradually decelerate. Even under favorable conditions within the next three years the growth rate will not exceed 6–7 per

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cent. And after 2016, it will fall to 4–6 per cent. Although, objectively speaking, such a deceleration can be considered positive for China, the Chinese government has a very different view.18

2. The Indian Model: A Synthesis of Three Worlds
2.1. The General Description of the Model
The Indian model substantially differs both from the East Asian pattern in general and from the Chinese one in particular. It bears no resemblance to any other model; this is a peculiar type of development model. India has a unique social and cultural setting. All its aspects are specific, starting from the fact that the subcontinent lies on a separate tectonic plate. For example, India's attitude with respect to cultural globalization differs in essential ways from that of China's. China's government attempts to control diverse global influences, especially the cultural ones.19 India is much more open. This country itself is an exporter of a number of different cultural patterns, which have become the heritage of the world, for example, yoga, meditation, Tantrism, etc.20

A unified and controversial transitional society. India is a world with a population surpassing that of some continents. In political terms it is founded on the principles of modern national federal state, and at the same time represents a model of a multicultural world where diverse religions, ethnic groups, classes and castes coexist. With respect to cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, India trails only Africa. For almost seven decades, India has been actively transforming from an agrarian, patriarchal and almost illiterate society to an urban, industrial and information-oriented one. Today India is actually an integration of several types of social systems. That said, the old agrarian system, adherent to caste ranking and community structure, on the one hand, provides the modern system with a steady social energy resource in the form of an abundant labor force. On the other hand, the traditional system becomes a source of major problems, as Indians themselves now consider poverty, illiteracy and lack of qualification incompatible with modern standards.

In short, we observe a great transitional economy with distinct contrasts. In particular, a high educational level and a large share of high-skilled specialists coexist with hundred millions of illiterate people; a large middle class (which is not characteristic of all emerging economies) – with mass poverty. Perhaps, one fifth of the population already lives close to the European standards, but a huge part of India's population lives below the poverty line (this line is set too low at that). Of course, there are strong regional imbalances. A true (not imitation) and established democracy – quite a rare case for the Third World countries – goes together with high (for similar states) corruption and inequality. The European-style democracy and the middle class, consisting mainly of graduates, go hand in hand with specific Indian prejudices, including those connected with caste system.

18 In my opinion, the development model cannot be changed if at the same time to pursue the extreme growth rates at any cost. To change the pattern, one should slow down in order not to swerve. If unchanged, the model raises a possibility for a deep crisis in the future. That is why the growth rates deceleration, though causing problems and social discontent, is a better alternative to a structural crisis.


At the same time, it is the caste traditions that serve as an important damper to suppress discontent with social inequality. The caste system preaches that inequality is a natural state and people belonging to different castes should live in different ways. That is why an ultimate decay of caste's ideology and psychology can lead to increasing social tensions.\textsuperscript{21} Today the number of people belonging to the lowest castes and tribes is much more than 250 million.\textsuperscript{22} The share of the poor among them is especially large.

All these and other issues (which are discussed later on) represent the current challenges as well as threats to India's future. Nevertheless, one can hope that the country will cope with them so that they would not be the source of irreparable perturbations.

\subsection*{2.2. Three Worlds Combined in a Single Model}

Contrasts are typical for all fast emerging countries with a transition economy. But India has its own distinct feature. I would rather call it ‘a combination of three worlds’. The matter is that India’s model is a peculiar and still a harmonic mixture of important features of the developed capitalist, socialist and developing countries, that is of all three worlds (the First, the Second and the Third one) of the modern world map.\textsuperscript{23} In my opinion, no other country has such a unique combination, which in many respects determines the peculiarity of the Indian development model. Let us consider it in detail.

It is clear that the \textit{Third World} is associated with poverty and population pressure that drives young people to leave villages for cities. The share of peasants in India's demographic structure is still dominant, the shortage of land and gradual growth of labor productivity in farming generate rural overpopulation, poverty and high unemployment rates. One should also mention widespread adult illiteracy especially among females (see Table 1).\textsuperscript{24} The Indian ethnic and civilizational peculiarity, including a modern version of community self-government in villages (officially these self-governing bodies are called ‘panchayats’) and vivid remnants of the caste system, is also important.

\textit{The Second World} manifests in an active state policy in the sphere of infrastructure and economic development on the basis of five-year plans. The state regulates economic activity and social life. It results, for instance, in supporting small business through regulation, licensing and setting quotas, in the protection of workers’ rights by special laws, in attempts to provide the peasants with minimal means of subsistence (e.g., through their involvement in paid public works, including land reclamation), quotas for women and members of lower castes in representative self-government bodies and so on. Here one should also mention the vigorous struggle against poverty and illiteracy, as well as efforts in demographic regulation.

\textit{The First World}. The positive features of the First World (which imply democratic traditions and high level of development) are uncommon for developing countries.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} The Second (that is the socialist) World, though having reduced its representation, still persists in some Asian countries and (in some spheres) in the CIS countries and also in Europe. It is worth noting that, according to the constitution, India is officially named a socialist secular democratic republic.
\item \textsuperscript{24} The law on universal primary education for children has already been passed. But there are many problems here.
\end{itemize}
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Meanwhile, India is considered a well-established democracy; it has a mature institution of private property and other important institutions of non-state economy such as large private corporations and financial market. The social stratum of self-employed people and high-skilled specialists engaged in private business has also been formed. Some of these features were introduced already in the colonial period. At present other peculiarities supplement them, including achievements in the field of innovations and fundamental science. India has the third largest scientific and technical labor force in the world. About 200 of the Fortune 500 companies use Indian software services. Alongside with China, India has its own space program.

There is no such a singular combination of three worlds in any other developing country. China combines only two worlds: the Third and the Second one. The features of the First world are only emerging on the basis of the Western technology. In Asia, even in the former provinces of British India (such as Pakistan and Bangladesh), democracy can hardly take roots. We can speak about a kind of combination of three worlds in some Latin American countries (especially in Argentine, Chile or Mexico), with the qualification that the institution of private property was formed there long ago. As for Mexico, its development is a result of its active relations with the USA. But the level of democracy there is much lower than in India, and the number of high-tech specialists is quite limited.

In my opinion, the synthesis of the three worlds gives advantages to India in terms of adjustment to different phenomena (see below).

*For the purposes of this article it is very important to view all achievements, advantages and problems through the lens of an Indian harmonic combination of the three worlds.* Firstly, the features of the First World manifest in India's economic structure with its prevailing services sector (including high-tech services) as is the case in developed economies. Secondly, they are evident in its export structure where the high-tech services also predominate.

The features of the Second World result among regulations and other things in government’s plans of economic transformation, in particular, in the development of innovative industries, agricultural productivity growth, infrastructure and medicine development. The features of the Third World constantly show up while in the field of demographic resources they will even sharpen.

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26 It is important to mention that according to the government (Planning Commission… Vol. 3: 251), the unprecedented progress in IT-technology was achieved through the realization of the Government Resolution on software technology parks which was adopted in 1993 (Software Technology Parks) (Ibid.: 255–256).

27 In the GDP structure services account for 59 %, industry – 27 %, agriculture – 14 %. At the same time, the industry's share remains the same for 30 years, while the services sector considerably increased at the expense of agriculture declining share.

Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>73.4 (2001)</td>
<td>75.2 (2006)</td>
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2.3. Characteristics, Peculiarities, and Advantages

The role of the state in India's economic growth is significant (but the state intervenes in quite a different way than it does in China), so it makes sense to consider some of its aspects. The Indian state initially aimed at creating a powerful economy and pursuing social policy. That is why most objectives as well as the means for their achievement (governmental planning and investments, control and regulations) remain consistent. However, in the course of time, especially after the 1991 reforms, the attitude to foreign investments drastically changed. In addition, the problem of growth acceleration was solved and a breakthrough in India's export potential was achieved. As a result, according to the WTO data, India's openness ratio is about 30 per cent, it is several times larger than it was in the 1970s. And the contribution of foreign trade to India's total GDP is growing. It has considerably come close to the share of international trade in the Chinese GDP. However, India's dependence on the world economy is also increasing.

The state's main economic objectives and the means for their achievement are as follows:

1. Achievement of high economic growth rates (up to 8–10 per cent per year) by means of: a) federal and regional planning and government investments; b) infrastructure improvement; c) attraction of FDI; d) development of high technologies; e) development of the education sector; f) import substitution and creation of necessary economic sectors; g) export promotion; h) other measures.


2. Support for small business and the peasantry through restrictions on large-scale business and foreign capital, different privileges, organization of public works etc. In addition, in India such support combines with recognition of corporate giants' special role and necessity to attract foreign investments. Thus, for instance, large foreign retailers cannot expand today, because there are fears that they will drive out small traders. But they are likely to enter the Indian market under certain conditions.

3. Fight against poverty and illiteracy.

The general description of the model. The modern Indian development strategy has many features similar to those of other more or less successful emerging economies. At the same time there are some indigenous features that will be scrutinized below. In the present section I will try to formulate and comment the most important characteristics of the Indian development model.

The main features of the Indian economic model are the following:

1. The large role of the state in all spheres which, however, has diminished since 1991.31

2. The state control over banking sector and quite strict currency regulations, which are gradually loosening.32

3. The large role of large multi-sectoral private and state companies which coexist with abundant (up to 45–50 million) small and smallest businesses in industry and especially in services.33

4. Predominance of the services sector, including financial and other ones, in the economic structure (see paragraph 5), accompanied with a rapid growth of industry.34

5. Large export high-tech sectors and professional services (information and communication technology (ICT), software engineering, outsourcing) which allowed India to occupy a special place in international labor division.35

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6. Active attraction of foreign investments and technologies.

7. Rather high savings rate, attention to infrastructure, scientific and technological innovations.

8. Emphasis on domestic consumption, which serves as an engine of growth, in addition to export stimulation, import restriction and development of import substitution.

9. An important role of the overseas Indian communities.

**Resources and advantages** (presented in two aspects).

Among the advantages, which are India's historical peculiarities or achievements, are the following:

- **The widespread use of the English language**, especially among well-educated Indians, and dissemination of English literature and information: many books and periodicals are published simultaneously in Great Britain, India and the USA.

- A **considerable level of higher education in India and attention to fundamental sciences** that allows for training specialists in different areas (engineers, doctors, and economists, etc.) with sufficient competence and with a good command of English.

- A **large number of high-skilled workers in innovative fields** as a benefit of the first two advantages combined with the Indian government's special efforts.

First of all, the world production of such drugs is supposed to double and reach 230 billion dollars by 2018.

Of GDP, in 2008 it was already 7 per cent. (Idem 2008: 20). The pharmaceutical industry based on production of the so-called generics, that is drugs with expired patent protection, is one of the most important industries in India. The production of such drugs is supposed to double and reach 230 billion dollars by 2018.


39 See Cheshkov, M. A. From Cross Cultural to Wider Generalizations // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenya. – 2009. – № 3. – С. 89–91. In Russian (Чешков, М. А. От страноведческих к более широким обобщениям // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. – 2009. – № 3. – С. 89–91); Akimov. The Project ‘Indian Republic’… It is slightly reminiscent of the situation with Turkish communities in Germany in the 1960s, with the Mexicans – in the USA, except that the Indian emigrants are high-skilled and well-educated unlike Mexican semiliterate day-laborers and uneducated Turkish workers.

40 The Indian specialists studied in Europe and especially in England for a long time. Since the 19th century that was an Indian advantage over China as the latter was for a long time a closed country or in a state of war. Independent India from the very beginning paid much attention to the level of higher education and the quality of trained specialists. It is indirectly confirmed by the fact that many specialists from India have been working in international organizations.

Certainly, the Indian system of higher education has many problems, including the task to increase the number of universities and improve their quality of work (O'Neill, J., and Poddar, T. Ten Things for India…).

all, this allowed creating a huge high-tech services sector (software, engineering, banking, management, accounting, legal, consulting, auditing and other business and information services), which exceeds 100 billion dollars. It also provides the export of high-tech production of knowledge economy. This is a rare and even a unique phenomenon for the Third World. Second, the fact that such specialists are low-paid (by international standards) provides the demand for their work in the USA and all over the world, realized both through recruitment in India and immigration. Of course, this involves a shortage of specialists in India, but at the same time promotes creation of large overseas community which is an important source of currency earnings, advanced concepts and contacts.

**Problems as a downside of advantages.** In developing countries (India is not an exception) many advantages can bring about problems as well. With respect to India these are: 1) demographic resources which are a source of unemployment, poverty and large-scale rural-to-urban migration; 2) low living standards which attract manufacturers. But poverty impedes progress, that is why elimination of poverty is the most important, complicated and expensive task. It is vitally important to solve it. But the solution will make the country's advantages disappear as well; 3) large territory, the development of which requires significant investments in infrastructure (according to some estimates, up to a trillion dollars); 4) receptive domestic market which plays a much more important role in India than in any other developing countries. But along with the market development the problem of protecting the small and smallest businesses from destructive competition of foreign and large-scale capital is rising.

To summarize, the most important peculiarities of the Indian model are as follows:
- comprehensive state-led development strategy which regulates financial flows, investments and support of different sectors (large, small and foreign business);
- developed high-tech services sector and industry which are the basis of the Indian export;
- focus on development of domestic consumption rather than an intensive development of export sectors;
- significant role of overseas Indian communities with a large number of high-skilled workers;
- mineral wealth, particularly large deposits of iron ore and other metals, as well as coal, etc.

### 2.4. Limitations of the Indian Model

The limitations are integral with advantages, first of all, with the extraordinary demographic resources. Besides, one should also take into account that in the near future an unprecedented number of young people will flood the Indian economy.

**The social aspect.** Rapid population growth makes issues of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy rather challenging. Besides, one should note that social tensions often exacerbate just at the moment when there appear opportunities to solve the problems in the short term. This circumstance can become the most important reason for social crisis and even collapse.\(^{43}\) One can clearly perceive that in India the growing ex-

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\(^{42}\) According to the IT Department of Ministry of communications and information technologies, in 2011 the IT production and electronics output in India amounted 88.1 billion dollars (i.e. a 19-percent increase from that in 2010), including software and services – 76.1 billion dollars (Kurbanov, S. A. *Peculiarities of Modern India's Economy Development*. Ph.D. theses. – Moscow: Moscow State University, 2012. – P. 15. In Russian (Курбанов, С. А. Основности развития экономики современной Индии. Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата экономических наук. – Москва: Московский Государственный Университет имени М. В. Ломоносова. – С. 15).

\(^{43}\) On the nature of such modernization crises that tend to occur in many countries see Grinin 2012a.
Economic growth in India is often constrained by a variety of factors. While the country has a strong state power, bureaucracy can be a hindrance. India has an Enormous population which will continue to grow, putting severe obstacles on progress. Corruption also tends to impede progress. We have already mentioned some political risks. In some cases the democratic form of government may not be strong enough to face the political challenges. However, social unrest often causes the growth of ethnic, regional and separatist sentiments and movements. The democratic government and traditions are India's advantages as they help to achieve a consensus and quell discontent when changing government and governing parties. But under certain circumstances they can give rise to political weakness, uncertainty, growth of the populist and nationalist movements impact, conflicts, etc.

So the future of the Indian economy and India as a powerful state depends on solidity of its social and political system. In my opinion, such strength is guaranteed to a degree by its current state system which is based on both the constitutional regulations confirmed at practice and on old traditions (e.g., the elite's conviction in the necessity of seeking appropriate balance of power distribution between its different levels or views that consensus and ideological tolerance are more preferable than struggle). Mahatma Gandhi liked to emphasize 'the beauty of compromise' that allows achieving moral victory with the help of the opponent himself. All this holds out a hope that India has a safety margin and will not collapse when facing challenges.

**The resource aspect.** Enormous population will keep on growing over a long period and together with a planned rapid industrial and urban growth this will aggravate the urgency of old problems including the shortage of farmlands and fresh water. This requires agricultural intensification and investing in augmentation of water resources. India greatly relies on energy imports whose amounts will continue to grow.

**Environmental protection** is the country's most vulnerable problem. In this respect India follows China – the planet's leading environmental polluter. The necessity to substitute coal as the main fuel and energy resource will greatly aggravate India's reliance on energy imports. Ecological problems are closely connected with the shortage of fresh water and farmlands, which are also included in the industry's sphere of interest.

**Bureaucratic and political aspects.** India has a strong state power, but bureaucracy puts severe obstacles on progress; corruption also tends to impede progress. We have already mentioned some political risks. In some cases the democratic form of government
hampers decisive measures and reforms as the leaders have to consider voters' opinion. The political impasse is also quite frequent when a political party fails to take an advantage and then political (legislative) process stagnates. There is also a danger of strengthening foreign policy ambitions which can involve the country in unnecessary confrontation.

Overall, in spite of all dangers, India has no limitations to confound its hopes for successful development and becoming a leader. Of course, there is a possibility of the middle-income trap, when a country attains a per capita income of US $10,000–15,000 and then cannot make a further decisive breakthrough. But India has not reached that level so far.

3. China and India: Common Features, Differences, Relative Advantages and Forecasts

India and China have always been compared to each other. Lately, this tendency has even intensified because the future of global economy depends on these countries' development. Not without reason, these countries have been often called to exchange experience.

3.1. Similarities and Differences

In many respects, the common points are determined by similar tasks and problems the two countries face: maintenance of high growth rates, necessity to provide employment opportunities for youth, rapid urbanization, fight against poverty, agriculture underdevelopment, shortage of resources; poor environmental conditions, reliance on energy imports, etc., as well as limited means of solving these problems, which include attraction of investments, innovations, infrastructure development and so on. The differences naturally stem both from historical, cultural and geographical settings and from different strategies.

Common features:
- large demographic resources;
- high savings rate;
- a big role of the state and public sector in economy and in regulating different spheres; stimulation of national corporations development; a big role of the state in infrastructure development;
- active attraction of foreign direct investments which are, however, regulated and canalized; a significant role of companies with foreign participation;
- export expansion and specific position in the international division of labor.

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striving for technological progress, innovations and education development;

- rapid agricultural development which provides these countries with major food resources, though the productivity of agricultural labor is still rather low and there are a number of problems to solve;

- a lot of similar problems (in addition to those mentioned above are increasing income and regional inequality, poverty, permanent danger of inflation; insufficient political reforms; heavy national debt, etc.);

- each country has some important advantages promoting its successful development but all of them are quite specific (they have already been mentioned above);

- both countries implemented the reforms without a full break with the past as happened in Russia, the CIS, and some countries of Eastern Europe. It is supposed to be a positive factor promoting high growth rates, whereas in Russia and some European countries the reforms were marked by a severe fall in GDP;

- the population of both countries positively evaluates major government's efforts and favors the high growth course and aspiration for leadership. Their leaders' ability to pursue a flexible policy and to alter the strategy is also important, although the possibilities for maneuver are limited by the peculiarities of their political systems.

Differences

- Although the reforms in both countries followed the path of reducing government control, in China the role of the state is traditionally more important, particularly in the banking and credit spheres. This determines many other differences.

- China's savings rate is higher than India's: in 2007–2011 in China it exceeded 50 per cent, in India it was in the range between 32 and 36 per cent (see Diagram 1). This probably contributes to China's higher growth rates and larger GDP (see Diagram 2).

- In China, the economy is generally more export-oriented with a larger role of foreign investment than it is in India.

- The Indian economy is evidently more based on domestic consumption as a source of growth.
The structures of the economy and export are different: in China industry and export of goods prevail, while in India this role belongs to services sector and export of services.

- Due to its export orientation, China always has a positive balance of foreign trade, while India – a negative one.
- In India the role of private capital and small business is larger than in China;
- Indian companies are more often listed on stock exchanges;
- Each country has its own economic mechanisms to drive the development – a kind of hallmarks of their success (in China these are special economic zones, in India – technological parks).

Diagram 1. Gross domestic saving (% of GDP)

Note: Data for India, 2011, are quoted from http://be5.biz/makroekonomika/capital_formation/capital_formation_india.html.

Diagram 2. Gross domestic product at PPP (current international dollars, billion)
3.2. Advantages over each other. Some Forecasts: Difficult Thresholds on the Way to Mature Economy

The above analysis shows that both countries possess great opportunities and face great challenges. One should distinguish between medium-term (i.e. the next one-two decades – roughly up to 2030) and long-term prospects (i.e. over the next three to five decades – approximately up to 2050–2060). In the medium-term, it is worth considering growth rates, the present level of development and immediate tasks. In this respect China has considerable advantages. However, different crises and explosive aggravation of problems can occur, which will significantly change the situation. As regards the long-term prospects and dangers, the change of demographic situation will be of critical importance (fast population ageing and labor shortage in China and, on the contrary, India's still unexhausted demographic dividend and the fact that the Indian population will exceed the Chinese one [see Tables 2–3 and Diagram 3]). Besides, in our opinion, it is the state system's capacity to transform and cope with major problems that will be more important, rather than average annual growth rates. The latter will substantially decrease in both countries by that time. In other words, it is important who will be able to avoid catastrophe and/or overcome problems with less losses.

Advantages over each other: Indian democracy versus Chinese authoritarianism. One can mention the following advantages over each other.

Political aspects. In the short run the necessity to consider the electorate's opinion, to seek political compromise and similar problems associated with the peculiarities of democratic power will be India's vulnerability. In this respect, the Chinese leaders have more opportunities, as they can ignore the voters' expectations. But in the long term, the democratic regime and different political powers' influence can turn to be India's definite advantage over China. First, with all shortcomings of India's government no one in the world doubts the foundations of its state system or calls for sweeping political reforms. There are no problems with observance of human rights and political persecution which are typical for China. Thus, as compared with China, India will not have to undertake extensive political reforms, as its political system generally conforms to the modern standards. On the contrary, China's political system which has greatly contributed to its success will be more and more frequently criticized at home and abroad. The criticism will intensify coupled with growing living standards and increase of the middle class. In the situation of diminishing resources for economic growth and increasing government liability to citizens, substantial or radical changes in China's political regime are undesirable. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not only problematic but also very dangerous and can cause destabilization, extension of populism and the country's disintegration (in this respect, the USSR is a very instructive example). Nevertheless, it is quite possible that some circumstances, social expectations or internal political struggle (combined with outside pressure) will make leaders take that direction. The fact that the Chinese people have never lived under democracy can lead to a severe government crisis and affect economic development.

Of course, India also has certain obstacles on its political pathway. As literacy grows and poverty reduces, new voters will play an increasing role in determining a political party to rule, and this can significantly change the political landscape. There is a danger that India will stumble over political scandals, crisis of the ruling party etc.
fore even reaching China's current level. On the other hand, China also has chances to gradually transform its political regime.

**Political and ideological openness.** India's another advantage is its greater openness and (in comparison with China) political-ideological resemblance to the West, despite all India's uniqueness. Besides, in the leading countries there are large Indian diasporas through which Western culture can penetrate into India.

**Separatism** threatens both countries. Dozens of ethnic groups populate China. But Han Chinese make up the vast majority of population. Therefore, the country's ethnic composition is more homogeneous than it is in India. With respect to the number of ethnic groups (more than 700), India is a unique country. In addition, it is a federation, whose states, according to the States Reorganization Act of 1956, were reorganized on linguistic basis. In short, given an appropriate public mood, there is a perfect opportunity for separation, as growth of living standards and literacy often awakes local nationalism. That is why India's disintegration on the basis of nationality and language is quite possible, though the traditions of consensus will most likely keep the country together. At present, separatist movements are active in the border territories of India and China (Tibet and Xinjiang in China, northwestern Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, as well as north-eastern states – in India). The dangers connected with hypothetical separation of restive states are difficult to assess. But I think the consequences of the separation of Punjab would not be as drastic for India as the separation of the western areas for China. Besides, one should take into account that separatism in western China enjoys much more international support than that in India. There is a real danger of separation of the western Chinese provinces during the transition to democracy. In China the transition to democracy can also generate various forms of nationalism due to the striking difference of the southern and northern provinces' dialects which distinguishes Han Chinese from other groups. On the other hand, community traditions are very strong in China.

In short, there are a number of different scenarios for the future of India and China. Both countries risk drifting into political and social crisis which may lead to a collapse. Still they have a chance to achieve economic maturity without disastrous consequences. But in general, if one estimates the potential of both countries to resist perturbations, India's chances seem better.

**The demographic aspect.** In the following decade, India will most likely catch up and overtake China in terms of population number; by that time each of these countries will have about 1.4 billion people. Then, India will lead the world in population (see Diagram 3). By 2050, India's population will probably reach 1.7 billion people (or a bit less), while in China, even if birth control (the one-child policy) is abolished, population will start declining (as forecasted by the UN, as early as in 2030). China's population by that time will reach 1.3–1.4 billion people (depending on the demographic policy). Consequently, by the second half of the 21st century India's population will be 20–30 per cent

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55 According to some estimates, India can reach this level roughly by 2030 (e.g., see NIC. Global Trends 2030... P. 15).


57 Two demographic scenarios, the first of which implies a preserved restriction and the second – its abolition, will differ not in the expected maximum of China's population number (in the first case it will not achieve even 1.4 billion people, in the second one it will slightly exceed the number), but rather in the rate of the population decrease (drastic – in the former case and less dramatic in the latter one). Consequently, the size of the working-age population in two cases can be very different.
larger than China's. But the most important factor is that the difference in the size of economically active population will be much larger: in India it will be 30–40 per cent larger than in China. However, by that time both countries will face an ageing population problem, but China will suffer from it much more (see Table 2 and 3). According to the estimates, by 2050 about 30 per cent of China's population will be aged over 60,\(^58\) while in India – only 15 per cent (or a bit more).

Table 2

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Source: ADB 2012.

Table 3

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Source: ADB 2012.

Note: * = Provisional budget figure.

Thus, India's main long-term advantage over China is the huge demographic dividend which it can benefit for another 30 years, annually engaging in employment millions of young people. On the contrary, China will experience increasing labor shortages which will raise labor costs. Meanwhile, it will be easier for India to attract foreign capital and produce industrial capacities, taking advantage of low wages combined with rather developed infrastructure and abundance of qualified specialists in different areas. Though, as has been said above, such large numbers of potential of workers and urban dwellers threaten the country with severe trials.

Meanwhile, by 2030 India will significantly narrow the economic gap with China and by 2050–2060 it will be able to overtake or even surpass China in terms of GDP. Still China's production per capita will be larger, because, as mentioned above, India's population by that time will dramatically increase. At present there is a considerable gap in GDP (see Diagram 2).

We have already touched upon the social aspect and resource scarcity. The growing shortage of farmland and water resources, and increasing demand for fossil fuel, etc. may lead to troubles and crises in both countries. But, given the authorities' growing financial resources and increasing living standards, the problems are solvable to a certain extent.

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Conclusion. New Economic Leaders in a World without a Leader

The analysis of the two giant states' development strategies and their potentials argues for the fact that in the next decades their role (and that of the developing countries as well) will increase, while the influence of the West will diminish. China and India will be certainly among the world leading economies in terms of GDP, but not always in terms of growth rates. As has been said above, China's growth rates will inevitably decelerate (among other things this will be caused by demographic problems). In long-term perspectives, India has more resources to maintain a high growth rate; however, in this respect it will be constrained to yield to some fast-growing emerging countries.

It is easily arguable that we will face several upsurges in the peripheral countries, while the current leaders' growth rates will decelerate. Besides, globalization will launch a leveling process among developing countries. In other words, new states, currently representing an example of poverty and underdevelopment, could occasionally take the lead in terms of economic growth rates. Today scholars often speak about (and in the next decades will constantly discuss) a number of new fast-growing economies, including Vietnam, Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia, and Nigeria etc., which already deprive China of foreign investments and a part of the export market. In addition to the familiar acronyms BRIC and BRICS, many new acronyms appear, formed of combinations of different states. The common point for the states included in such combinations is the forecast of their fast economic growth (though one can find some states almost in every such a list, e.g., Indonesia and Turkey). For example, already in 2005 the Goldman Sachs said about ‘Next Eleven’ that this group of rapidly developing middle-tier countries would collectively overtake the EU-27 in global power by

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59 Next Eleven consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, The Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam.
In 2009, Robert Ward coined a new acronym CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa). These countries are favored for several reasons, such as ‘a diverse and dynamic economy’ and ‘a young, growing population’.

In his article Jack Goldstone introduced an acronym TIMBI (Turkey, India, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia). Their combined GDP has already exceeded China’s and will be growing much faster in the coming decades. The economist Jim O’Neill, who in 2001 invented the acronym BRIC, a decade later, coined a new one – TIMS – for the four fast-growing markets (Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and South Korea). Of course, it is not the matter of more or less suitable acronym or economists’ fancy for this game. This phenomenon actually reflects the growing importance of developing countries.

The analysis of the Indian and Chinese models, as well as those of other successfully developing countries, allow speaking about common features of all fast-growing countries (though with wide divergence of their development models), including the following characteristics: 1) state’s active economic policy, including public provision for education; 2) a tendency of high gross domestic savings rate; 3) active FDI and technological flows; 4) export orientation (with simultaneous tendency for import substitution); 5) exploitation of cheap labor; 6) in many cases, aggressive exploration and extraction of mineral resources. Sometimes it is supplemented with country’s benefits of diaspora engagement (e.g., the Turkish diasporas in Germany) or geographical proximity to a developed state, for example, in Mexico, etc.

Finally, we can conclude that due to all transformations the world will face a fundamental reconfiguration. The USA position in the world will weaken at that. But those who suppose that another leader, for example China, will supersede the USA are quite mistaken. The weakening of the USA hegemony will not lead to the emergence of a new leader capable of substituting the USA in a comparable number of functions. Neither China, nor India will be able to assume the burden of such leadership because of economic limits and factors (the problem of poverty, social discontent etc.), the lack of experience and required alliances, as well as the intolerable burden imposed by such leadership. So, despite the tendencies, a new absolute world leader will not emerge in the next decades. But a number of countries and associations will start dominating in different spheres. In short, we will have to live in a new situation and adapt to new realities.

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RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Anastasia V. Mitrofanova

The article discusses interconnections between terrorism and religion. In its first part, a working definition of terrorism is given, differentiating it from other types of political violence. The second part is focused on religiously motivated terrorism. The author questions some popular opinions, such as the anti-modern character of religious violence; peculiar proneness of Muslims to terrorism; and incompatibility of religion and terrorism. The article states that terrorists are sincerely motivated by religion and do not simply use religion to conceal their selfish ends. This part also dwells on specific rationality of religious terrorism. The third part deals with terrorism of millenarian religious groups, such as Aum Shinriko, ‘Order of the Solar Temple’, and others. The paper concludes that terrorist activities of such groups are driven by their theology dating back to Gnosticism.

Definition of Terrorism

The analysis of international terrorism is difficult due to the complexity of this phenomenon. Primarily, no terrorist in the world would accept to be labeled as the one. The greatest Anglo-American researcher in terrorism Bruce Hoffman (former director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence in Scotland) writes that ‘terrorists perceive themselves as reluctant warriors driven by desperation... A communist or a revolutionary, for example, would likely readily accept and admit that he is in fact a communist or a revolutionary... The terrorist, by contrast, will never acknowledge that he is a terrorist...’. Therefore, with respect to the notion of terrorism there was formed an atmosphere of double standards and mutual accusations. There exist definitions of terrorism that involve six or more different characteristics. From the scientific point of view such definitions are unproductive because they do not reflect the necessary and essential features of the phenomenon.

American scholar Alex Schmid analyzed these definitions and clarified that they had the following determinants:

- ‘violence, application of force’ – in 83.5 per cent of cases;
- ‘political’ – in 65 per cent of cases;
- ‘cause fear, terror’ – in 51 per cent of cases.2

These elements are the ones that one should take into account in order to create the most compact definition of terrorism that reflects its necessary and essential characteristics.

By analyzing different definitions of terrorism and known terrorist acts, we can single out the characteristics of a terrorist act. A terrorist act is committed:

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3 Ibid. – P. 40.
By an organization, not an individual person. Bruce Hoffman makes a distinction between terrorists and ‘fanatic killers’ – even when the latter declare political goals. In his opinion, ‘to be qualified as terrorism, violence must be perpetrated by some organizational entity with at least some conspirational structure and identifiable chain of command beyond a single individual acting on his or her own’. Due to this, Hoffman does not reckon the murder of Robert Kennedy by Sirhan Sirhan in 1968 as a terrorist act, for Sirhan did not belong to any terrorist group, although he acted driven by political motives.

– Against civilians (i.e. those who are not public officials or soldiers). If an act is done against a public official or the regular army, then it should be seen as an episode of guerilla war (that is why terrorists often call themselves ‘urban guerrillas’).

– Non-governmental groups. Terrorism should be distinguished from terror. Terror is implemented by the state against its own citizens through various agents of ‘force’. Sometimes the state seeks to mask its involvement in terror, creating the so-called ‘death squads’. This term, which grew out of political practice in Latin America, is now applied worldwide to indicate the characteristics of groups, made with secret support of a state, and often of the agents of state bodies, which are activated in their ‘free time’.

– With a wider objective than an act of violence itself. A terrorist act is often understood in the context of the ‘message’, and some (e.g., the greatest US expert on the topic Mark Juergensmeyer) use the term ‘theatre of terror’, emphasizing that a terrorist act is a statement which is submitted to a wider audience than its immediate target. ‘By calling acts of religious terrorism “symbolic”, I mean that they are intended to illustrate or refer to something beyond their immediate target’, writes Juergensmeyer.

This brings us to the working definition of terrorism as a system of violent actions committed by non-governmental organizations based on political or ideological objectives. Terrorism is one of the many forms of politically motivated violence. In addition to killings and kidnappings of civilians, there are forms of political violence such as guerilla warfare, sabotage (destruction of buildings and property), politically motivated robbery (‘expropriation’).

Terrorists should be distinguished, on the one hand, from the guerrillas (insurgents), and, on the other, – from common criminals. The main difference between terrorists and guerrillas is that the latter carry out armed attacks against the regular army, not the civilian population. Also, traits of guerilla fighters (which are not characteristic of the terrorists) include their desire to conquer and hold territory. From common criminals terrorists differ in their ideological motivation. As Mark Juergensmeyer writes, ‘what puzzles me is not why bad things are done by bad people, but rather why bad things are done by people who other-wise appear to be good’. Numerous attempts to ‘criminalize’ terrorism in scientific terms should be denounced, just as murders of public servants committed for lucrative motives should not be equated with terrorist acts. At the same

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3 Hoffman, B. Inside Terrorism... – Pp. 42–43.
4 Death Squad. The Anthropology of State Terror / Ed. by J. A. Sluka. – Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
6 Ibid. – P. 7.
7 See Vityuk, V. V., Danilevich, I. V. Terrorism as Political Phenomenon and a Theoretical Problem // Terror-

time, there is no clear distinction between terrorism and a criminal offence. Terrorists
can take advantage of criminals or their structures, and criminals quite willingly attach
themselves the halo of martyrs for the idea (e.g., sometimes murderers proclaim them-
selves as ‘cleaners of society’).

There are no solid borders between state terror and terrorism either. On the one hand,
terrorism can get an immense scale, thus reaching the level of state repression (e.g., terror-
list acts of Islamists in Algeria in the early 1990s, when entire villages were razed to the
ground). On the other hand, seemingly non-state terrorist groups may be secret creations
of the state. For example, recently it became clear that many well-known Protestant ter-
rorists in Northern Ireland were actually agents of the British secret services. Be that as it
may, the widely used term ‘state terrorism’ is not accurate from the scientific point of
view. One can speak of state-sponsored terrorism, but not of state terrorism.

In the activities of one and the same organization the terrorist acts may be inter-
twined with a guerilla war or a peaceful social activity. Then it would be more appro-
priate to speak not about ‘terrorist organizations’, but rather about ‘organizations en-
gaged in terrorism’.

The Phenomenon of Religious Violence

For a long time terrorist motivation was of ideological type (ideological terrorists
were populists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, European leftists, Colombian rebels, etc.).
Significantly smaller scale of terrorist activity was acted out by various national liberation
movements (e.g., Irish Republican Army). Even as late as 1968, among terrorist
groups there were none which operated on religious grounds. But already in the 1990s,
about one-quarter of active groups had religious motives.8 This change of mindset
among the terrorists occurred because of the massive disappointment in the secular ide-
ologies (including communism), which had affected developing countries in the 1970s
and by the end of the 1990s – the entire world.

Disappointment in the secular ideologies has led to the situation that the main bene-
ficiaries of these ideologies (students, intellectuals) turned to religion, after which reli-
gions increasingly began to resemble ideologies; in other words, there was a politiciza-
tion of religion. Researchers of political processes in the Muslim world assess, for example,
that the Islamic revolution in Iran was carried out by no means by the clergy (if it is at
all possible to talk about ‘clergy’ in Islam), but by the religiously oriented secular intellec-
tuals.9 This is no surprise since it is exactly intellectuals who have the knowledge on how
to govern states, lead revolutions, and attract the masses to their side, and so on. Moreo-
ver, Iran, where the clergy (i.e. ‘ulemas’, spiritual leaders) if not carried out the revolu-
tion but at least headed it, is a unique case in the Islamic world. In all other countries
(e.g., Algeria), Islamic movements were led purely by intellectuals, who have received
Western or Westernized education.10 John Esposito believes that the majority of Islamic

Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Science, 2003. – P. 18. In Russian (Витюк, В. В., Данилевич, И. В.
Тerrorism as a Political Phenomenon and as a Theoretical Problem // Terrorism in the Modern World:
8 Ranstorp, M. Terrorism in the Name of Religion // Journal of International Affairs. – 1996. – Num. 50(1). –
Pp. 41–62.
political movements are now absolutely state-of-the-art in terms of management structure, ideology, and organizational principles, and that therefore it would be more correct not to tag them as ‘fundamentalist’, as it has become ubiquitous in the press, but rather as ‘neo-fundamentalist’.11

Politicization of religion and the explosion of religious violence occur, thus, not in the traditional, archaic societies, where the majority of the population actively practice religion (participate in rites, cherish customs, and know the theological basics), but on the contrary, in societies that are highly modernized and secularized. The point is that the goal of politicization is by no means the return to the past times, or conservation of archaic elements of the present, but quite the opposite – an attempt to implement a successful modernization in its broadest sense (from economic to social and political modernization). If modernization based on ideas of socialism and Western liberalism failed, then modernization based on religion comes to replace it. As a result, modern terrorists rarely come from the layer of uneducated peasants. They are usually students or intellectuals, from well-off and well-known families at that (a typical example: Osama bin Laden, an engineer by training and a successful businessman). Religious terrorism literally ‘hijacks’ cadres from the ideologically motivated, primarily leftist, radical movements – as Oliver Roy writes ‘the same people who in the 1960s were the followers of Nasser or Marx, have now become Islamists’.12

The very idea of religious terrorism can seem absurd to non-religious people (it is postulated that religion is supposed to teach pacifism and compassion). However, in the religious justification of violence there is nothing that would be principally different from the ideological justification. Indeed, the ethics of most major religions includes the prohibition of murder, and calls for doing good, although any religion per se is a doctrine of salvation, not of ethics. It is exactly in the reference to the necessity of salvation of the soul that abstract ethical norms receive their concrete meaning. Due to this, as the great researcher of politicized religions Mark Juergensmeyer highlights, although almost all religions preach the virtue of non-violence, they always find room for sanctioning violence.13 It is important to point out that political violence can occur within the framework of any religion. Nowadays, one hears and reads much about ‘Islamic terrorism’, but in Islam there are no specific dogmas which would make members of this faith more prone to violence than any others.

It would seem that religious traditions of Buddhism forbid all acts of violence – even annihilation of animals. However, Buddhists, including monks, do not reject religious violence, arguing that it is impossible to avoid in our amoral times.14 By designating their political enemies as the enemies of religion, Buddhists thus gain moral justification for murder. A good example is the 1959 assassination of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka by a Buddhist monk – a terrorist. In other religions, which in principle allow for violence, a similar step is even easier to make.

The Christians also perform acts of religious terrorism. For example, in the United States each year several murders of gynecologists and explosions at birth clinics, perpe-

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11 Esposito, J. L. The Islamic Threat... – P. 120.
14 Ibid. – P. 166–167.
tronized by Protestant fundamentalists – opponents to abortion took place. Even in the work of the classic German political scientist Karl Schmitt it is shown that the well-known verse from the Bible ‘love your enemies’ should in no way be understood in terms of prohibition of religiously motivated violence. According to Schmidt, the true meaning of that quote is that we ought to love our own personal enemies. As for political enemies, the Christian ethic warrants no love for them, but prescribes fighting them. The fight may also be in the form of individual acts of terrorism. Therefore, Islam breeds neither more nor less political violence than other religions.

In terrorism in general, and in religious terrorism in particular, the main principle is motivation. It is not that terrorists use religion for justification of violent actions for lucrative motives (this is particularly evident in cases of suicide terrorists). A true religious motivation can be discussed when an act of political violence is carried out for religious purposes exclusively. Juergensmeyer writes the following about religious wars: ‘These religious activities are not just political exercises justified by religion, they are perceived by the faithful as facets of a more fundamental confrontation. Conflicts of the real world are linked to an invisible, cosmic war: the spiritual struggle between order and disorder, light and darkness, faith and doubt’.

In this cosmic, ecumenical war the enemy is not a ‘political opponent’, but rather something so horrible that no sacrifice in the name of its destruction is excessive. From there derives the irrationality of religious violence when victims are random people, but only at first glance, since in reality what unites them is belonging to a group that possesses the properties of the cosmic enemy. For example, in 1994 a Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein machine-gunned Muslims, who gathered to pray in one of the mosques in Hebron (29 killed, 150 injured), and was then killed by the angry mob. Sikh terrorists used a bomb to bring down an ‘Air India’ airliner in 1985 (328 killed), and in 1983 suicide terrorists of the Hezbollah blew up a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (241 killed). In all three examples there are two traits that almost always accompany religious terrorism: the victims personally had done nothing wrong to their murderers, and the perpetrators of the acts were willing to die in various manners, literally emphasizing their lack of lucrative motives.

Yet, the religious consciousness refuses to accept the motivations of terrorists. Acts of violence are held to be absurd, irrational conduct. ‘How is it possible to kill people just because they belong to another religion?’ Whereas for a religious fanatic, that reason is probably the only justification of murder. In terms of religious motivated violence, Juergensmeyer writes that ‘any individual who was part of a group deemed to be the enemy might justifiably become the object of a violent assault, even if he or she were an innocent bystander. In a cosmic war there is no such thing, all are potentially soldiers’. Notice that in the examples above and generally in the practice of religious terrorism the victims are extremely rarely (if ever) truly random. They usually belong to a group against which (and not against concrete human beings) the terrorist act is di-

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18 Ranstorp, M. Terrorism in the Name of Religion…
rected. They may be Muslims, Hindus, Jews or American soldiers – but certainly not random victims. The impression of irrational acting occurs only because the victims were not personal enemies of the terrorists. However, we hope that what is written above clarifies the misunderstanding.

Moreover, in order to destroy the representative of ‘Universal Evil’ (it does not matter whether it is one person or several), a fanatic terrorist commits suicide without thinking twice. From his, or her, point of view there is nothing absurd or irrational about it, and he or she is not any more irrational than a soldier who throws himself under an enemy tank with a bundle of grenades. Those who are in the tank are only guilty because they were born at the wrong time (and fell under military conscription), their death will not solve the course of the war, and the soldier will inevitably die. Yet, the soldier's conduct is entirely rational, even to non-religious people – since the tank was indeed destroyed, from an absurd action there is an actual result. For the religious consciousness, hell, heaven, the struggle between good and evil are as real as the tank. Religious terrorism is, thus, irrational only to a non-religious mind. The fact that terrorists go to certain death is completely reasonable from their point of view, as in most religious traditions it is believed that those who die for the faith go directly to heaven (even though they had not previously led a holy life in the generally accepted sense). Thus, in his actions, Islambouli (Anwar Sadat's assassin) started from a point of view that the grand prize for a believer is salvation for the sake of which one may kill, or be killed in the name of God.20 Such views were expressed or could have been expressed by all known suicide terrorists.

‘Amateur Terrorism’ and Millenarian Sects

Everything mentioned above refers to a form of professional or organized terrorism. Long it was the only known form of terrorism, except for certain, extreme examples of violence. Terrorist organizations were firmly structured with a fixed membership – a classic example might be the operation of Social-Democratic underground in Tsarist Russia. High level of organization and professionalism abundantly facilitated the work of the police after such groups were detected and arrested. Even during the 1990s, according to experts, in addition to a general strengthening of religious terrorism in the world, there was another significant change: what appeared is the so-called ‘amateur terrorism’.21 Now terrorist acts are carried out often by people who either do not belong to any organization, or belong to a loosely structured community. Sometimes these are simply virtual communities, i.e. members of the organization never meet in person, rather only maintain electronic links. Sometimes there is no need for links – a lone person performs an action at his or her own risk. In the case of an amateur terrorist act, ‘an act of terrorism is the result of personal initiative, even though in accordance with the political doctrine’, writes RAND Corporation expert Peter Chalk.22 Amateur terrorism is still dangerous, since in our times an individual can cause severe damage, even and when he or she possess no specific knowledge (all terrorist methods can be easily found out on the Internet).

22 Ibid. – P.24.
It is obvious that no Islamic (usually a rigid structure), or ‘old’ left-wing terrorist groups fall in the fold of amateur terrorism. This concept includes primarily various ultra-right-wing organizations or movements that are concerned with one specific problem (e.g., the movement against abortion) and the so-called millenarian (apocalyptic) sects. The classic example of amateur terrorism is the explosion of a bomb at the US federal building in Oklahoma City (on April 19, 1995, 168 killed, 500 wounded), planted by Timothy McWeigh and Terry Nichols, who held ultra right-wing views, but ‘officially’, did not appear to belong to any organization. Organizers of the act were not professional terrorists and used home-made plastic explosives.

This article will primarily refer to millenarian sects, because their methods of religious violence deviate most profoundly from the ruling notions of rationality. Advocates of political Islam, ultra right-wingers, and opponents of abortion alike all aspire to one achievable result (even after several attempts) in carrying out acts of political violence.\(^23\) It may be argued that it is a cruel thing to kill a doctor, but it may not be denied that the doctor will no longer perform abortions, and in this aspect the deed of the amateur terrorist is entirely rational. It is precisely such motives that led the Jewish extremist YIgal Amir, the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, in trying to stop the implementation of Rabin's peace plans.\(^24\) We will once again stress that most religious terrorists do, at least to some degree, measure the extent of the violence they inflict with the desired goal.

Quite the opposite case is with the millenarian sects (the term comes from the notion of ‘millennial kingdom’). They are also called apocalyptic, as they oriented to the approaching end of the world and the annihilation of the mankind. These sects, experts say, ‘demonstrate proneness to unlimited, unrestrained violence, when a murder is often presented as a means to achieve spiritual enlightenment’.\(^25\) From the sidelines, it seems that millenarian groups do not follow any rational goals, but that they only strive to destruct as many people as possible. Yet, as in the case of suicide terrorists, irrationality of these sects is only ostensible. Similar to violent actions of the Irish Republican Army, American abortion opponents and members of the organization ‘Army of God’, violent actions of the millenarian sects have perfectly defined conceptual foundations. Analyzing their dogmatism and the way of life, we can conclude that all these sects, without exception, belong to Gnosticism, or ‘Gnostic religion’ as some experts call it.\(^26\) As it is known, the Gnostics held the material world for the quintessence of evil, and the human body as a ‘prison of the soul’. In accordance with the views of the Gnostics, a man appeared as a result of a terrible error, when a part of the spiritual energy found itself locked in a material dungeon. The goal of the Gnostics, throughout the history of exist-

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\(^23\) Among other things, there are proofs that members of different sects do feel certain closeness among themselves. For example, the Oklahoma City explosion happened on the day of second anniversary of the Branch Davidians sect's suffering by the police (Ranstorp, M. Terrorism in the Name of Religion...). It is possible also to underline the fact that this particular explosion should not be considered as a rationally justified one, as it was not directed toward some certain group (e.g., Afro-Americans) that is considered to be the enemy of the ultra-right wing supporters.

\(^24\) Alianak, S. L. The Mentality of Messianic Assassins... – P. 287.

\(^25\) Chalk, P. Non-Military Security and Global Order... – P. 27.

ence of this religious and mystical tradition was, on the one hand, the liberation of one's own soul from the bondage of the body (that is why they have practiced mass suicide), and, on the other hand, the destruction of the material world. Only in this way, in their view, could the fullness (Pleroma) of creation be restored.

Even now it is possible to clearly delineate among the Gnostic (or rather neo-Gnostic) sects those that are more oriented to their own destruction, and those which tend more to destroy others. In the former group are some well-known sects27 such as ‘People's Temple’ (1978, mass suicide in Guyana, more than 900 dead), the Branch Davidians (1993, the USA – cult members killed by FBI, more than 80 dead), ‘Order of the Solar Temple’ (a series of murders and suicides from 1994 to 1997, Europe, more than 70 dead). As pointed out by Italian researcher Maria Luisa Maniscalco, all these apocalyptic sects had been considered benign until the tragic events.28

The members of these sects, as well as the Gnostics of the past, had absolutely no appreciation of their life and attempted to separate them-selves from it rapidly. Members of the ‘Order of the Solar Temple’ (the teaching of this sect directly derives from Gnosticism, since its leaders considered themselves heirs of the Knights Templar) were convinced that death is only an illusion and that by abandoning their bodies they are to go to the star Sirius. Members of the American sect ‘Heaven’s Gate’ also performed mass suicide believing that, having left their bodies, they would go aboard a spacecraft. Anyone familiar with the Gnostic tradition will recognize in these Gnostic beliefs without difficulty an echo of Gnostic representations of journeys through celestial spheres for the purpose of uniting with the initial world.

When it comes to other type of groups, i.e. those that are more inclined to destroying the material world, it is, for now, sufficient to mention only the ‘Cult of Supreme Truth Aum Shinrikyo’, created in 1984 in Japan. Aum is the only apocalyptic sect which has been proved to have carried out a terrorist act (releasing sarin gas in Tokyo's underground transport system, in March 1995, 12 deaths) against random people who did not belong to any group. Beliefs of Aum carry a syncretic character and incorporate elements of both Eastern (Tibetan Buddhism, Hinduism) as well as Western religions, especially that of Gnosticism. The central idea of eschatology of Aum consists of the idea that a nuclear war will break out in the near future, in which the majority of the population would be killed, while a new, clean world would be populated by only members of the sect. Aum had managed to gain a relative international popularity, and an especially large number of supporters, more than in Japan, the sect gained in Russia.

After the commission of a terrorist act in the Tokyo subway by the sect, it became clear that during the entire period of its existence (fore more than 10 previous years) Aum worked on making chemical and biological weapons with the aim of provoking a war between Japan and the United States, which should spread into a global catastrophe.

The ministers of Aum especially targeted recruits among students who study physics, medicine, biochemistry, biology and engineering sciences – we should remember that in the Islamic world exactly these categories of young people were eager to join Islamic movements. At the same time, legal and illegal purchases of components to make weapons were taking place. In particularly, in 1997 the head of Aum's ‘intelligence service’ said that the technology for making sarin gas was purchased in Russia by

27 More precisely, the sects which became famous only after the atrocities had been committed.
a high state official. 29 Between 1990 and 1995, Aum performed occasional acts of terrorism using different toxins (botulinum, anthrax), which remained completely unsolved by the police. Only in 1995, the not entirely successful (from the sect's point of view, of course) sarin attack put an end to the unpunished, unlawful activity of ‘Aum Shinrikyo’.

It is obvious that the apocalyptic ideas of Aum Shinrikyo do not contain anything original. Many existing sects share with Aum the intense expectation of the forthcoming end of the world, which will occur as a grand and generally non-metaphysical (often nuclear) war, after which the mankind will be destroyed, and only the members of the sect will stay alive to create a new and better world. However, it is considered that no other sect is carrying out active measures to accelerate the end of mankind. States and international organizations have no grounds to ban their activities, which are within the bounds of the principle of freedom of conscience, just because their catechism resembles ideas of Aum, Branch Davidians, or ‘Order of the Solar Temple’. 30 In addition, similar ideas are not openly advertised in some sects, rather it is necessary to pass several stages of initiation to be fully informed of them.

It should be noted that the originally Aum Shinrikyo was perceived as a ‘normal’ millenarian sect, both in Japan and beyond, and that it had freedom to operate and propagate its ideas. In January 1994, an international conference entitled ‘Ecology and Religion’ was taking place in Moscow, at which the representative of a Aum talked about how mindful the sect was regarding the protection of the environment (by the way, the millenarian sects are generally characterized by ‘environmental awareness’ – some of them believe that the catastrophe that will obliterate the world would be an environmental one). In Japan, the organization has not been banned, it exists and propagates its ideas, having renounced all of its ‘destructive elements’.

In all the millenarian sects (those mentioned or not), what is observed is a significant overlap of their dogmas and *modus operandi*. First of all, as the researchers note, this is a clear separation (‘cut off’) of members of the sect from the entire rest of the world, which is understood as something that has no meaning or value, or simply as the embodiment of evil. Therefore millenarian sects make absolutely no proportion between their goals and the number of victims. By the way, vehement conflicts between the sect and the surrounding communities are the basic trademark of the so-called ‘destructive sects’. For comparison, we mention that Christianity does not assume that the saved will be Christians and Christians only. Only God knows who is worthy of salvation. Sects, on the contrary, state that all members of the sect will be saved and only them. It is exactly from there that, in our opinion, the main danger of the millenarian sects comes, and not in their ‘totalitarity’ or ‘destructivity’, since similar accusations can be made of any religion. Separation of members of the sect from the world, coupled with the reflected effort to initiate or cause global disasters – are a threat to global security, and are embodied by this type of sects.

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30 Due to this reason the author of the text is not prone to mention the names of these particular sects.
GLOBALIZATION, MIGRATION AND LABOUR:
IMPERATIVES FOR A RIGHTS BASED POLICY

Patrick A. Taran

Migration has always been an essential component of economic development and social progress in many countries. Labour migration becomes one of the most important sources of regional integration, where regulation of labour migration is implemented at the regional level, for only such large integration unions that exploit the advantages of markets, resource bases and labour potentials amalgamation, can hold out against increasing competition within globalizing world. However, if migration is not regulated by adequate laws and rules, it carries a high risk to violate the rights of people participating in it and to create social tension. Today the discussion on migration represents contradiction between economic logic of globalization, on the one hand, and those moral values which are incarnated by human rights concept – on the other. The focus of such contradictions often concentrates on directly opposite views concerning the way migrants’ rights protection, especially those who do not have legal status, and the ways of guaranteeing security and social stability if foreign citizens prove to be under protection of national legislation. Within everyday reality this contradiction puts migration in the centre of discussion concerning interaction of labour and capital, distribution of economic activities incomes, and how foreign working people and civil society can organize themselves in order to clearly formulate and protect their own rights.

All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.

Declaration of Philadelphia 1944

History tells us that migration has been an essential constituent of economic development and social progress of many countries. Migration is making vast but often unrecognized contributions to economic development of most countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whether in providing labour power and skills for Kazakhstan and new Russia, opportunities for employment abroad and remittance income in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine.

Labour migration is becoming one of the most important keys to regional integration and development, whether among European States, in the Southern Africa Devel-

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1 Declaration of Philadelphia concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organization (ILO), Sections I(a) and II(a) respectively. The Declaration was adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1944 and incorporated as an annex into the revised ILO Constitution of 1946 (when the ILO also became the first specialized agency of the UN). For the Constitution and Declaration see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#pre.

This Globalizing World 135–154
opment Community, or in South America's Mercosur. It is key in those areas precisely because it is regulated and harnessed in regional, interstate spaces of economic and social integration. Only such spaces of larger markets, larger resource bases and larger labour forces will be able to meet the competitive demands of a globalized world. This is true for the CIS as well.

However, unless regulated by appropriate laws and regulations, migration entails a high cost in violations of rights of individuals, in social disruption, in lost or reduced productivity, and lost opportunities for economic growth and development.

Migration today, and the contention over recognition of migrants' rights, represents a cutting edge of contention between the economic logic of globalization and the moral values embodied in human rights concepts and law. This contention is marked by acrimonious policy debate in countries North and South and in international conferences. At the heart of these debates are often opposing views regarding the extent to which human rights protections apply to migrants – especially those in irregular situations – as opposed to both security and social considerations relativizing or excluding foreigners from protection under national law.

In day to day reality, this contention makes of migration a central and significant arena of dispute and redefinition in relations between labour and capital, in distribution of benefits deriving from economic activity, in the level of protection and regulation of conditions of employment and work, and in the extent working people – foreign workers in particular – and civil society can organize to articulate and defend their interests.

Role of Migrant Labour Today

In the economic realm, migrant labour has become a key feature in meeting economic, labour market and productivity challenges in a globalized economy. Migration today serves as an instrument to adjust the skills, age and sectoral composition of national and regional labour markets. Migration provides responses to fast-changing needs for skills and personnel resulting from technological advances, changes in market conditions and industrial transformations. In countries of aging populations, migration offers a potential to replenish declining work forces as well as to inject younger workers, potentially increasing dynamism, innovation and mobility in work forces.

It is a global phenomena; no region and few countries are untouched. ILO has calculated that today, some 105 million foreigners are economically active, that is to say employed, self-employed or otherwise active in remunerative activity, across the world. That is nearly half of the total 214 million people living outside their country of birth or citizenship as of the year 2010. The foreign born commonly represent 10 per cent of the work force in Western European countries. Proportions in a number of countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas are today similar or higher and some countries in the Gulf rely on foreign workers for 50 to even 90 % of their work forces.

Due to economic, demographic and technological changes, increasing numbers of jobs in industrialized economies cannot be filled by native-born workers. Ageing of native work forces combined with declining populations is an important factor. Latvia and Lithuania have already seen reductions of population by nearly 10 per cent since 1989 – including working age adults. The native Russian work force is currently declining by

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some 750,000 workers per year, the consequence of more people reaching retirement age than young people entering the labour market. Fertility rates in Hungary, Italy, Spain, Russia, the Ukraine and elsewhere are well below replacement.3

The current projection for the European Union region is that while today the average social security dependency is two retired persons for seven economically active, the ratio will rise to 4 per 7 by 2050: meaning either twice the contributions per working person or halving the income for retirees.

While migration is not a silver bullet solution to these challenges, it is certainly one of the necessary responses.

**Challenges of Globalization**

Growing economic interdependence of states is a widely acknowledged component of globalization. Regarding the impact on migration, an ILO study said, ‘The evidence points to a likely worsening of migration pressures in many parts of the world… Processes integral to globalization have intensified the disruptive effects of modernization and capitalist development… Many developing countries face serious social and economic dislocation associated with persistent poverty, growing unemployment, loss of traditional trading patterns, and what has been termed a ‘growing crisis of economic security’.4

Accelerated trade is replacing or undercutting domestic industrial and agricultural production with cheap imports, but at the expense of many jobs in those sectors, in numerous developing countries. Meanwhile, data indicates that job creation by private sector in many countries affected by Structural Adjustment Programs has not matched the numbers rendered unemployed by downsizing governments.

As the ILO Director General Juan Somavia puts it, *if you look at globalization from the point of view of peoples' concerns, its single biggest failure is its inability to create jobs where people live.* In sum, migration pressures on the ‘supply side’ are increasing as possibilities for employment and economic survival at home disappear.

On the other side, demand for migrant labour is anything but declining. Rather, demographic trends and ageing work forces in many industrialized countries mean that immigration has become an increasingly important option to address changing labour force composition and needs and future economic and social security performance.

Growing competition for highly educated specialists in expanding service sectors has resulted in a significant rise in skilled labour migration. Simultaneously, needs around the world to fill the so-called ‘3-D jobs’ (dirty, dangerous and degrading) and thus maintain economic competitiveness through low labour costs produces a continuous demand for cheap and low-skilled migrant labour in many countries.

**Stakes High for Future Cohesion, Economic Viability and Social Welfare**

To determine how important migration may be, ILO conducted a future simulation for Western Europe using its methodology to predict performance of social security systems, a method proven accurate over the previous ten years. The findings? If current trends remain the same regarding population aging and decline, female participation in the

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3 For example, the UN Population Division World Population Report shows fertility rates in Spain at 1.29 in 2000–2005 and averaging slightly higher at 1.43 over the period 2005–2010.
work force, retirement age, low immigration, and modest advances in productivity, the standard of living in Western Europe measured by per capita income of gross domestic product will be 78 per cent of what it is today, 22 per cent lower.\(^5\)

While migration is not the ‘silver bullet’ solution alone, it is clearly one important element among several macro-policy responses required to achieve a more positive outcome than this simulation indicates.

Migration will have major influence on economic performance, productivity and future well-being in Europe, as well as in Asia, North America and in the CIS region.

Today, migrant labour in both developed and developing countries largely fills ‘three-D’ jobs: Efforts to fill 3-D jobs and to acquire economic competitiveness at low cost produce a continuous demand for cheap and low-skilled migrant labour in numerous sectors of national economies. These sectors commonly include agriculture and food processing, construction, cleaning and maintenance, hotel and restaurant services, labour intensive assembly and manufacturing, the sex industry and others. In fact, immigrant labour has long been utilized in industrialized countries as a low cost means to sustain economic enterprises and sometimes, entire sectors of economic activity that are only marginally competitive and would not survive without cheap foreign labour.

Small and medium size companies and labour-intensive economic sectors do not have the option of relocating operations abroad. Responses include downgrading of manufacturing processes, deregulation, and flexibilization of employment, with increased emphasis on cost-cutting measures and subcontracting.\(^6\) In a number of countries, these measures are expanding the number of jobs at the bottom of the employment scale. These jobs are simply not filled by national workers. Workers may not be available because of work force aging and numerical decline – the case in a growing number of European countries and the Russian Federation. Also, unemployed or otherwise available national workers are simply not willing to take such jobs, for reasons of low pay, degrading and dangerous conditions, and/or low status in those jobs and sectors.

The resulting demand for migrant workers provides a significant impetus to labour flows and facilitates the incorporation of undocumented migrants.\(^7\) ILO research in Southern European countries demonstrates the extent to which ‘the migrants take jobs that the locals refuse. It is simply a matter of substitution’.\(^8\) One study noted, ‘We can conclude that migrants are in competition only with marginal sections of the national labour force … when they are not sufficiently sustained by welfare provisions, in specific sectors, and/or in the less-developed areas inside these countries’.\(^9\)

For the less qualified jobs, employers demand workers who will not exercise pressures on the salary structures. Given that, at least initially, immigrant workers will not

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\(^7\) Escobar Latapi, A. Emigration Dynamics in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. 12th IOM Seminar on Migration, Managing International Migration in Developing Countries. – Geneva, 1997. – P. 4.


\(^9\) Reyneri, E. Migrants’ Involvement in Irregular Employment…
challenge the relation between salary and the social status attached to specific occupations, contracting migrant workers avoids the economic risks – particularly structural inflation – that national workers induce when they demand salary increases.

ILO has estimated that, globally, some ten to twenty percent of international migrant workers are in irregular situations, without legal authorization or undocumented. An on-line database on irregular migration in the European Union provides detailed estimates indicating that migrants in irregular situations number between 2.8 and 6 million, giving a range of 11 to 23 per cent of total stocks. Migrants in irregular situations are even more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. However, the presence of migrants in irregular situations appears to have been tolerated by authorities in certain circumstances in some countries. This coincides with the fact that absence of legal recognition heightens the exploitability and lowers the costs of migrant labour, in some cases allowing marginally competitive economic activity to remain in business.

(Mis)treatment of Migrants

The corresponding treatment of migrant workers clearly contradicts internationally agreed human rights principles and specific international legal standards.

Treatment of migrants in general and migrant workers in particular is commonly characterized by abuse and violations of norms, both national where they apply to migrants, and international standards. As noted in the Conclusions on Migrant Workers of the 2004 International Labour Conference:

Despite the positive experiences of migrant workers, a significant number face undue hardships and abuse in the form of low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom of association and workers’ rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Gaps in working conditions, wages and treatment exist among migrant workers and between migrant and national workers. In a significant number of cases unemployment rates, job security and wages differ between regular migrant workers and national workers.

The pressures of higher unemployment rates among immigrants and ethnic minorities make them less susceptible to unionisation, especially in sectors of precarious employment with strong threats of dismissal for either organizing or simply complaining about absences of occupation safety and health protections and ‘decent work’ conditions. As the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) highlights, organizing migrants and immigrants into unions or organizations to defend their interests and rights is often extremely difficult as it is easily intimidated and disrupted by the threat or actual practice of dismissal and deportation.\(^\text{10}\)

Gender, migration and abuse

A word on the gender dimensions is warranted. Women now comprise half of the total migrant worker population; that is as workers themselves, not dependents. Differential opportunities for legitimate employment affect men and women differently. Demand for migrant workers in receiving countries is defined by the labour market segmentation in these countries: opportunities are available for precisely these low-skilled jobs considered suitable for women. The feminisation of international labour migration, together with the fact that most job opportunities for women migrants are in unregulated

sectors (agriculture, domestic work, sex industry) and the existence of sex-disaggregated labour markets contribute to the increase of discriminative labour markets in countries of destination. Female migrants are thus marginalized even further, they are more often left with no option but irregular migration, and exposed to worst forms of abuse.

**Discrimination**

Equality of treatment and non-discrimination are fundamental premises for maintaining functional labour markets and viable labour relations. Equality of treatment and of opportunity is also essential to upholding social cohesion in societies characterized by increasing diversity of populations.

However, discrimination plays an important role in maintaining – and justifying – stratification and segmentation in the labour market. It contributes and mutually reinforces attitudes that relegate or constrain certain identifiable groups to certain roles and strata in the work force.

Repeated, reinforced discrimination leads to depression, apathy, resignation, and marginalization. When people – and groups – are consistently denied employment opportunities, and when they are also confined to ghettos, provided inferior education or training opportunities, perceive law enforcement as providing little protection, and face discrimination in other aspects of community life, the combination adds up to a powerful recipe for exclusion, the antithesis of inclusion that is the fundamental notion of integration.

Unequal starting points or disadvantages, together with discriminatory behaviour, are the key reasons why migrant and ethnic minority workers face greater obstacles than the majority population. In contrast to individual acts of discrimination, societal discrimination consists of arbitrary barriers against the advancement of minorities; the whole ‘system’ disfavors individuals because they are members of a certain group.

Compounding the challenge of discrimination is underlying ideological precepts of the definitions and identities of most nation-states around the world. Historically, these identities have often been constructed around mono-racial, mono-cultural, monolingual, and sometimes mono-religious definitions of belonging in nation-States.

The reality is increasingly diverse, and will inevitably become more so. A pronounced shift of understanding national identities is required. Diversity needs to be legitimized to respect and preserve the essences of identities that comprise that diversity, including those historical national identities.

**Whose Security?**

The contradictions outlined above give rise to contradictions in the rhetoric and practice of States.

In a number of countries, migration is being simultaneously encouraged and combated. Distance between policy pronouncements and *de facto* arrangements reflects a major contemporary contradiction in States' practice. Despite the political rhetoric about illegal migration, some governments appear to tolerate irregular migration while they officially reinforce controls against ‘illegal’ migrant workers. The consequences

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are, on the one hand, a supply of cheap labour on their territories, while on the other hand, migrants are unable to organize in the workplace to defend their dignity and decent work conditions, and they are stigmatized and isolated from allies and support.

With too few options available for legal migration despite both strong demand for foreign workers and a high supply of willing migrants, irregular migration has become the only alternative. However, the placement of barriers between supply and demand establishes a lucrative ‘business’ opportunity for helping people arrange travel, obtain documents, cross borders and find jobs in destination countries despite border barriers.

The flow of low-skilled migrants to more developed regions is channeled by clandestine means precisely because of the non-existence of legal migration categories that would allow for their legal entry in destination countries. Once they are in host countries, migrants remain confined to jobs in unstructured or informal sectors, in irregular work and under exploitative conditions of employment. In contrast, ILO research underlines that legal labour migration channels contribute to both reducing trafficking in children and women and the smuggling of migrants.

Restrictions on freedom of movement combined with absence of enforcement of health and safety protections and inability to ensure payment of wages according to minimum standards all contribute to expanding a market for trafficked migrants who have no choice but to labour in conditions simply intolerable and unacceptable for legal employment. The absence of labour inspection, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, construction, domestic service, sex-work and others where migrants are concentrated, facilitates the space in which forced or compulsory labour can thrive.

At the level of domestic politics and national government administration, promoting an agenda of migration control has become a viable vehicle to capture political attention and budgetary resources. Pursued to the detriment of other considerations, that focus has subordinated fundamental humanitarian and human rights considerations as well as economic and developmental factors to secondary roles.

In a growing number of countries, migration management responsibilities have been shifted from labour ministries to interior or home affairs ministries, thus transforming contexts for policy elaboration and implementation from that of labour market regulation to that of policing and national security.

Despite the vast extent that migration is about work, this shift separates administration of an increasingly sizable portion of the work force from the institution of the State most directly concerned with labour market regulation, conditions of work, industrial relations, and social security.

Reference to social dialogue – consultation with social partners – is absent in many national as well as international migration policy initiatives. ‘Management’ of an increasingly large and important sector of the working class outside normative protections, outside social dialogue and outside labour market institutions contributes to accelerated deregulation of labour markets as well as to deterioration of relations between labour, employers and the State overall.

The policy dilemmas in the economic and administrative realm are reinforced in the political discourse and ideological frameworks advanced in host States regarding irregular migrants. The utility of their presence – in irregular and exploited situations –

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represents a challenge to normative and ideological values of most industrialized countries inasmuch as these persons are denied legal and social protection. A predominant response is banal association of irregular migration with crime, arms, drug trafficking and terrorism, and discussion of draconian measures to ‘combat illegal migration’. Social stigmatization and outright violence is encouraged by the language of illegality and by military terms – as if ‘illegal migrants’ were an enemy in warlike confrontation.

The terminology of **illegal migrant** or **illegal alien** explicitly associates migration with crime, as does placing immigration control in the same category as crime, arms and drug control. While the term ‘illegal migration’ is more ambiguous, the ease by which language of illegal migration is transposed to ‘illegal migrants’ and the manifest association of both these terms with criminality make these terms vehicles to convey – indeed encourage – the antithesis of acceptance and respect. Language conveys values, explicitly and implicitly. The generalized rise of hostility and violence against non-nationals – migrants, refugees, immigrants, even sometimes, foreign students and tourists – is not simply coincidental to the generalized use of these terms.

Legally and semantically, the term **illegal migrant** is an oxymoron – a contradiction – from any reading of human rights values. It contradicts the spirit, if not directly violates the letter, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which clearly establishes in Article Six that every **person** has the right to recognition before the law, and in Article 7, that every person has the right to equality of treatment before the law.

Contradictions pitting an amalgam of restriction and control measures against a rights-based approach to regulating migration are further reflected in international political developments. The adoption and growing number of ratifications of two Protocols, one on Combating Trafficking in Persons, the other to suppress smuggling of migrants, of the International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime puts dealing with migration in a context of crime suppression, prevention and punishment. Both of these protocols focus on suppression and prevention measures to confront two particular aspects of irregular migration (trafficking, smuggling). However, human rights protections are subordinate aspects, and essential only provide certain protection for victims of trafficking.

**Security versus Rights?**

A growing assault on the universality of international principles of human rights has evolved over the last decade; it is now particularly focused on migration and the treatment of non-nationals.

Newly articulated ideological and political arguments specifically challenge the applicability of human rights law and principles to migrants and other non-nationals. On the one hand, post-September 11 doctrines advance the notion that the extent and nature of threats to national and State security posed by ‘international terrorism’ justify – even require – restrictions on human, civil and judicial rights of migrants in Western democracies as well as elsewhere.

The criminalization of migrants and the securitization of States conveniently dehumanizes foreigners, removing the imperative of recognizing and protecting their human rights and precluding solidarity and equality of treatment. Doing so ensures that a significant portion of workforces remain in docile, unprotected and inferior status.

Arguing for securitization of States is also effective in mobilizing public support for repressive measures – impeding in particular access of foreign workers and their fami-
lies to legal defense, social services and ability to organize to defend their interests and participation in host societies.

Relativizing Rights

Proposals relativizing human and labour rights have emerged in the arena of international migration. A ‘utilitarian consequentialist’ approach argues for an explicit trade-off of lowered application of rights and unequal treatment for non-national workers in exchange for increased opportunities for employment in potential host countries. In this approach, rights are commodified as negotiable bundles that may be traded, sold or renounced in exchange for economic benefits in form of access to labour markets. This approach is explicitly based on the premise that certain bundles of rights can be forfeited or traded to ‘earn’ access in temporary and otherwise limited circumstances to employment in developed country labour markets. It also suggests that trade-offs can be negotiated with organizations representing native workers to address their economic and political concerns.

These arguments coincide with continuing calls and initiatives to determine ‘minimum’ or ‘core’ rights applying to migrants. Such initiatives have been articulated for in a draft resolution circulated (but not adopted) at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1997, in proposals emanating from senior officials of IOM, from EU and Council of Europe forums, in academic circles, and proposals to revise ILO Conventions and in discussions around the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Proposals for delineation of ‘minimum rights’ appeared to have intensified with increased ratifications and entry into force of the 1990 International Convention on protection of migrants’ rights. A clear risk in this approach is establishment of a set of guidelines or principles that are much more general, vague and unenforceable in contrast to the explicit standards and supervisory mechanisms of the ILO Conventions and 1990 International Convention on migrant workers.

A Rights-Based Approach

A rights-based approach to migration is placement of universal human rights norms defined by the relevant international instruments as central premises of national migration legislation, policy and practice founded on the rule of law. Application of these norms is conditioned by historical, economic, social and cultural factors.

The central notion of human rights is ‘the implicit assertion that certain principles are true and valid for all peoples, in all societies, under all conditions of economic, political, ethnic and cultural life’. Human rights are universal – they apply everywhere; indivisible – in the sense that political and civil rights cannot be separated from social and cultural rights; and, inalienable – they cannot be denied to any human being. This is the basis of the concept of ‘human rights for all’ articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which codified in a single instrument, norms common to major religious and historical traditions worldwide.

A corollary notion is that universal principles of human rights implemented in the rule of law provide the foundation for governance – governance of nations, of community relations, and of international migration. This notion reflects historical experience that social cohesion and social peace can only be sustained under conditions of demo-

ocratic rule, which in turn requires the accountability, the credibility and the enforceability provided under rule of law.

While not a binding legal instrument in itself, the UDHR has subsequently been adopted or formally endorsed by nearly all the World's nation-States. It has acquired the legal status of customary international law – generally universally applicable as a legal norm.

Two major International Covenants elaborated the principles of the Universal Declaration into binding normative standards on political and civil rights, and economic, social and cultural rights in the 1960s.\(^{14}\) Specific conventions explicitly extending the ‘universal’ rights to victims of racial discrimination, women, children, and migrants were elaborated over the three decades from 1960 to 1990: Convention for the Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination (CERD), Convention Against Torture (CAT), Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, (CMR).\(^{15}\) These seven instruments were characterized as the seven fundamental human rights instruments that define basic, universal human rights and ensure their explicit extension to vulnerable groups worldwide.\(^{16}\)

Three fundamental notions characterize the protections in existing international law for migrant workers and members of their families:

1. Equality of treatment between regular migrant/immigrant workers and nationals in the realm of employment and work.
2. Core universal human rights apply to all migrants, regardless of status.
3. The broad array of international labour standards providing protection in treatment and conditions at work – safety, health, maximum hours, minimum remuneration, non-discrimination, freedom of association, maternity, etc. – apply to all workers.

**International Labour Standards**

Some principles and rights at work that derive from the ILO Constitution and that have been expressed in the eight ILO Conventions\(^ {17}\) are deemed to be fundamental for the protection of human rights for all workers, including migrant workers, by the ILO and its member States. They concern freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labour and child labour and non-discrimination in employment and occupation. Moreover, following the adoption of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ‘all members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of their membership of the Organization, to respect and to promote and to realize in good

\(^{14}\) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

\(^{15}\) Texts and status of ratifications of these conventions are available on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at: www.ohchr.org.


\(^{17}\) C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (1948); C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949); C29 Forced Labour Convention (1930); C105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957); C100 Equal Remuneration Convention (1951); C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958); C138 Minimum Age Convention (1973); C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999).
faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions.\footnote{International Labour Organization. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. – Geneva, 1998. – Par. 2.}

The International Labour Standards in the areas of occupational safety and health, conditions of work, protection of wages and labour inspection, employment policy, maternity protection, the regulation of private and public employment agencies, as well as those covering sectors employing a large number of migrant workers have been identified as equally important to the promotion of decent work of all migrant workers.

The ILO instruments that promote equality of treatment between migrant workers and nationals in the field of social security are also particularly relevant. ILO social security standards define personal scope of coverage irrespective of nationality, almost all contain similar clauses on equality of treatment between nationals and foreign workers in the host country, and the majority also contains special non-discrimination clauses.\footnote{Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 (1952); Employment Injury Benefits Convention No. 121 (1964); Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention No. 128 (1967); Medical and Sickness Benefits Convention No. 130 (1969); Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention No. 168 (1988); and Maternity Protection Convention No. 183 (2000).}
The ILO also adopted several complementary standards that deal specifically with the protection of migrant workers’ social security rights.\footnote{Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention No. 19 (1925); Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention No. 118 (1962); Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention No. 157 (1982).}

International jurisprudence has amply reinforced the application of \textit{International Labour Standards} to policy and practice regarding employment dimensions of migration. Decisions and opinions of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations have repeatedly underscored the applicability to all migrant workers of International Labour Standards covering conditions at work, occupational safety and health, maximum hours of work, minimum remuneration, non-discrimination, freedom of association, collective bargaining, and maternity leave, among others. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association supervising the core international conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining has specifically ruled that all migrant workers regardless of status are entitled to protection and expression of basic association and representation rights.\footnote{See Fifth Edition of the ‘Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO’ (2006).} The ILO Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation (No. 111) of 1958 has been frequently referred to in upholding equality of treatment and non-discrimination for migrant workers and workers of immigrant origin; an example is cited below.

This applicability has also been explicitly upheld in an international court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an Opinion issued in 2003. In its conclusions, ‘The Court decides unanimously, that … The migrant quality of a person cannot constitute justification to deprive him of the enjoyment and exercise of his human rights, among them labor rights. A migrant, at the moment of taking on a work relationship, acquires rights by being a worker, which must be recognized and guaranteed, independent of his regular or irregular situation in the State of employment. These rights are the consequence of a labor relationship.’\footnote{URL: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/13.htm.}
Migrant Specific Instruments

The ILO Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 (No. 97) establishes equal treatment between nationals and regular migrants in areas such as recruitment procedures, living and working conditions, access to justice, tax and social security regulations. The ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention of 1975 (No. 143) established norms to reduce exploitation and trafficking of migrants while insuring protections for irregular migrants, and to facilitate integration of regular migrants in host societies.

The content of ILO Conventions 97 and 143 formed the basis for drafting the 1990 International Convention on migrant workers, which expanded and extended recognition of economic, social, cultural and civil rights of migrant workers rights.23

Together, the two ILO conventions on migration and the 1990 International Convention comprise an international charter on migration providing a broad normative framework covering treatment of migrants and inter-State cooperation on regulating migration.

Eight points describe the importance of these three Conventions:

1. They establish comprehensive ‘values-based’ definitions and legal bases for national policy and practice regarding non-national migrant workers and their family members. They thus serve as tools to encourage States to establish or improve national legislation in harmony with international standards.

2. They lay out a comprehensive agenda for national policy and for consultation and cooperation among States on labour migration policy formulation, exchange of information, providing information to migrants, orderly return and reintegration, etc.

3. The 1990 International Convention further establishes that migrant workers are more than labourers or economic entities; they are social entities with families and accordingly have rights. It reinforces the principles in ILO migrant worker Conventions on equality of treatment with nationals of states of employment in a number of legal, political, economic, social and cultural areas.

4. ILO Convention 143 and the 1990 Convention include provisions intended to prevent and eliminate exploitation of migrants, thus reinforcing the ‘decent work’ agenda defined by International Labour Standards, nearly all of which apply explicitly or implicitly to all migrant workers.

5. ILO Convention 143 and the 1990 Convention explicitly address unauthorized or clandestine movements of migrant workers, and call for resolving irregular or undocumented situations, in particular through international cooperation.

6. These Conventions resolve the lacuna of protection for non-national migrant workers and members of their families in irregular status and in informal work by providing norms for national legislation of receiving states and their own states of origin, including minimum protections for undocumented or unauthorized migrant workers.

7. While the three Conventions address migrant workers, implementation of their provisions would provide a significant measure of protection for other migrants in vulnerable situations, such as victims of trafficking.

8. The extensive, detailed and complementary text contained in these instruments provides specific normative language that can be incorporated directly into national legislation, reducing ambiguities in interpretation and implementation across diverse political, legal and cultural contexts.

23 Texts and related information available respectively at URL: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex and www.unhchr.ch.
84 different States have ratified one or more of these three complementary standards as of April 2010. 24 11 member States of the European Union have ratified one or both ILO conventions. 25

In the CIS region, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kirghiz Republic and Moldova have ratified one or more of these three instruments; Tajikistan is the first to have ratified all three. With 14 additional signatories to the UN Convention (signing is a preliminary step to ratification), it can be anticipated that more than 90 States will have adopted some level of international standards as the basis of national law and policy within the next couple of years. This is a high proportion of the 120 to 130 countries for which migration is an important feature, whether as origin, destination and/or transit countries.

Entry into force in 2003 of the 1990 Convention allowed it to be cited as an authoritative standard, and thus it is today exercising persuasive power over non-party States as well, even though they have not agreed to be bound by its standards. While most States Party to this Convention are primarily countries of origin of migrants, several ratifying States are destination countries (Argentina, Chile, Libya) and others such as Mexico, Nigeria and Senegal have large migrant and immigrant populations on their territories, meaning substantial responsibilities for domestic implementation.

Other States have utilized provisions in the 1990 Convention as a guide to elaborating national migration laws. Recent legal studies have concluded that existing national law in Belgium, Portugal, Spain and other countries is almost entirely in conformity with the main provisions of the 1990 Convention, meaning few legal hurdles to ratification. 26

Nonetheless, the slow progress in ratifications of the 1990 International Convention on migrants’ rights and of the ILO Conventions in the last decade symbolize a broader political resistance to recognition of application of human rights standards to migrants, particularly undocumented migrants.

Rights and social protection carry costs, an implication which confronts the logic of globalized economic competition. Opposition to wider ratification of this Convention reflects pressures to restrict rights and corresponding labour costs of a now internationalised reserve army of labour in order to ensure that it remains cheap, docile, temporary and easily removable when not needed.

However, the absence of protection of human rights and the denial of social protection for a part of society carries enormous costs for economic progress and social cohesion for societies as a whole – whether individual nation states or wider in the context of wider international relations today.

**Elements for a Policy Agenda**

Governance of phenomena that affect economic performance, industrial relations and social cohesion requires a foundation in the rule of law to ensure credibility, ac-

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24 The ILO Migration for Employment Convention No. 97 of 1949 is ratified by 49 countries, the ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention No. 143 of 1975 is ratified by 23 countries; and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families ratified by 45 countries and signed by 14 others. A number of States have ratified both of the ILO Conventions; several have ratified one or both ILO Conventions plus the 1990 International Convention.

25 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

countability and enforceability. Nonetheless, international legal standards provide only a basic grounding for policy and practical measures necessary both to protect migrants and regulate migration.

As the ILO puts it, ‘A rights-based international regime for managing migration rests on a framework of principles of good governance developed and implemented by the international community that are acceptable to all and can serve as the basis for cooperative multilateral action. Existing international Conventions defining the rights of migrant workers provide many of the needed principles, but a sound framework would have to include principles on how to organize more orderly forms of migration that benefit all’.27

Regulation is required to manage capital-labour relations in general and specific features such as labour migration. Market forces alone do not and cannot provide adequate, workable regulation of what is by definition a complex, international phenomenon highly subject to exploitation and conflict.

International dialogue on migration has increasingly focused in recent years in identifying common approaches among States in regulating what is by definition a phenomenon requiring international cooperation. Nearly two decades ago, delegates of some 160 countries agreed upon a comprehensive common agenda in the chapter on migration of the Plan of Action adopted by the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo. More recently, regional migration dialogues, the Berne Initiative’s International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM), and the Global Commission on International Migration28 continued elaborating common approaches.

A vital contribution was the adoption of Conclusions and a Plan of Action on migrant workers at the 2004 International Labour Conference in Geneva.29 Those Conclusions outline a comprehensive approach to regulating labour migration from a rights based approach in the context of labour market and employment considerations. Especially significant is the fact that they were adopted unanimously by ministerial level government representatives together with the leadership of trade union and employer federations from 177 ILO member countries. Equally important is the existence of a normative system, institutional structure, organizational competence, and constituent engagement in ILO behind this Plan of Action to see to its effective implementation. Following this Plan of Action, ILO subsequently elaborated a comprehensive Multilateral policy Framework for Labour Migration from a rights’ based approach that takes into account labour market concerns and sovereignty of States.30

Elaboration of an explicit national migration policy and/or plan of action is a highly useful and increasingly common step by governments to articulate a deliberate approach to migration governance. In Central Asia, the Kirghiz Republic has developed five-year plans on Employment and Migration, and Kazakhstan has established a formal national

migration policy following extensive internal and international consultations; it is preparing comprehensive labour migration legislation.

As described in the ILO Multilateral Framework on labour migration and other models, essential elements for a migration policy agenda include:

1) A standards-based foundation for comprehensive national migration policies and practices.

Migration policy and practice can only be viable and effective when they are based on a firm foundation of legal norms, and thus operate under the rule of law.

As noted above, the three instruments comprising an international charter on migration provide the normative framework and specific model legislative language required for national law, in turn the basis for national policy. The point of establishing legal rights and legislative policy standards is to ensure social legitimacy and accountability, only guaranteed by a foundation in the rule of law.

2) An informed and transparent migration policy and administration.

Immigration practice must respond to measured, legitimate needs, taking into account domestic labour concerns as well. Such a system must rely on regular labour market assessments to identify and respond to current and emerging needs for workers, high and low skilled. Policy and practice will need to address such areas as awareness raising, supervision of recruitment, labour administration, training of public service and law enforcement officials, recognition of educational equivalencies, provision of social and health services, labour inspection, rights restoration and recovery for victims of trafficking, and other areas.

3) Institutional mechanisms for dialogue, consultation and cooperation.

Migration policy can only be credible, viable and sustainable to the extent it takes into account the interests, concerns and experience of the most-directly affected stakeholders. Key stakeholders are the social partners: the employers and worker organizations. Labour ministries need to have a key role. Consultation and policy-making must also take into account the numerous other concerned ministries and agencies within government as well as civil society bodies and certainly migrants themselves.

4) Enforcement of minimum national employment conditions norms in all sectors of activity.

Preventing exploitation of migrants, criminalizing abuse of persons that facilitates trafficking, and discouraging irregular employment requires enforcement of clear national minimum standards for protection of workers, national and migrant, in employment. ILO Conventions on occupational safety and health, against forced labour, and on discrimination provide minimum international norms for national legislation. A necessary complement is monitoring and inspection in such areas as agriculture, construction, domestic work, the sex industry and other sectors of ‘irregular’ employment, to prevent exploitation, to detect forced labour, and to ensure minimal decent work conditions for all.

5) Gender sensitive migration measures.

The feminization of migration and the predominance of abuse of women migrants require recognizing gender equality as integral to the process of policy-making, planning and programme delivery at all levels.

6) A Plan of Action against discrimination and xenophobia.
Discrimination and xenophobic hostility against migrants are serious challenges to governance and social cohesion in every region of the world. ILO research found pervasive discrimination against regular immigrant workers – unlawful discrimination – across Western Europe. The 2001 World Conference in Durban articulated a major component of national policy on migration by defining a comprehensive and viable model plan of action specifically to combat discrimination and xenophobia against migrants at national, regional and global levels, based on common experience from different regions. A specific national plan of action on racism and xenophobia is essential today to achieving and sustaining social cohesion.

7) Linking migration and development in policy and practice.

Migration has long been and continues to generate significant contributions to both development and social progress and welfare in home and host countries alike. However, such contributions will certainly be enhanced by a broad array of policy measures ranging from reducing costs and constraints on transfer of migrant remittances to providing accessible mechanisms for regular migration to validating qualifications of migrants as well as recognition of the employment and economic contributions all labour migrants make.

8) International cooperation.

Formalized mechanisms of regular dialogue and cooperation among States – including participation of concerned stakeholders – are essential in all regions. Of particular note are expanding legal and operational regimes for freer circulation of labour/persons across regional economic integration initiatives in several world regions, including the Andean Community and Mercosur in South America and the East Africa Community and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States.

A Shared Responsibility

Promotion of the rule of law, good governance and social cohesion are shared responsibilities among all stakeholders: government, employers, trade unions, civil society and migrants themselves. Social partners – in concert with migrant associations – have key moral and political leadership roles to play in mobilizing societies and governments to ensure implementation of a rights-based framework for international migration.

Key stakeholders are the social partners: the employers and businesses that provide employment and the trade unions – worker organizations – representing the interests of workers, both migrants and nationals.

A shift of major importance is the evolution of trade union attitudes from ignoring migration – or expressing hostility towards irregular migrants – to taking stands of...
solidarity with migrant workers regardless of status. Major policy shifts followed by extensive organizing drives among migrant workers have taken place over the last decade by mainstream trade unions and national confederations across Europe as well as in Africa, the Americas and Asia. National labour confederations and/or sectoral unions in Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, South Africa, the UK and the USA – among others – have full-time national staff for migrant worker organizing and anti-discrimination issues; all are active in policy advocacy for improved protection of rights and decent work conditions for migrants. The main global and regional trade union confederations have issued calls for ratification of the 1990 Convention and the ILO conventions on migrant workers.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have been active in promoting protection of rights of migrants as well as good governance in many countries. Most CSOs concerned with migration issues are nationally based and focused; regional formations have emerged in Asia, Central America and Europe. In the last five years major human rights monitoring organizations – International Federation of Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch – have given substantial attention to migrants' rights.

Act of the Crisis

The global financial crisis has evolved into a deepening global employment crisis. This employment crisis also has a huge impact on labour mobility and labour migration, both in itself and in perceptions of migration and migrants. This impact and these perceptions only intensify the pressures on and challenges for ‘getting it right’ on migration policy.

It is often said that migrants – like other ethnic minority workers – are the last hired and first fired. This is certainly the case today as a consequence of the global economic and financial crisis.

The global crisis has led to a serious slowdown in world economic activity. Nowhere has this been more evident to many people than in their jobs and their earnings. Enterprises in many countries including the Russian Federation are not hiring new staff; major lay-offs continue unabated. Some companies are resorting to short-time arrangements, such as reduced hours and pay for personnel remaining on the payroll or putting workers on part-time employment or unpaid leave. A review of the impact and recovery from previous economic crises suggests that return to pre-crisis employment levels may take four to five years.

According to the 2009 Global Employment Trends report (GET) issued by the ILO, a dramatic increase has already taken place in the number of people sent into the ranks of the unemployed, becoming working poor or being put in vulnerable employment. Depending on the effectiveness of recovery efforts, the GET report estimates an increase in global unemployment in 2009 compared to 2007 by 50 million.

53 For a global overview of trade union views and activities, see Migrant Workers Labour Education. – 2002. – Num. 4(129). URL: www.ilo.org/actrav.
54 See website of International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) at URL: www.ituc-csi.org. Some 200 articles and items posted relate to trade unions and migrant workers; search by key word migrants.
55 For ample information on evolving civil society activity worldwide on migrants’ rights and around International Migrants Day, see December 18 network website at www.december18.net.
Migrants tend to be among the workers most hit by economic downturns for several reasons. Migrant labour is often used as a cyclical buffer, like other macroeconomic policies aimed at maximizing growth and minimizing unemployment. For migrants, this means they are often the last to be hired and the first to be fired and their employment relationships are frequently non-standard, and in poorly regulated sectors or activities.

In times of economic insecurity migrants easily become scapegoats; xenophobic sentiments and discrimination against migrant workers rise. This alone presents one of the most formidable challenges for social peace and cohesion, and therefore for governance, in hard times.

Data compiled by ILO confirmed the impact on migrant workers:
1) Migrants and persons of foreign origin are hard hit, they are disproportionately among those already laid off or rendered unemployed.
2) Those migrants remaining employed are often affected by reductions in pay, working time, and worsening working conditions.
3) Migrant workers have less access to social safety net support. This is especially true for migrants in irregular situations.
4) However, many migrant workers are not returning home, unless forcibly expelled. This is the case even when they are being offered financial incentives to voluntarily depart. Simply put, conditions at home are even worse. While there may be opportunities for some kind of work in host countries, there are simply none at all at home. The return of migrant workers from Europe or the USA to home countries is a rare exception, and reflects the fact that, atypically, situations in their home countries may be significantly less deteriorated than generally.
5) Migrant workers are thus compelled to take whatever work they can find. They may accept even more substandard pay and abusive conditions than before. This fact presents an immediate policy challenges for governance and for stabilization of labour markets and working conditions.
6) Scapegoating of migrants and xenophobic violence against foreigners are on the rise throughout the world. These are expressed in increased murders and Lynchings of migrants in some countries, in generalized expressions of anti-foreigner sentiment, in hostile political discourse, and in calls for exclusion of migrants from access to labour markets and emergency social protection benefits, and more generally in incidents of conflict between foreigners and ‘nationals’.
7) Many countries reduced quotas or intake of foreign workers; some embarked on deliberate policies of exclusion and expulsion of migrant workers.
9) The further deteriorated situations in home countries make whatever remittances migrants can send an even more crucial lifeline for their families and local communities.
10) What employment opportunities existed earlier for those remaining at home are also evaporating, meaning even fewer options for persons coming back from abroad. This also makes the return of migrant workers potentially a greater threat to labour market stability and ultimately, social stability at home.

However, it is incontestable that, given long term labour market, demographic and technological trends, immigrant labour and skills will be as essential for recovery from the crisis as they already became to productivity and economic progress – in Russia, Kazakhstan as well as elsewhere – in recent years.
Call for Action

It is clear that, given enormous economic and political interest in inaction, change in policy will only come about when significant political and social pressure is generated for adoption of a ‘rights-based approach’ and deliberate regulatory policy by governments.

Common approaches, strategies, coordination, and the ability to mobilize human resources are needed to defend rights and dignity of migrants – non-nationals – and to advance proper and sustainable regulation of migration in the context of today’s globalized world. An agenda of ‘next steps’ includes:

Establishing a Rights-Based Policy Approach
2. Establishing – where they do not exist – national consultative mechanisms on labor migration among social partners (representative national employer and worker organizations) and relevant government entities.
3. Elaboration of a national migration policy framework and strategy for implementation.
4. Expanding and consolidating CIS legislation and policy support on labor mobility across the region.
5. Encouraging cooperation by government with employer organizations and trade unions to elaborate and implement policy as well as ensuring adoption of relevant national legislation.
6. Support should also extend to organizing and affiliation of migrant workers.
7. Explicitly avoiding scapegoating of migrants, particularly by preventing forced expulsions or repatriations of migrant workers that implicitly or explicitly target migrant workers as responsible for jobs loss and rising unemployment.
8. Emphatically repressing racist violence and xenophobia against foreigners, and prosecuting perpetrators of violent acts.
9. Increasing capacity of labour inspection to monitor sectors and workplaces where migrant workers are concentrated, to shore up decent treatment in the face of pressures to increase exploitation.

Discrimination
10. Particular attention needs to be focused on supporting and advocating the implementation of an effective agenda to prevent discrimination and ensure social cohesion. An action agenda was mandated in the Declaration and Program of Action of the Durban World Conference against Racism and Xenophobia.

Core elements include:
- an explicit legal foundation based on relevant international standards;
- outlawing racist and xenophobic discrimination, behaviour and action;
- administrative measures to ensure full implementation of legislation and accountability for all government officials;
- consolidation of independent national human rights/anti-discrimination institutions with powers to address discrimination against non-citizens;
- teaching and speaking respect for diversity and multicultural interaction;
emphasizing positive images of diversity and of migration in communications media.

**Conclusion**

Today, in the context of globalization accompanied by a rise in inequalities in distribution of wealth and exclusion of entire populations from economic and social well-being, greater emphasis is needed on advancing rights-based approaches. These are fundamental to ensuring the primacy of the rule of law, extension and consolidation of democracy, and greater equity in the distribution of material means for well-being and social cohesion.

Migration is a central arena for expression of values in law, policy and practice. Advancing a rights-based framework for protection of migrants and regulation of migration is thus imperative. This requires advocacy and action in promotion of human rights law, of international labour standards, of humanitarian principles and of respect for diversity. These are the guarantors of democracy and social peace.

A primary step is obtaining States' adherence to relevant international human rights standards, particularly the two ILO migrant worker Conventions and the 1990 International Convention on migrants rights. Complementary steps are to address labour market needs, ensure *decent work* opportunities for all, combat discrimination and promote integration.

Promotion of the rule of law and respect for diversity are shared responsibilities among all stakeholders: government, employers, trade unions, civil society and migrants themselves. Social partners – in concert with migrant associations – have key moral and political leadership roles to play in mobilizing societies and governments to ensure implementation of a rights-based framework for international migration.

Progress is encouraging, but the challenges remain huge.
THE ‘AHIMSA FACTOR’: ECOLOGICAL NON-VIOLENCE PROCESS ANALYSIS IN CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL PARADIGMATIC Shifts

Michael Charles Tobias and Jane Gray Morrison

The world is witnessing the sixth extinction spasm in the annals of 4.2 billion years of life on Earth. We lose some 40,000 discrete populations of organisms every day. Species and habitat loss exceeds anything comparable during the last 65 million years. The human population is poised to hit between 9.5 billion and – in the absolute worst case scenario, 15 billion – with all of its accompanying consumption. A new global paradigm that can set the gold standard for ecologically-humble human behavior is urgently required and the nation of China – the largest country in human history, by far – has the potential to set in motion the global processes that are a prerequisite to a new gold standard for rectification of ecological violence. This will be no easy challenge, to be sure.

In this essay the authors examine some of the comprehensive biodiversity, global trade, ecological degradation, demographic and animal rights challenges facing the China of 2013 and suggest some solutions.

What is at Stake?

China's environmental predicament represents some of the best, but also the most vulnerable, of circumstances. In this precarious and dialectical regard it is not alone. The human condition has awakened, as if from a long slumber, to divine in its current situation both peril and promise.

Ecological schizophrenia captures both the upside and colossal downside of human affairs. We are all, each of us, free to choose our destinies. Evolution neither condemns nor liberates us. We alone must be the agents of inspired change.

In May of 2006, The European Environment Agency embraced a concept whose time is long overdue: that of ‘halting the loss of [global] biodiversity by 2010’.1 This announcement echoed the avalanche of data and widespread alarm throughout the world's scientific communities by firmly acknowledging that we are now in the midst of the Earth's sixth massive extinction spasm in the known 4.2 billion history of known life on this planet. The recent acceleration in species extinctions is occurring some thousand times more rapidly than the presumed ‘natural rate’ of extinctions, which is estimated to be one out of every million species, or, between 10 and 100 extinctions annually. The rate of loss varies from location to location, of course. But in some areas we could be looking at literally hundreds of thousands of species wiped out forever in a day.2

2 This assertion is born of three empirically driven sets of data. First, the astonishing revelations of Terry L. Erwin. In a study of one hectare (2.4 acres) of Ecuador's Yasuni National Park tropics, Erwin and colleagues extrapolated a reliable index of invertebrate abundance, and determined as many as 60,000 different species per hectare, many of them endemic within those very few acres of rainforest (Erwin, T. L. The Tropical Forest Canopy: This Globalizing World 155–163
This Globalizing World

As species disappear, their link to other populations is shattered, thus triggering larger and larger collapse of habitat, migratory viability, and the critical genetic robustness of interdependent communities, all of whose breakup can happen as rapidly as in a forest fire, or the calving of an ice shelf in Antarctica, where the root causes are deep within the texture, often beneath the radar screen of detection. ‘Whether it's forests, marine systems, grasslands, you name it, they are in disrepair. For the sake of the planet, the biodiversity science community has to create a way to get organized, to coordinate its work across disciplines, and together with one clear voice advise governments on steps to halt the potentially catastrophic loss of species already occurring’, said Dr. Watson, former chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). \(^3\)

Little wonder, then, that approximately 40,000 discrete populations of organisms across the planet are being extinguished every day. \(^4\)

Ecological Renaissance

Along with the European Environment Agency, China, too, has long embraced an environmental calling. Eco-science, biodiversity protection, renewable energy R&D, pollution mitigation, reforestation and many other ecological sectors have seen a true coming-of-age across the People's Republic. China is well on its way – notwithstanding enormously complex challenges – to becoming a leader in that universal predilection to engender a global ecological civilization. Cutting-edge environmental restoration has been much discussed in Chinese academic and civil engineering circles for years. Eighteen months ago, an important case study of ecopolis, beginning with Hangzhou City, was published by the Research Center for Eco-Environmental Sciences at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Therein, the author Rusong Wang described the ‘ten big eco-infrastructure projects and 1250 eco-engineering projects [that] have been carried out in areas [such] as free-bicycle service system, eco-agriculture and eco-industrial transformation, sustainable consumption, eco-community, wetland restoration, rural sewage treatment, municipal wastes regeneration, eco-cemetery, eco-mapping’. Wang adds, ‘Up to now, 30 per cent and 70 per cent of its townships have met the State and Provincial ecopolis standards respectively, and 6 counties/districts were granted as eco-counties’. \(^5\)


3 See [source](http://www.english.biodiv.gov.cn/zycx/200609/t20060904_92341.htm). See also: ‘Mass Extinction Underway, Majority of Biologists Say,’ by J. Warrick, Washington Post, April 21, 1998: ‘A majority of the nation's biologists are convinced that a 'mass extinction' of plants and animals is underway that poses a major threat to humans in the next century, yet most Americans are only dimly aware of the problem, a poll says’, quotes Warrick. See [source](http://www.well.com/~davidu/extinction.htm).

4 See [source](http://www.rain-tree.com/facts.htm; www.satyamag.com/novdec00/keating.html).

5 See [source](http://www.english.biodiv.gov.cn/zycx/200609/t20060904_92341.htm). See also: ‘Mass Extinction Underway, Majority of Biologists Say,’ by J. Warrick, Washington Post, April 21, 1998: ‘A majority of the nation's biologists are convinced that a 'mass extinction' of plants and animals is underway that poses a major threat to humans in the next century, yet most Americans are only dimly aware of the problem, a poll says’, quotes Warrick. See [source](http://www.well.com/~davidu/extinction.htm).


1 See [source](http://www.eco.confex.com/eco/2011/preliminaryprogram/abstract_27375.htm).
Many of the most provocative implications and exciting opportunities inherent to the ecopolis sustainability design concept are discussed on the Harvard Business, and Harvard Design Schools website devoted to ecopolis. In a recent article, the vertical sustainability and ‘best practices’ approach being employed in the world’s second highest-building, the Shanghai Tower, are examined.

Among the numerous other indicators of a Chinese ecological renaissance are the country’s recent National Strategy for Plant Conservation aimed at safeguarding the future of nearly 5,000 specifically identified threatened plants within the country, to her efforts to expand an in situ network of protected areas. China’s massive 10-year reforestation project is aimed at covering 97 per cent of the country, the largest initiative of its type in any country in history. Initially, an area twice the size of Colorado was planted. By 1998 commercial logging in China’s one designated biological hotspot – the Hengduan Shan, or Mountains of the Southwest – had been halted.

Ecological Challenges

Here is where the much discussed inherent contradictions within Chinese tradition have been pointed out, namely, a reverence for nature in ancient Daoist tradition – seen in so much of Chinese aesthetic appreciation on canvass, in literary and other art and philosophical forms – but, alas, a simultaneous predilection to undermine that very spirituality, in some instances. To date, for example, many individuals continue to ignore the government ban on cutting down forest and data suggests that as little as 5 per cent of the overall forests in Hengduan Shan remain.

Similarly, in spite of major botanical restoration work with endemics and floristic medicinals, it is likely that Chinese wild rice could disappear in little over a decade from now. These are just two examples out of many. Such ecological contradictions are rife within every nation, but for China – that has so much wilderness yet to lose – such contradictions could prove heartbreaking if the challenges they pose are not overcome.

Halting the Loss of Biodiversity

The crisis of disappearing biodiversity cannot be understated: it is the core loss that a nation and her people must fear the most, lest they end up like the extinct culture of Easter Island. As with every economy, China’s spectacular growth is altogether dependent on the vast treasure troves of her natural heritage, no matter how hard it, or any oth-

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6 See http://www.sustainablecitiesfinance.wordpress.com/.
9 A ‘hotspot’ so defined refers to a region that has at least 1500 endemic vascular plants (indicator species) in terrain of which at least 70 per cent has been lost from its original extent. See Michael Charles Tobias, Jane Gray Morrison, Russell Mittermeier, et. al., ‘Hotspots’, the Feature Film Documentary, A Dancing Star Foundation/PBS Feature. www.hotspots-thefilm.org.
12 ‘Chinese wild rice will become extinct in fifteen years’, says Peking University Professor Dr. Lu, in a new report detailing the country’s fast disappearing natural heritage and just some of what is at stake. See Yardley, J. China's Turtles, Emblems of a Crisis // The New York Times. – 2007. – December, 5. URL: www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/asia/05turtle.html.
er country, tries to cover-up in situ depletion by trying to import natural resources from outside her political borders, ecologists call a syndrome of ‘the Netherlands Fallacy’: an equation that correlates sustainability with carrying capacity.13

Should China see its natural heritage go bankrupt to any demonstrable extent, it would be bereft of more than its soul: China herself would be lost.

History has not been kind to the twenty-two great civilizations of the past that ignored the ecological warning signs, as outlined all too clearly by such notable historians as Arnold Toynbee and Jared Diamond.14 In Collapse, Diamond points to three developmental leviathans in China that together embrace ‘the world's largest development projects, all expected to cause severe environmental problems’. They are the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei Province, the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, and the overall runaway development across much of Western China.15

As previously indicated, The People's Republic has as much or more to lose in terms of biodiversity than any country in history. Consider some of the nation’s 'basal ecological metabolism’: nearly 18 per cent of the country remains clad in forest, or 175 million hectares (420 million acres or nearly 700,000 square miles). At least 6,347 vertebrate species including 581 mammals, 1,244 bird species, 284 species of amphibian, 376 species of reptile and at least 20,000 marine species exist within that vast and scattered canopy.16 In addition, nearly 8 per cent of the Earth's plant species are represented in China, or some 30,000, a third of which are endemic (found nowhere else). From the summit of Everest to the Turfan Depression 154 m below sea level, China's altitudinal variations are the largest in the world, ensuring an astonishing turnover rate of species diversity across the vast arrays of China's numerous mountain ranges, deserts, tropical, temperate and marine biota.

Among the country's most critically endangered iconic species are not only the highly threatened Giant Panda, but lesser known creatures, not least of which, the world's 'greatest concentrations of endangered primate species', including the snub-nosed monkeys of the genus Rhinopithecus, and the Hainan gibbon.17 Other astonishing 'Chinese citizens' include Yangtze river dolphins and Père David's deer, snow leopards, Chinese alligator, and the world's largest number of endemic pheasants, not to mention a quarter of the world's unique Rhododendron species, plus some of the most diverse lichens, ferns and other bryophytes on Earth.

Like the countries of the European Union, the People's Republic has committed to halting biodiversity loss, with ever-present benchmarks. The Conservation International authors of the critical book Hotspots in their assessment of China write, ‘...time is short ... pressures on fragmented natural habitats from grazing, clearance, hunting, and collection of forest produce remain, and new threats, such as dam building on all main rivers in the hotspot, mining, and unplanned mass tourism development accompanied by road expansion and wildlife consumption are emerging. This means that the extinction of

15 Diamond, J. Collapse... P. 367.
many of the restricted-range species of plants and animals is a realistic and immediate possibility.  

These warnings are being countered by strong collective endeavors evidencing China's awareness of, and resolve to counter biological degradation with significant sustainability initiatives, as heretofore referenced. While China – like most other nations – has realized the vulnerability of its indigenous flora and fauna, it also knows well the spectacular global scope and importance of such biodiversity. And unlike, say, a place like Yasuni National Park in Ecuador, where insects and spiders have been tracked uniquely for nearly two decades, the invertebrates of China have enjoyed only preliminary research, yet the indications suggest an even more astonishing array of creatures yet to be discovered.

This generation of young Chinese ecologists has much to be hopeful about. But, as is consistent with any mixed record, it will not be an easy path. For example, the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) ranked China 133 out of 146 (with North Korea being 146). By 2008, the Environmental Performance Index showed some improvement: China had risen to a ranking of 105 out of 149 nations listed. China fell behind Myanmar and was just barely ahead of Uzbekistan. But last year, China fell again to 116 out of 132. Much of this can be attributable to China's air and water pollution issues, but also to biodiversity loss.

**Ecological Costs/Benefits**

The approximated cost/benefits accompanying ecological damage in a country the size of China is unambiguous. With net annual losses far exceeding the nation's US$ 10 billion monthly trade surplus average and a general demographic reversal in terms of increasing preferred family size (2 rather than 1), consumerism in China is taking a terrible toll, in spite of the country's trillion dollar plus ‘cash hoard’. Metropolitan statistical areas, with their tally of low sulfur coal-fired power plants, spring up virtually overnight, and the fast-growing number of automobiles are outstripping even the human population explosion. Increasingly, more and more landscapes are being converted to sacrifice areas.

Of course, the targeting of China's growing surplus at an environmental safety net is no less critical than a nation-wide pension fund. While China's official press agency Xinhua cited former Vice Premier Zeng Peiyian, as declaring 'coal, iron and oil' to be the purchases of choice with all of China's cash surpluses, two other looming realities must sound a wake-up call for the country: 1.45 billion Chinese by 2050, a large per-

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22 URL: http://epi.yale.edu; http://epi.yale.edu/epi2012/rankings.


25 Ibid.
centage of whom will be elderly; and vastly truncated natural capital. These represent a potentially lethal combination for biodiversity.

The Agricultural Conundrum

One of the most problematic areas of concern, when speaking of a green future amid environmental disparity and biodiversity loss, involves agriculture. In a provocative Washington Post editorial in March 2011, Lester Brown asked, ‘Can the United States feed China?’ It raised many eyebrows and also provided ample opportunity to reflect on current grain import/export dilemmas, desertification and falling water tables across the North China Plain. Brown writes, ‘Just as China is America's banker, America could become China's farmer’. He explains this scenario by examining how ‘China requires 80 million tons of grain each year to meet just one-fifth of its needs’. If, as Brown speculates, China ‘charges into the US grain market, American consumers will find themselves competing with nearly 1.4 billion foreign consumers’. Politically destabilizing spikes in agricultural prices would not make for the best diplomacy. Brown says, ‘If China pushes US food prices higher, tensions between the two countries may escalate’.

That is one bad side of the equation. Another concerns the basic ecological overshoot and what such consumption, if predicated upon a scenario of exhausted Chinese soils and watersheds, bodes, namely, additional biodiversity fragmentation. Considering that the aforementioned IUCN in China has already published information attesting to the fact that ‘more than 27 per cent of species are considered threatened’. That adds yet another whopping dimension to the challenge of engendering a global ecological civilization with China at the helm, given its size, population, wealth accumulation and biological diversity. Then add the animal rights side of the equation and there are further difficulties. Indeed, as many luminaries from China's own Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Hsheh Ling-Yun, to Leonardo Da Vinci, Mahatma Gandhi and Einstein have said, a human civilization can be judged according to its treatment of other animals. Animal rights are the most telling mirror of the ethical and spiritual challenges facing any nation. For China, the myriad of animal rights and basic animal protection issues are mired in a web of insufficient legislation, monitoring, or regulatory statutes guaranteeing any nationwide coverage. Even across its 31 Provinces, and at least 50 widely varying cultures and language groups, a singular lack of homogeneous ethics in China militates against the likelihood of any surge in empathy towards non-human animals anytime soon.

This constitutes probably the severest crisis in process-formulation that China must contend with, for it underscores all other ecological malfunctions; placing the nation on a path towards those many other civilizations in past centuries and millennia that have actually gone extinct. Twenty-two such civilizations were chronicled by the late British historian Arnold Toynbee. Clarence Glacken, of the University of California-Berkeley made similar strides, as did men like Oswald Spengler, Jared Diamond, and the author of this essay in his 1994 book (and film), World War III: Population and the Biosphere at the End of the Millennium (Bear & Co., Santa Fe, New Mexico).

Chinese Animal Rights Issues

In a Forbes interview with Peter J. Li, Associate Professor of University of Houston, Dr. Li has gone into many details specific to China’s not entirely unique situation. Dr. Li says that, ‘The sheer number of farm animals in China suggests the world’s great number of farm animal are raised in welfare compromised farming conditions in China’. He also speaks about the crisis of Chinese bear farming, ‘shocking farming and slaughter practices’, ‘dog slaughter’, ‘a collective fear of hunger in the minds of people over the age of 50 in China’ that might add to what is, in essence, a stark abnegation of traditional Chinese ethical and aesthetic values; and the overall situation across China given that, as Dr. Li puts it, the country has ‘lagged behind the industrialized nations in animal protection law-making for more than 180 years’. Dr. Li writes, ‘Never in its 5,000 year history did China ever raise and keep hundreds of millions of wildlife species in captivity as it is today’.29

Indeed, Dr. Li reminds us that China surpassed the USA as the world’s biggest meat producer in 1990. And he adds that, ‘While Westerners greet each other by asking “how are you”, Chinese people traditionally greeted each other by saying “Have you eaten?”’ (Ibid.). Dr. Li remembers how, when he ‘met some of [his] old classmates back in China 30 years after graduation, [he] was some 40 pounds lighter than they were. They actually wondered if [he] got enough to eat in the US’ (Ibid.). In terms of food, Dr. Li points to the fact that ‘China’s rapid industrialization has threatened the survival of 398 species of vertebrates’ across China. And he has examined traditional Chinese medicine in terms of its exploitation of Chinese biodiversity, for tiger bone wine with its ‘dubious curative effect’ and Dr. Li goes on to ask ‘whether all these allegedly indispensable and life-saving ingredients for illnesses ranging from eye irritations to cancers, coma, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and even liver transplants are really nothing more than the wildlife farming industry capitalizing on the anxiety of patients’ (Ibid.).

And it is not just Chinese medicine, but a penchant for all things ivory, yet another disastrous cultural addiction that is the primary engine for destruction of African and Asian elephants – the largest land mammals on Earth who share with us, humans, deep self-awareness, emotional and cognitive bonds.

Dr. Li concludes that, ‘Animal suffering is unprecedented in China in magnitude in both numerical terms… and in welfare conditions. With regard to China’s ranking on a global report card, so to speak, I would not hesitate to say that it [China] may be at the bottom…’ (Ibid.)

And yet, he is not all despair and pessimism, pointing out that today, China ‘has an estimated 130 million dogs, many of whom are household pets. As a result, China’s animal protection community is expanding. Some Chinese activists estimated that as many as 30 to 50 million Chinese are animal lovers, bigger than the total population of Canada’.30

China’s Profound Ecological Opportunity

Conversely, despite the aforementioned difficulties, these ‘negative externalities’ could actually – if reversed – pose the greatest opportunity in Chinese history to conserve biological heritage so as to guarantee all the basics for a huge population: clean

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30 Ibid.
water, clean air, healthy soils, ample storehouses of grain, home grown fruits and vegetables, not to mention a legacy of ecological nonviolence and enthrallment for future generations. With such opportunities come the most exciting and noteworthy prospects for ecological entrepreneurs ever, within any country.

For this to happen, Chinese conservation and business need to work hand-in-hand, while the Government hopefully continues to proactively urge the adoption of smart, nation-wide strategies for identifying biodiversity rarity; setting priorities for large scale ecosystem protections to mitigate corresponding economic progress; allocating significant ecological resources; distributing the ‘green benefits’ of virtuous engagement with the natural world; implementing national ‘polluter pays’ protocols and precautionary principles; and exacting much stricter monitoring and enforcement of current environmental and animal rights legislation.

The challenges are exacerbated by the time-frame, which is short. China's position vis-à-vis other countries is one of significant loss: among those nations with the largest number of threatened and endangered plant and animal species, China is one of the worst, ranking 14th and 7th from the bottom, respectively. And while the country has focused considerable attention on the prospects of ecotourism, it has done so without any overall sustainability plan.31

Conversely, with her increasing economic success, and vast opportunities for international carbon credits by mitigation within China, the economics of environmental remediation suggest an industry that will transcend all others in the country, thus providing a win-win for one of the last standing aggregates of critical biodiversity on Earth. In this spirit, China's National Environment Protection Agency has long avowed that ‘the survival of mankind cannot be separated from that of other species’.32

On Point

To this end, China appears clearly on point: recognizing her unique threatened endangered species status since signing on to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2004, China has endeavored to put in place such groundbreaking legislation as its Law on the Protection of Wildlife, while engendering an in-country network of protection mechanisms.33

Ten years ago, the Chinese Academy of Sciences embarked on saving endangered vascular plant varieties throughout the country in a grid of gardens with the ultimate goal being some 458 square kilometers of plant protection, the largest collective botanic garden network in the world.

Hundreds of wildlife breeding stations have been created, and measurable progress noted with rare species like the Panda, the Chinese alligator, Eld's deer and Tibetan antelopes.34 These biological and endangered species endeavors should be viewed as a kind of barometric reading; the baseline for assessing environmental amelioration. Because all economics are a sub-set of Mother Nature, what is good for the Giant Panda is good for all of China.

34 Ibid.
What is Good for China Should be Good for the World

When Jeremy Rifkin spoke last year before the European Commission, treating of what he has characterized as the ‘third industrial revolution’, he described how Germany ‘is expected to produce 35 per cent of its electricity from renewables by 2020’; how ‘Daimler, the company that invented the internal combustion engine that ushered in the Second Industrial Revolution, is readying hydrogen fuel stations in preparation for the mass production of its fuel cell automobiles in 2015’. He described a new vision for the EU’s, putting forth the prospect of [the European Union] becoming the largest and wealthiest internal commercial market in the world.

‘The key, – said Rifkin, – was in creating a seamless distributed renewable energy régime, a green electricity Internet, and a communication and transport network that will allow one billion people to engage in sustainable commerce and trade across the European continent and its periphery. By such means the European Union will come of age’.

Now, consider China’s future. I, too, have a dream for a nation that can also seamlessly fulfill a similar promise as that divined by Rifkin for the EU. That dream involves China that is ecologically compassionate in her embrace of regional biological integrity, and brilliantly proactive in terms of the responsibilities and duties attendant upon every nation in what is, as never before in human history, a globally interdependent environmental commons.

This was well stated during the December 2012 IUCN China roundtable on what was called ‘Nature Based Ecological Civilization’. The IUCN Chair of the Commission on Education and Communication, Dr. Juliane Zeidler, brought forth the concept of ‘Love, Not Loss’, suggesting that the ‘best way to rekindle our connection with nature’ was by remembering not just all that which has gone extinct or is threatened with extinction, but also, and critically, that which ‘we loved in the first place… [to] reconnect our daily lives with nature’. Moreover, the new IUCN President, Mr. Zhang Xinsheng, has long been committed, as he has put it, to ‘building consensus among all stakeholders for development of a green and sustainable future’. Considering that he has also recognized the continuing plight of poverty throughout much of the world, and a myriad of environmental crises, Zhang Xinsheng’s optimism and resolve to create a better world speaks not only to the mission of the IUCN, but to that of China, as well.

Conclusion

The necessary global processes that might transform China as a whole into a champion of ecological non-violence will necessitate a vision of one of the most ancient, powerful and elegant countries in the world setting the highest possible benchmark for all things green, sustainable, compassionate, and tolerant; a nation that – were it to do so – has every reason to become an ecological beacon for world civilization and harmony.


REFLECTIONS ON GLOBALIZATION
AND GLOBAL STUDIES

THE CULTURE OF ‘ONENESS IN DIVERSITY’:
A MANIFESTO

Ervin Laszlo

Introduction

Human civilization on this planet is approaching a critical threshold. This ‘bifurcation’ in the evolutionary trajectory of civilization presents not only danger; it is also a unique opportunity. It is the opportunity to create a sustainable and peaceful co-civilization. The key to making effective use of this window in time is the rise of a new and more appropriate culture: a planetary culture of oneness in diversity.

A new phase is coming in the evolution of human civilization. It is driven on the one hand by the prospect of increasing crises with accompanying unrest and turbulence, and on the other by the openness created by the unsustainability of today's world: the ever more widely perceived need for fundamental change. The economic, social and political problems of today's world, and its current and impending crises lead to the realization that, as Einstein said, the significant problems of our time cannot be solved with the same kind of thinking that gave birth to them. This realization motivates the intensifying search for new ways of thinking and acting.

New ways of thinking and acting call for a new culture. Culture in this sense is not merely the icing on the cake of civilization: it is its fundamental woof and warp. It is the very essence of how we, humans, see the world and ourselves in the world; the ground of our values and the warrant for our aspirations.

A culture of oneness-in-diversity is needed to orient the unfolding of the next phase in the history of human civilization. This culture must offer an embracing view of the individual, society, and the web of life on the planet. It must offer a functional ethic for life in a globally extended, interacting and intercommunicating world, grounded in a view based on the best insights of science and spirituality.

A planetary oneness-in-diversity culture could empower today's generations to transcend the fragmented and now intrinsically unsustainable culture that dominates the contemporary world. The Manifesto presented on these pages outlines the contours of this urgently needed new culture.

THE MANIFESTO

The Call for a Planetary Culture of Responsibility

A planetary culture of oneness in diversity is built on the recognition that we are conscious members of a globally interacting human family, and that, as conscious

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1 Presented at the Second World Cultural Forum in Hangzhou, May 19, 2013.
2 This and the following segment are based partially on the Manifesto on Planetary Consciousness drafted by this writer with the Dalai Lama and adopted by the Club of Budapest in October of 1996.
members of the human family, we have multiple responsibilities. We have responsibilities as:

– individuals;
– citizens of our country;
– collaborators in a business and an economy;
– members of the world wide net of human communities;
– persons endowed with an evolved mind and consciousness.

As individuals, we are responsible for seeking our interests in harmony with the interests and wellbeing of others. We are responsible for condemning and averting any form of killing and brutality; responsible for not bringing more children into the world than we truly need and can support; and responsible for respecting the right to life, development, and equal status and dignity of all the children, women, and men who inhabit the Earth.

As citizens of our country, we are responsible for demanding that our leaders beat swords into ploughshares and relate to other nations peacefully and in a spirit of cooperation; that they recognize the legitimate aspirations of all communities in the human family; and that they do not abuse sovereign powers to manipulate people and the environment for shortsighted and selfish ends.

As collaborators in business and in an economy, we are responsible for ensuring that commercial objectives do not center uniquely on profit and growth but include a concern that products and services respond to human needs and demands without harming people and impairing nature; that they do not serve destructive ends and unscrupulous designs; and that they respect the rights of all entrepreneurs and enterprises who compete fairly in the global marketplace.

As members of the worldwide net of human communities, it is our responsibility to promote mutual understanding and respect among people and nations whether they are like us or different; and to demand that all people everywhere should be empowered to respond to the challenges that face them with the material as well as spiritual resources that are required for maintaining the excellence and the quality of life throughout the human communities of the planet.

And as persons endowed with mind and consciousness, our responsibility is to encourage comprehension and appreciation for the human spirit in all its manifestations, and to inspire awe and wonder for a cosmos that brought forth life and consciousness and holds out the possibility of its continued evolution towards higher and higher levels of insight, understanding, love, and compassion.

The Call for a Planetary Culture of Solidarity

In most parts of the world, the intrinsic potentials of people are repressed and underdeveloped. The way children are raised depresses their faculties for learning and creativity; the way young people experience the struggle for material survival results in frustration and resentment. In adults this leads to a variety of compensatory, addictive, and compulsive behaviors. The result is the persistence of social and political oppression, economic warfare, cultural intolerance, crime, and disregard for the environment.

Eliminating social and economic ills and frustrations calls for considerable socio-economic development, and that is not possible without better education, information, and communication. These, however, are blocked by the lack of an adequate level of socio-economic development, so that a vicious cycle is created: underdevelopment creates frustration, and frustration, giving rise to defective behaviors, blocks development. This cycle must be broken at its point of greatest flexibility – the development of the culture that inspires the mind and motivates the behavior of a critical mass of people in society. Achieving this objective does not pre-empt the need for socio-economic devel-
opment with all its financial and technical resources, but calls for a parallel mission in the cultural field. Unless human culture evolves to the planetary dimension, the processes that stress society and the environment will intensify and create a shockwave that could jeopardize the current transition towards a sustainable global society. This would be a setback for humanity and a danger for everyone. Evolving a planetary culture of solidarity is a vital cause shared by the whole of the human family.

The Call for a Planetary Culture of Oneness

The human organism is a cooperative assembly of more cells than there are stars in our galaxy. These cells are highly diverse among themselves, yet they create multiple organs and organ systems in the body, and obey the precise and remarkably coordinated flows of energy and information that sustain the living state. This entire multidimensional, enormously complex system is focused on the paramount task of maintaining the organism in its physically improbable state of dynamic balance, where life's irreversible processes can be sustained without reverting to the inert state of thermal and chemical equilibrium.

Living nature, in turn, is a complex assembly of myriad species and populations inserted in myriad environments, where the overall dynamic balance of the whole system is nonetheless maintained, there by enabling the presence and the persistence of life in the biosphere.

Human communities emerged in the womb of nature millions of years ago, and increasingly autonomous cultures and corresponding behaviors evolved already twenty to fifty thousand years before our time. With the advent of the Neolithic ten thousand years ago, a growing segment of human communities separated themselves from the encompassing balances of the web of life and began to create their own systems and environments, altering natural equilibrium to fit their needs and aspirations. In today's world concern with sustaining the system in which we live our lives has become overshadowed by concern with serving the perceived needs and wants of individuals, and individual communities.

This shift in focus has produced multiple gaps and divisions. On the one hand, it has encouraged the flourishing of diversity as individually powerful persons and communities created worlds to serve their own interests and aspirations. On the other, it has failed to maintain unity and coherence in the global community, fragmenting it into modern and traditional, rich and poor, developed and developing factions. The growing diversity of cultures without the parallel aspiration to oneness has made the global system that emerged on this planet intrinsically unsustainable.

The Next Development of Planetary Culture

There is now a need for a further development in human cultures – a development based on respect for the diversity of local cultures combined with due regard for their global unity and oneness. Particular cultures have always integrated their populations in some form of unity, and now that human populations have grown to the global level, these cultures need to expand their purview to embrace all people and all communities. The identity and unique excellence of local cultures and communities must be safeguarded, but it needs to be balanced by concern with the dynamic integrity of the web of life on the planet.

The need is for a planetary culture of oneness in diversity. Its purposive co-evolution by responsible individuals and their diverse nations and communities would empower the creation of a world eco-civilization capable of ensuring the thrust of humanity, and the persistence of all life on Earth.
A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION AND CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Endre Kiss

Globalization is a process that can be defined positively and in a relatively concrete manner. Without any doubt, there exists a possibility of its positive definition, even if this definition, due to the universal and holistic character of the object, can be worked out not without serious scientific, logical and discursive problems.

After the first decade of the third millennium we sharply feel the necessity to learn about the history of globalization. It is necessary to emphasize that we are not interested in the past history of globalization or numerous historical analogies (from the Roman Empire to India) that have often been the objects of analysis in the recent decades. What we are interested in is the 'history of the present', as we consider globalization a genuine recent phenomenon.

The spontaneous answer (to the question about the possibility of history of globalization in the strict sense of the word) must be positive. However, from the methodological point of view, a dilemma can appear already in this very moment of spontaneity. As the specific and fundamental feature of globalization is its functional character, the problem of its history should be considered within absolutely new context.

In fact, the functional character of existence is also historical, this historicity, however, differs much from the historical mode of existence of the non-functional dimension. The only fact that globalization as a whole is a further not defined entirety of functional and non-functional dimensions makes this dilemma solvable. So, it is likely that this simultaneously functional and non-functional dimension on the whole can have a history in a methodological sense.

The reflection on the answer to this question assumes choosing dimensions (thematic ‘fields’) in which we intended to investigate history of globalization comprehended in such a way. The actual cognitive interest (Erkenntnisinteresse), becoming here thematic, stipulates a priority of possible questioning with a certain clarity. This order is determined by the practical and even pragmatic relevance of specific problems.

Then, the question whether the so defined globalization had its own history (simply said, history since 1989), means then also the determination, in which concrete fields (dimensions, disciplines) we will inquire about this possible history.

In this sense, the following central problems of globalization history (in the sense we recommended) are proposed: 1) the imperial dimension (as the one of international politics and of the so-called actoral spheres, the issue of decisivity in the context of globalization, as well as the respective poles of the global power distribution); 2) the economic dimension (the specific structure of the global economy and monetary world economy); 3) history of economic cycles (at the time of globalization), and, 4) history of intellectual, spiritual and ideological value transfers within global process.

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This Globalizing World

Speaking about global Europe, we should also inquire about its history in the context of these four extensive problem domains.

The emergence of globalization (in the strict sense of the word – in 1989) also caused the end of imperial world divided in two parts. It is, therefore, clear that in the course of spontaneous processes of the budding nineties, the exact explanation of the imperial problematics seems to be absolutely sinking in the millennial harmony of new freedoms and global self-regulation. The eminent factor of the relative devaluation of political subsystems in the dynamically deploying globalization also added to this general state which can be characterized as spontaneous.

Through this development, serious historical expectations appeared in a new post-imperial world. It is significant, that Huntington's theory which presented the first far-reaching analysis of the imperial agenda after 1989, formulated it from a new (and at the same time 'old-fashioned') point of view of 'civilizations', which are difficult to identify within traditional political approach.

Basing on this only fact, we can conclude that not only anti- but also post-imperial sentiments were strong and vital at those times. It shows that even the ‘imperial’ issue should be discussed only in a civilisatory circle of thinking. However, the clash of concrete empires differs from that of civilizations! It might have been simply impossible for Huntington to follow the traditional theory of political realism at that time! The analysis of 'civilization', or rather 'clash of civilizations' was obviously a genuine imperial research. However, it followed by no means the traditional discipline of international politics. Huntington most clearly refused the political mask and reconsidered the imperial order through the semi-political lens of the new civilisatory relations.

The methodological aspect of history of the specifically global, that is money/money economy, consists above all in the fact that the global economy is a holistic phenomenon, for which it is very difficult to invent a specific and adequate meta-language. This is, by the way, a far-reaching common phenomenon in the description of all holistic objects, not only those of globalization. This methodical problem does not come therefore from globalization as a new, but as a holistic phenomenon.

A methodological problem of another type arises due to the fact that monetarism of the real global economy is almost a complete manifestation of an altogether theoretical model. Then, there emerges a crucial proximity between the model and reality. This proximity creates a lot of new problems, particularly those, which increasingly conceal the effective difference between model and reality, which cause blurring of the languages of theory and practice. In the case of a crisis, it will be more difficult to categorize this crisis as a more or less simple realization of the model or as a traditional cyclic destabilization of real economy.

2 The problem domain 'Europe' is connected with a thousand threads with the overall problematic of globalization. For our research, the relevance of Europe underlines above all the fact, that for many citizens of the EU, globalization in the EU often appears as a consequence, insight, and challenge of the membership. Practically the challenges of the EU differ very much from the ones of the non-institutionalized globalization.

3 On this issue see the following works: Kiss, E. Monetarista globalizáció…; Kiss, E. Das Globale…


5 Rudolf Carnap's scientific-theoretical stipulation is very useful: we can describe objects on a certain representational level, if only a language refers properly to this representational level; however, this language can not be on the same representational level like the one referring to these objects, which is called 'meta-language'. The mentioned problematic appears in the case of every object, or rather every representational level, that is in itself holistic and has a character of entirety, which is a systematic place of a possible meta-language for this object sphere always at the expense of additional big difficulties.
However, the same difficulties emerge with the *actors* as well. In most cases, it is quite difficult to decide whether an event should be interpreted as a result of real actors' activities or as a well predictable consequence of an already fundamentally elaborated model. The most noticeable, but also decisive effect of global economy consists in re-valuation, even in the fundamental change of the money function. This modification leads to the occurrence of widespread speculations or economic bubbles.

The other most determinant effect of this global economy is, however, only *implicitly* economical. This consequence is the state's indebtedness, after which globalization relatively (or also absolutely?) devalues the states under all circumstances. However, a state in debt also has its own logic of functioning which determines the economic life and generally its social existence: these two aspects in their turn define the global economy reflexively and in retrospection.

The world economic cycles unfold during particular periods of globalization, so it is always a very difficult task to distinguish large groups of causes from each other in the permanent economic dynamics. Thus, it becomes difficult to separate the dynamic-structural moments of globalization from the cyclic and conjunctural changes in the explanation of a crisis (also then, if both groups of causes are interdependent and determine each other at the level of a real causality). For these reasons, it *appears absolutely problematic to draw up a history of globalization in the framework of the economic system.*

The recognition of the circumstances and fundamental mental states of globalization was accomplished by the second half of the 1990s. Within this new frame, the present reveals also as a *new aggregation of the most diverse intellectual contents, values and innovations.* Undoubtedly, there has emerged a medial global world culture.

The mass culture anticipated this deployment process already in the 1970s, and the global mass culture undoubtedly also disposed qualitatively new traits. This new global (world) culture increases the importance of the ‘other’, that is of the ‘virtual’ world, it creates a permanent presence in the most different parts of the world and brings together all regions, and nevertheless (as an opposite process) moves away every region and every individual from its own space and origin. This global (world) mass culture gradually makes the society rootless and, at the same time, global and international. This culture realizes classical (though paradoxical) post-modern basic values (anti-totalitarianism, consumer attitude without any relevant consumption, individualism without any immanent primary value orientation) not only among masses, but effectively at the *global* scale. It *shows how problematic it could also be to make an attempt to define the history of globalization in the context of the mass culture becoming global.*

When reconstructing the determinations of globalization, one more question arises: which structural and functional reasons have enhanced the status and the scale of the *imperial* discourses in the context of current globalization. Thus, we also inquire about the phase delay in the thematization of the imperial problematic.

It is clear that the professionals’ intellectual consciousness itself needed a considerable time to understand the following obvious contrast and then to elaborate it. On the one hand, the international politics developed apparently without any problems and changes, keeping its traditional imperial character even in the era of globalization, whilst, on the other hand, the political subsystem was not globalizing for a simple rea-

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son: that it is not functionally determined and led, and so it could not be determined and led functionally.

It means that in the era of the universally acknowledged globalization, the interpretation of political system may not be subjected to any fundamentally new norms. The difference between the experience of a new global world and the objective view that the political system is a phenomenon that cannot globalize on the basis of a quite abstract insight, might constitute a difficulty, certainly not easy to dispel in this learning process.

This undoubtedly applies to the abstract and theoretical thinking; however, it would not be difficult to prove it also with empirical data. We should realize then, that in the era of globalization no essentially new political institution was born. It means that politics as a system and subsystem persists its system-theoretical difference from the functional world of globalization without any problem and for a long time.

The scale of the imperial issue in the era of globalization most likely increased due to the extreme, extraordinary enhancement of the actors’ dimension. It can be easily comprehended that the actors’ possibilities and the use of the increased action radius in many cases directly leads to imperial problems. For example, in the pre-global time, one could hardly imagine that a European prime-minister could influence global processes in such a direct way, as was the case with Tony Blair.

With respect to the increasing relevance of the imperial problematic the decisivity is also generally characteristic of globalization. The importance of the direct and indirect decision is growing. The critical thrust of decisivity leads to a problem which is hardly enough recognized up to the present. Whereas globalization and liberal democracy are interdependent and mutually determined. The rapid growth of the relevant decisivity already signals a systematic failure in the universe of globalization: there is a clearly perceptible contradiction between the founding principles (liberal democracy as basic condition) and the reality (the actors’ decisions). By the way, the systemic and theoretical difference between globalization and political system can show up at this point.

The functional processes of globalization in many respects bring together individual states and regions. In their intensity, the significantly increasing imperial interactions obviously also belong to the numerous new qualities of globalization. The imperial processes permanently re-qualify individual states and regions according to their power. The constantly repositioned club of empires shows itself downwards closed, whilst it is always upwards breaking out again.

The increasing importance of the imperial discourse is considered as an integral part of history of globalization. Can this question, however, also be reversed? Is it possible to reinterpret the former history of globalization in the context of imperial discourse? We suppose that history of globalization can be positively developed in the context of imperial discourse.

During the first period of globalization the imperial question hardly appears in an explicit way. The preceding period when the world was divided into two parts had drastically improved the validity of imperial reflections. It is anything but surprising that Francis Fukuyama's theory of the end of the history – maybe even against the author's own wish – envisaged the model of universal post-imperial democracy (or, as formerly Alexandre Kojève has noted in this context, of universal democratic world-state). Exclusively in this context Samuel S. Huntington's works can be interpreted as conforming to reality. There is no doubt that his ideas were aimed at cooling down the optimistic expectations towards a post-imperial new world order. He wanted to bring public opinion back to 'reality'. The more significant fact is that even Huntington himself did not want,
with these objectives, to call this new imperial start by its proper name (or did not dare to do it?). He formulates his new message not in political, but in partly political terms of 'civilization'. In the context of 'civilization', the international politics will then recall the realism of Kissinger who openly rehabilitates Metternich.

Then, in the context of the imperial discourse, the first period of globalization revealed itself as the time of prude discussions and activities. The attention was focused on the only enemy of this very confident era – on fundamentalism.

The second period of globalization, developing in the context of imperial discourse, defines the international politics again. However, based on some arguments one can suggest that this period failed to identify any relevant difference between the specific functionalism of globalization and non-functionally founded mode of existence of the political subsystem in general. The central idea of this second period was (obviously in the context of the imperial discourse) the fact that in this phase of the post-communist democracy and neoliberal politics, a possible international conflict could be legitimized only morally.

The large working force of the 1989 turn is also still noticeable in this context. The realization of imperial motives and causes was legitimate in public only if it could be planned as an answer to a qualified violation of human rights. The problems of international rights, always arising immediately through this reality, were systematically ignored. It means that the intervention initiators, starting slowly, should make considerable efforts to present to the public the actual strategic objectives as a generous and universal answer to the violation of human rights.7

The approaches of 1989 were applied in international politics and demonstrated in the interventions of the 1990s. The typical event of this second period was the Kuwait's war against Saddam Hussein that can be perfectly well classified in this frame. This prude discourse led to the wars and also made serious international conflicts possible. At the same time, we could estimate how successful were the new criteria of the concept of the enemy – new criteria created new concepts of the enemy.

The third period of globalization, developing in the context of imperial discourse, started on September 11, 2001. From that time the contours of a new bipolarity became visible. In this still unipolar global world, the concrete and at that vague phenomenon of terrorism hold the position of a structural enemy violating human rights.

The full reconstruction of real historical phenomena is not the main purpose of this paper. Anyway, the Irak war of 2004 during this new period was largely and extensively legitimized already in terms of terrorism. For us, Osama bin Laden's death in 2011 brought the natural end of that period of globalization (in the context of the imperial issue).

Osama's death became a symbol, too. It incarnates the change of great historical periods of new globalization. The bipolarity of this third period (which came to the end with the death of the terrorists' leader and symbol) consisted in two poles 'we' and 'terrorists' and built up a whole range of new contacts and alliances and was obviously used in many other cases. In this way, a combination of a new virtual and a real bipolar world emerged.

In terms of the prevailing bipolarity, one should consider the alliances' activities that generated free circular structures. First, the circular alliance activity converged with respect to the common enemy – terrorism. The other activity of this structure was ori-

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The third period of globalization (in the context of the imperial discourse) created the bipolarity anew (and at the same time a new type of it), completed with these two circular alliance activities. It is characteristic that this very complex structure became really possible just because the prevailing bipolarity was to a great extent also virtual and asymmetrical.

At present we already observe the fourth period starting. The basic structure of this new situation points out again at bipolarity with corresponding accompanying substructures. All the time globalization was structurally more or less built around ‘one’ pole, as opposed to the ‘bipolarity’ in the fight against terrorism.

The situation developing now contains in the very early stage a contradiction, if not just a paradox with theoretical consequences. On the one hand, we reasonably assume that China articulates its long-term interests (particular or also universal) and will aspire to realize them also in the long run. At the same time, we think that the whole previous period of globalization may be characterized only through the short term interests of important actors. A long term in the global world of the short term introduces elements of universalism in the universe of particularity.

China's particular interests might be under no circumstances interpreted as universal. It is, however, noticeable that these ideas, emerging in international literature in connection with China's international activities, are based on ‘mutual confidence’, ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ of others and realization of ‘mutual benefits’. Under certain circumstances, the objectives particular in themselves can show universal elements as well, although they deliberately do not contain, if not even intentionally avoid, open ideological intervention, new definition of the framework of international politics, and the identity transfer or missionary intentions.

The mutual symmetry of values of particularism and universalism begins to remarkably shape both poles of the new world that becomes bipolar again. Particularism can contain numerous universal elements, while the neo-liberalism, initially announced as universal, often reveals just the disillusioning particularism.

In this unfolding new situation, the system of individuation will lead to certain historical consequences. In this case, we will deal with the issue of neutral values and evaluation. We can stand against it neither from the philosophical point of a positive view on individuation, nor from that of a negative attitude.

Presently, the Chinese culture and society is opposed to the complete and definite individuation of the American pole. This is a society that stands at the very beginning of its individuation process. China is considered as a society, in which this type of individuation does not absolutely correspond to people's personal needs.

A process of individuation currently occurring in China cannot be homogeneous any longer. Perhaps, three important parallel tendencies will be developed, namely:

1) reproduction of the classical European individualization;
2) ‘individualization’ of the new mass culture following American pattern;
3) almost a uniform post-modern individualization.

The processes of individualization can have different effect on the two newly crystallizing global poles. It is not only because processes of individualization have finished at one of the poles and are still in progress at the other one. It is so because both sets of principles constitute the basis of functioning of their own system. Both philosophical bases (finished individualization versus starting individualization) are the actual principles of organization of both conglomerates.
From this comparison there comes a new asymmetry. Although these three individuation processes will probably influence China, but China in its turn will not probably have a similar influence on the other pole. The other pole will not probably consider a disindividualizing or anti-individualizing tendency as an attractive alternative, even if the actual sources of individuation do not work productively any more. It means that the same process will proceed, on the one side, actively, and on the other side, passively.

We have only outlined some points of cultural traditions in the usual sense. Nobody will doubt the scale of differences in cultural traditions and transmissions. Nevertheless, we do not want to repeat\(^8\) the fatal error of Samuel S. Huntington, who reflected these enormous differences through wrong and unproven actualizations into the present time and also used them in a de-historizing manner in the theoretical interpretation of the current global situation.

To preserve the effective characteristics of the Chinese civilization and society as they are, it is necessary to embed them first of all in the economical and political system, and only within these spheres it is possible to influence the formation and interpretation of contemporary history.\(^9\)

The elements of cultural tradition, in the wide sense of the word, will be able, at the most, to have some limited influence in the new bipolar world. So one can suppose that the current American civilization (culture) that combines the Weberian positivistic absence of values and evaluation (Wertfreiheit) with religious fundamentalism and the strong Chinese civilization (culture) that can hardly return to absolute rules and values in everyday life regulation, will constitute a determinant and in many ways still tacit opposition.

Anyway, the guiding principle of the Chinese politics, appearing absolutely functional in some aspects, seems hardly able to confirm the tremendous and often mythological background of the Chinese peculiar characteristics. One of the key issues of the future is whether the American (Euro-American) or the Chinese philosophy of organization will appear more realistic in comparison with the historism of the others.

The further point of comparison in terms of new bipolarity will probably be the labour culture or rather the labour philosophy. The Chinese concept of labour culture aggravates basic problems of the globalizing world in an unexpectedly large number of factual contexts. Extreme individualism and other social issues are suddenly re-thematized. So, industrialism and post-industrialism appear in a new light again, not to mention the contradictions of a non-consuming post-modern society that must appear with consumption ideas (like on the American pole) in dazzling light. This coexistence of values seems absurd in comparison with the Chinese labour culture, and this model endangers many societies, since they will certainly be unable to balance this contradiction by their own force.\(^10\)

In our opinion, globalization already has its history. Our aim was to prove it by the example of the imperial discourse. The era of a new bipolarity (with corresponding accompanying phenomena) is really only starting now.

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\(^8\) Kiss, E. The Civilisatory Components of the Post-socialist System Change, a. a. O.

\(^9\) Individual relevant aspects of Chinese culture (that partly remind of the Protestant and Jewish religions), as well as the practical characteristics of this civilisatory tradition regulating the everyday life seem to us as being of some relevance.

\(^10\) The destabilization of the U.S. industrial society in the 1970s when the work achievements of the former Far East paved new ways for the American society can be a relevant analogy.
SOCIAL CONTRADICTION, GLOBALIZATION AND 9/11

Tom Rockmore

This paper will focus on a basic social contradiction, due to a deep, often overlooked tension between capitalism, the main motor of the main world – it is the economy stupid – and an influential form of Islam, which, in applying the Protestant term of religious ‘fundamentalism’, I will be calling ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. I believe that this contradiction, which is largely due to the unfettered expansion of increasingly globalized economic capitalism, lies at the root of 9/11. This paper will unfold as follows. It will begin by reviewing theories of 9/11 associated with the names of George W. Bush, Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. I will be arguing against the approach to 9/11 in terms of religious or cultural explanation in calling attention to the economic component of the problem. I will further be arguing that 9/11 can be best understood as social contradiction between capitalism and Islamic fundamentalism. I will further be suggesting that this social contradiction indicates an important limit of capitalism.

Bush’s Religious Approach to 9/11

By ‘9/11’, I will understand the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists, mainly of Saudi Arabian origin, in the United States on September 11, 2001. There is no dispute that Islamic fundamentalists, mainly from Saudi Arabia, mounted this attack. The problem is how to understand this ongoing series of events.

There has been so much effort directed toward meeting the threat of 9/11 that there has been surprisingly little attention directed toward understanding its origins. There seem to be so far three main theories. These theories are identified with the names of George W. Bush, Samuel Huntington, and Bernard Lewis. Bush was president of the US at the time of the attacks. His whole presidency was taken up in the aftermath of dealing with their consequences. Huntington was a professor of political science, whose views were dependent on those of Lewis, who was a professor of Middle Eastern history.

When I refer to George W. Bush I have in mind not only opinions he may or may not privately hold and publicly represent but also the convictions held by those who work together with him in forging, amending and defending the religiously-based policies that so often characterized his administrations. Three sources of his policies include: fundamentalist Christianity (opposition of one religious fundamentalism to another); American exceptionalism; overt link to neo-conservatism as formulated in the PNAC strongly influenced by Vice-President Dick Cheney, his closest advisor.

Bush, who identifies strongly with his particular variety of Christian faith, is a so-called born again Christian. The term ‘born again’ is frequently used in Evangelical, Fundamentalist, Pentecostal and some other forms of Protestantism. According to Jesus, on those born again will be saved. ‘Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God’.

Bush is representative of a widespread American form of religiosity. Studies show that evangelicals constitute some 40 per cent of the American population. Bush, who

1 John 3:3.
was earlier apparently an alcoholic, is strongly committed to his version of Christian faith. This and related forms of Protestantism are sometimes called fundamentalists. Protestant fundamentalism, which is a defense of religious orthodoxy, arose in the US in the controversy between fundamentalists and modernists early in the twentieth century. It is often noted that Protestant fundamentalism, which has parallels in other religions, can be understood as an effort to prevent or impede the absorption of religion into an increasingly secular culture.

Protestant fundamentalism is closely linked to a particular worldview. Evangelicals like Bush often subscribe to biblical literalism and biblical infallibility or biblical inerrancy. They tend to read the Bible literally. They tend to accept that the Bible is inspired by the Holy Spirit and literally true. They accept the virgin birth of Christ. They believe Christ's death was the atonement for the sins of mankind and that Christ was bodily resurrected. They often accept the reality of Christ's miracles.

Fundamentalist Protestantism is strongly influential in American politics. The ability to mobilize the fundamentalist vote is a main reason why Bush was twice elected president of the US. Fundamentalist Protestantism is allied with a Manichean, dualistic vision of good and evil, them and us.

Throughout the long years of his presidency after 9/11, Bush applied this kind of dualistic view in responding to the Islamic terrorist threat. Bush's religious approach to the problem of 9/11 is rooted in the idea of American 'exceptionalism'. According to this view, America represents God's will on earth. As citizens of the country that is the only legitimate representative of God on earth so to speak, Americans have a manifest destiny, which is expressed in its policies, which are designed to thwart evil perpetrated by its enemies. This certainty about the supposed divine mission of the United States makes it relatively easy for those who represent the country on a political plane to engage in activities that might seem inconsistent with its view of itself, such as more or less exterminating the American Indians, whose survivors live in reservations, entering into a long series of wars when it feels threatened by large and small foes, including Panama and Grenada, torturing prisoners, and so on.

Then there is the neo-conservative viewpoint, which holds that the period after the end of the cold war is not less but rather more dangerous for the so-called American way of life. This view, which was spelled out in a document called the Project for a New American Century well before Bush became president, called for the US to establish bases in all sections of the world in order to take pre-emptive military action not if there was in fact a clear and present danger but rather if there was ever a possibility of one arising. The similarity between this political posture and the view of Carl Schmitt that the world is divided into friends and foes was amply illustrated in the identification of the so-called axis of evil as well as the coalition of the willing, which was assembled by bribing and coercing a series of other nations to enter into the War in Iraq in which they had no clear stake.

**Huntington on Clashes of the Future**

A rather different analysis is suggested by Huntington, who already in the 1990s worked out a vision of future wars as due, not to economics or political considerations but rather to what he called differences between cultures or ‘civilizations’, which he later applied to understand 9/11.

Huntington's theory arose in the early 1990s after the break up of the Soviet Union and the claimed capitalist ‘defeat’ of international communism. To understand Huntington's position, it useful to see it as a possible answer to ideas that were attracting attention at the time, especially the view of Francis Fukuyama. It was a moment when Fuku-
yama, inspired by Reagan's conservatism, but who has in the meantime turned against neo-conservatism, was confidently proclaiming the end of the history.

Huntington refutes Fukuyama through an approach based on identity politics and a conception of the nation state. When he worked out his theory, Huntington was not concerned with a particular series of historical events, but rather with fundamental sources of conflict in the present historical moment. His position revises the view of the modern nation-state as a primary cause of historical events.

According to Huntington, we are in a new phase of world politics. Views of 'the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state' miss a crucial point, which he formulates as the hypothesis that 'the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic'. His basic claim is that 'The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future'. In other words, the causal role earlier played by nation states will shift to civilizations, or what he also calls cultures.

It would be as mistaken to disregard economics in conflicts between nation states and even 'civilizations' as it would be to reduce any and all international conflicts to such factors. Huntington's suggestion that economics is now less important than before can be interpreted in two ways. Either it has somehow become less significant in international conflict than it once was, or other, more important factors have emerged in the meantime. Yet there is no evidence that the role of economics in international conflicts has diminished, especially in the period with which he is specifically concerned of more than a half century since the end of the Second World War.

Huntington's book, which appeared several years later, extends his argument that since 'clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace... an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war'. The term 'remaking' which figures in the title of the book – *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* – can be understood in two ways: as referring to the historical change in the world order or even – in a way closer to the neo-conservative view of hegemonic empire – as inviting (us) to modify it. In that sense, it is in principle consistent with so-called regime change dear to the Bush administration.

Huntington's suggestion that 9/11 manifests less a clash of civilizations (and/or cultures) than difficulties due to Islamic politics and living conditions in the Islamic world contradicts his 'official' hypothesis that international conflict is currently best explained through the hypothesis of a clash of civilizations in calling attention to ideology and economics as explanatory factors. If the problem of 9/11 is due to, and can be ameliorated through, a change in Islamic politics and living conditions, then the clash of civilizations is no more than an effect following from other, deeper causes. Huntington's cultural model, which is intended as an alternative to other models of international relations, is not useful directly or even indirectly to analyze 9/11 or international conflict. Since differences in civilizations, which Huntington regards as primary, are themselves caused by other, deeper factors, it is incorrect to attribute the primary cause of international conflict to this factor.

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Lewis' Historical Explanation of 9/11

It is but a short step from Huntington's 'official' view that 9/11 is explicable through a clash of civilizations to the further view that it is explicable through a clash of religions. This claim is an *ad hoc* thesis, invented specifically for the purpose of explaining 9/11 after it occurred. According to this thesis, 9/11 can be understood as a clash between two religions: Islam, which is ill adapted to the modern world, and Christianity, which is very much up to date.

This suggestion is a variation on Max Weber's well-known thesis that religion, particularly Christianity, is particularly important for the rise of capitalism. As concerns 9/11, Weber's thesis can be reformulated as the general claim that various forms of religion are useful for, or on the contrary harmful to, the prospects of the democratic way of life.

The religious analysis of 9/11 exists in both popular and scholarly versions. The non-scholarly, popular version takes the form of a dualistic analysis, mentioned above, that opposes good and evil, our religion and theirs, one fundamentalism to another. As specifically applied to 9/11, it suggests that Christianity is deeply attuned to democracy (and freedom), which, on the contrary, fundamentalist Islam opposes.

Lewis explains current events through the role of the religious dimension of modern life. This is different from the well-known concern to provide a religious explanation for both sacred and secular phenomena. The religious approach to knowledge is basic to the effort common to all three main Abrahamic religions to explain the events of human history, and finally history itself, through God. This religious reliance on God as the ultimate and finally only explanatory factor has never wavered.

Lewis elaborated his view in two works published around this time. In the first book, which was completed before 9/11, he analyzes the familiar theme of *What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* in adding many details. In an Afterword, he notes that President George W. Bush clearly indicated that the war against terror is not a war against Islam, although some, such as Usama bin Laden, who proclaimed a *jihad* in the classic sense of a war against infidels, depict it as a struggle between Christendom and Islam. Lewis points to the problematic nature of Western dominance during centuries over the Islamic world, which reached its peak in the twentieth century. He detects Islamic pluralism in the difference between traditional and non-traditional forms of Islam. For some, such as bin Ladin, the cause is to return to an earlier, purer form of Islam through removing Western influence and restoring Islamic authenticity. But for other Muslims, the cause is freedom, including freedom from corrupt Muslim tyrants. According to Lewis, either the Muslim moderates will triumph, or the prospect for the West is grim.5

In the second study, which was completed between the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Lewis applies his theory—a theory about the inability of Islamic countries other than Turkey to modernize—to 9/11. The work is based on an article that appeared in *The New Yorker* in 2001,6 where Lewis once again insists on the significance of the failure of Islam to modernize. This leads in turn to a rejection of modernity in favor of what Lewis calls a return to the sacred past. This return is fueled by the poverty and tyranny of the Islamic world, made increasingly visible by the mass media. Lewis agrees with the Ayatollah Khomeini that the temptation of the US is the greatest threat to a strict

vision of Islam. He ends by predicting that, if bin Ladin can impose his leadership, a long and bitter struggle lies ahead.

In the appendix, he indicates that the American objectives in the former war are to deter and defeat terrorism, and ‘to bring freedom, sometimes called democracy to the peoples of these countries and beyond’.7 He repeats his view that Middle Eastern tyranny derives from a failure to modernize and cautions it will not be easy to bring democracy to the region. Pointing to Turkey, his example over many years, he suggests that, though the task is difficult, democracy can be created in the region. What he does not say, which is just as significant, is that the Turkish brand of democracy is so different from what, say, is understood by that term in Europe that the European Common Market asked for major changes before Turkish candidacy could even be discussed. A main instance is the continuing repressive treatment of the important Kurdish minority, whose rights, extending even to the right to speak their language in public, have consistently been violated.8 Another problem is the massacre of the Armenian minority early in the twentieth century, which Turkey has never acknowledged as a crime against the Armenian people. Left unclear is what ‘democracy’ can reasonably mean in a part of the world that has never known a system of government approaching any of the many forms of democracy that have long existed in the West.9

Human Actions and the Intelligibility of History

All three views overlap in a number of ways, for instance through a recognizably pro-Western bias. Ever since the events occurred, there has been a well-established tendency to assess the conflict from a dualistic, Western perspective based on prior adoption of Western standards as well as a further tendency to reject even the semblance of adopting, taking seriously or even considering Islamic standards of evaluation. This pro-Western bias results in three limitations rendering many Western theories of 9/11 unsuitable for an overall interpretation of the ongoing events. First, it creates a spurious link between the problem of understanding the ongoing struggle between fundamentalist Islam and the capitalist West, a struggle it tends to judge in moral terms. Yet since neither the non-Muslim West nor the non-Western Muslim world has a moral monopoly, the impression that moral right is uniquely situated on one side but absent on the other is misleading. Second, since a moral judgment ought not to be formulated before the problem has been successfully characterized, it is simply premature to render a moral judgment prior to identifying the problem. Third, identification of any kind with one of the parties to the conflict, in effect taking the part for the whole, prevents the formulation of a general theory encompassing all the parties within the wider framework of a single analysis.

The discussion so far has reviewed and criticized the three main current approaches to 9/11. It shows we do not currently possess anything resembling an acceptable or even a widely shared view of this series of events, which continue to be described from varying perspectives. It remains to formulate an alternative categorial framework (or conceptual matrix), in short a general theory to comprehend, to understand and/or to interpret 10 – three terms I will be using interchangeably here – the events comprising 9/11 understood in the wider sense.

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It is obvious that to comprehend history it must be intelligible. The intelligibility of historical phenomena is understood in very many ways. Writing in the fifth century Augustine set the tone for much of the historical debate in suggesting that human history is comprehensible only against the background of divine history.11 This means that human history can be understood on the condition it is a working out of divine history, which is independent of the aims, intentions, and knowledge of human individuals. In refuting Bossuet’s restatement of Augustine, Voltaire, who coins the term ‘philosophy of history’, arguably formulates the first secular theory of history. Yet Löwith still defends the general Augustinian view in insisting that historical meaning is essentially theological.12 Others think that history has no intrinsic meaning, hence cannot be known, or comprehended. Shakespeare famously reports that ‘it is a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing’.13

If nothing rational is happening in a given sequence of historical events, then it cannot be grasped rationally. Hence there is an intrinsic link between the rationality of historical phenomena and the ability to know them. Yet it does follow that the rationality of history is theological either in part or in whole. In raising the question of the rationality of history, I will be treating historical knowledge as a special part of, but in all other ways inseparable from, the general problem of knowledge.

The rationality of history is different from its claim to cognitive objectivity. The rationality of history indicates something is happening, which can be grasped through human reason. This is different from a claim to make an objective determination. Thus, some observers are concerned with the ability to discuss the past objectively in terms of present evidence or other evidence that might later become available.14 For present purposes, the problem at issue is not whether or not evidence is sufficient to justify a particular historical inference, but rather how to understand what has been and may still continuing to take place.

Since 9/11 is composed of an ongoing series of historical events, the task of formulating a theory of 9/11 belongs to the domain of historical explanation, or the epistemology of history. There is a difference between writing about historical events or history in general and the epistemology of history. ‘Rules’ of how to go about writing history are not permanent, but are constantly being ‘negotiated’ between working historians who arrive, through public debate among themselves, at views that are shared for a time and then later revised about the appropriate ways to approach historical phenomena. At any given moment, working historians presuppose a series of shared views about the discipline in gathering information in a wide variety of ways, which they narrate and interpret. The ‘construction’ of a historical narrative, may, but need not, touch on epistemological questions.

The events of history can be understood if and only if we can treat them as rational, hence cognizable. If history is just one thing after another, then it cannot be understood, but if it is rational, then it can be understood. Human history is rational, hence cognizable, since it is composed of human actions, which are themselves rational, hence cognizable. In this respect, three thinkers help us to formulate a view of 9/11 as rational, not irrational. Aristotle, an ahistorical thinker, points out that all human actions are

13 Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5.
goal-directed, aimed toward the good for human being. Even the actions of a person allegedly mad aim at what that individual understands as the good. Hegel, who was a profoundly historical thinker, shows that in the historical process there is a difference between what we aim at and the result, what we desire to do and what we accomplish in virtue of the cunning of history. Marx, whose thought is equally historical, notes that the main motor of the modern phase of the historical process is economic since basic reproductive needs, which can only be met through economic activity, are more basic, hence more important, than any others.

Social Contradiction and 9/11

Though all human actions aim at the good, human actors understand it in very different ways. The result can be a social contradiction. By the term ‘social contradiction’ I will understand a clash between two or more incompatible interests, which may take many different forms and whose consequences can be minor or of major importance.

The events of 9/11 do not constitute either a break within history, in which case they could not be understood, or even a new phase of the historical process. They are lodged within an ongoing historical process, which precedes and succeeds them. They represent the interaction, in this case the violent interaction, between two very different views of the good for human beings, which we can simply identify as capitalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

On the one hand, there is the constant expansion of capitalism, which has now reached or is about to reach economic globalization. ‘Economic globalization’, which has no precise meaning, is understood in very different ways. By (economic) ‘globalization’ I will have in mind the integration of national economies into international economy in different ways. I will further have in mind two related phenomena: on the one hand, there is the tendency in capitalism, which needs constantly expanding markets, either by developing already existing markets or by entering other markets in the process of continuing to extend itself throughout the world. This process has already culminated, or will one day culminate, in a point in which nothing is left untouched by it.

When that point is reached, the process of economic expansion characteristic of capitalism will come up against its natural limit, its **terminus ad quem**, beyond which there is no further possibility for development. On the other hand, there is the effect of globalization, the way in which capitalism encroaches upon, adheres to, and transforms everything with which it comes into contact in the course of attempting to maximize profit. This aspect of globalization, which is by no means benign, is extremely menacing, even a deadly threat for all (indigenous) forms of social ‘organization’, including, but not limited to, local customs, traditions, and economic structures, which it tends to displace in substituting a version of itself.

Economic globalization takes many forms, such as the creation of an interlocking, exceedingly complex series of relations among the major banks, which was brought to the attention of the wider public during the subprime crisis in early 2008. It has been known at least since the middle of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, that it is basic to capitalism that it produces constant change in extending itself in the search for new markets. It has been emphasized by a number of observers, including Adam Smith, He-

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16 For instance, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels write, ‘The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are
gel, Marx, and others, that there are enormous disruptions and social consequences to the constant extension of capitalism. To put the point briefly but not inaccurately, the price to pay for incessant economic expansion is a permanent, enduring threat to anything, including all local forms of economic, social and/or cultural practices of the most varied kind that even appears to stand in the way of further economic development. In its most extreme form, this takes the form of economic globalization, which is identified as good in itself, and at any rate, and despite apparent difficulties, in any case always better than all its alternatives. Thus, skeptics about economic globalization, such as Dany Rodrik, who think economic globalization risks going or has in fact already gone too far are countered by its enthusiasts, such as Jagdish Bhagwati, who think that, if anything, it has not gone far enough.

The unrestricted commitment to economic globalization as the good life is not without its costs. One obvious cost is that in practice this vision sometimes conflicts with a very different vision of the good life. In place of the synergy between economics and religion that supposedly exists in capitalism one finds a direct opposition, not between Islam and economics, but with respect to Islam and capitalism.

The opposition takes place on different levels. They include the very distinction between economics and religion, a distinction, which is not made in Islam, where religious criteria determine economic practice. Thus, to take a banal example, on religious grounds, and though in practice various accommodations are possible, it is forbidden within Islam to require interest on a loan.

The relation between Islam and capitalism plays out in various ways as a function of the kind of Islam in question. For present purposes, we can distinguish between moderate Islam, in which it is possible to seek a compromise with various aspects of modern Western life, including capitalism in all its many forms, and conservative views of Islam, which are less prone to compromise, more resistant to the idea of abandoning any of the practices of Islam as traditionally prescribed. In its most conservative form, Islam takes the form, in borrowing the Protestant term ‘fundamentalism’, of Islamic fundamentalism directed in two directions: on the one hand, Islamic fundamentalism is directed toward recovering the supposedly authentic form of Islam as it was created by Mohammad during his lifetime and may or may not, depending on the interpretation, later have been corrupted. On the other hand, Islamic fundamentalism is directed toward refusing, indeed opposing by any and all means, opposition of any kind to social life organized wholly and solely along fundamentalist Islamic lines. What this means is

swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

that fundamentalist Islam, like other forms of religious fundamentalism, is directed toward the ceaseless reproduction without change of any kind of a form of life based on the original view of Islam.

In practice, this opposition to any perceived change in the original view of Islam takes two different forms. First, there is the opposition, which often takes a violent form, to any effort, of any kind whatsoever, to update, modify, or otherwise alter the perceived view of the original form of Islam. Thus, Sayyid Qutb, the central intellectual figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, rejected any compromise, leading to change in Islam on the premise that either there would be Islam or there would be something else, which must be rejected in principle. This attitude leads in practice, on the part of Islamic fundamentalists, to intra-Islamic conflict between the immoderate Islamic fundamentalists and all other, more moderate followers or Islam. Second, there is the conflict between Islamic fundamentalists, the defenders of an Islamic life without compromise in the traditional Islamic space, especially in the Middle East, on the one hand, those, including the Muslim actors of 9/11 who defend their highly traditional view of religion in opposing, if necessary by violent means, the perceived threat to the continuity of an entirely traditional Islamic way of life.

They understand the obvious point that the continued expansion of capitalism can only be carried out at the expense of the effective demise of the Islamic dream of the recreation of Mohammad's view of the good life according to Islamic principles.

**Conclusion: Economic Globalization and 9/11**

According to Hegel, contradiction moves the world. If not in general, it is clear that in the specific case, Western and Islamic views of the 'good' for human beings are different and incompatible, based on different and incompatible frames of reference. The Western view of the good life is linked to modern industrial society, which features ceaseless economic expansion requiring constant change. The Islamic view of the good life, at least as originally described by the Prophet, requires simple reproduction of the type of human existence specified in the Qu’ran.

This difference can be restated in terms of a well-known anthropological model between basically different kinds of society. The French cultural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss concentrates on the kinship systems, which he analyzes in terms of social function. Roughly speaking, he argues that social facts exist not because they are functional for the social order, not because they are functional for the person. On this basis, he suggests that in tribal societies, there is a basic structure that is reproduced over time or conserved. This leads to a contrast between self-reproducing societies, which resist change of any kind, such as the traditional Islamic society to which Muslim fundamentalists are attached, and which in that sense are not ‘historical’, and those very different societies, in practice those associated with modern capitalism, in which change

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19 According to Qutb, 'Islam cannot accept any compromise with jahiliyya, either in its concept or in its modes of living derived from this concept. Either Islam will remain, or jahiliyya; Islam cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam and half-jahiliyya. In this respect Islam's stand is very clear. It says that truth is one and cannot be divided; if it is not the truth, than it must be falsehood. The mixing and coexistence of the truth and falsehood is impossible. Command belongs to Allah, or else to jahiliyya. The Sharia of Allah will prevail, or else people's desires.' Qutb, S. Milestones (Ma'alim fil Tariq). English transl. – Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990. – Pp. 101–102, 112; cited in Zeidan, D. The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle // Middle East Review of International Affairs. – Num. 5(4). – P. 5.


at any cost in order to maximize financial gain through economic expansion is a para-
mount value.

The ceaseless economic expansion characteristic of modern life in the West is not
innocent. There is a two-fold price to pay. On the one hand, there is the zero-sum game
in which at least schematically wealth is accumulated in ways that enable some to profit
through their economic relation to others. It is often noted that Western economic ex-
pansion has not so far ‘solved’ the problem of poverty and that it barely helps, if at all,
the very poor. According to the United Nations Food Agency some 920 million people
currently subsist on less than 1900 calories a day. On the other hand, the need to con-
tinually expand the economic base runs up against social differences that are overcome
as it were in the process of reaching Western economic goals. To put the point bluntly,
despite the malfeasance of non-democratic Islamic countries, which have also failed to
solve the problem of poverty, hence increasing the number of people turning to radical
Islam, the fact of the matter is that even if the problem of poverty had been resolved, the
results of capitalism are in conflict with a commitment to fundamentalist Islam.

The result is a form of alienation located ‘outside’ capitalism, or alienation with re-
spect to the very economic process. Marx, who was concerned with the effect of the nor-
mal functioning of a modern form of free market economy on people who work within
it, insightfully describes ways in which as a result of the normal working of capitalism
such individuals are alienated by the very system that is in principle intended to realize
the good life. This economic form of alienation, which is still unfortunately with us, is
now being supplemented by a different kind of alienation. What we are confronted with
now is a form of alienation arising not within but outside of, hence in reaction against,
capitalism, which to many individuals situated both within and outside capitalism,
seems inimical to their understanding of the good life.

There is an obvious social ‘contradiction’ between two prominent views of the
good life, which are now locked in a deadly confrontation. On the one hand, there is the
mainly non-Muslim Western view that the human good lies in ceaseless economic ex-
pansion. On the other, there is the fundamentalist Islamic conviction that the human
good lies in the ceaseless maintenance of the traditional form of Muslim religious life
focused on the ceaseless repetition of the same.

This ‘contradiction’ suggests the West faces a deep problem that cannot be correct-
ed through the expedient of a global war on terror. This difficulty clearly cannot be as-
similated to the ‘mistaken’ actions of a few dissident, rogue elements within Islam.
Many in the Islamic world reject Islamic fundamentalism, but many more also reject as
mistaken the pursuit of a Western way of life, including Western ‘democracy,’ however
that term is understood, as well as the bare economic incentives of modern industrial
capitalism. Al Qaeda, the ‘official’ enemy of the US and its allies, is only the currently
most visible form of the fundamentalist view of Islam, in that sense similar to the fund-
damentalist Protestant movement in Christianity, which is engaged in a struggle for the
heart and soul of Islam.
GLOBALIZATION AND COSMOPOLITANISM: CLAIMS, ATTITUDES, AND EXPERIENCES OF FRIENDSHIP

Peter McCormick

My suggestion here will be that many understandings of today's globalization give rise to at least one major problem. And I would also like to suggest that what might help solve that problem is focusing fresh philosophical attention on a cardinal conceptual innovation in yesterday's cosmopolitanism.*

Such help would be important. For, as Korea's Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General, observed in his speech ‘The Bonds that Unite Us’ on the eve of the G8 summit in early July 2008 at Lake Toyako in Japan's Hokkaido, we must recognize that today's radically new problems are global and require global solutions.1 But among these problems might also figure a still insufficiently critical understanding of what today's globalization itself is. My suggestion will be that a still almost forgotten understanding of cosmopolitanism yesterday may help us articulate a less unsatisfactory notion of globalization today. The bonds that unite us, I believe, are not so much Ban Ki-moon’s global concerns; they are our own ancient cosmopolitan natures as human beings.

By way of introduction, here are several stipulations usage about how I will be using in what follows our key terms, ‘globalization’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’.

In what we may call Oxford English, that is in contemporary British usage of English as recorded in the most recent Oxford dictionaries,2 ‘globalization’ is a relatively recent English word. This is also the case for its equivalents in other languages. In common English usage, the word ‘globalization’ goes back no farther than to the mid-twentieth century.3 And today the word ‘globalization’ refers to ‘the action of globalizing’ in the sense of doing something whose scope encompasses the whole world. Thus, the emphasis of the English word ‘globalization’ falls heavily on generalization.

By contrast, in Oxford English ‘cosmopolitanism’ is a relatively older word. Its common English uses go back to the mid-seventeenth century. Today, the word ‘cosmopolitanism’ generally refers to a quality some persons and groups may have. Some dictionaries call this quality ‘being at home’. That is, some are at home not just in their countries of origin but almost anywhere in the world. Such persons or groups are understood as no longer confining themselves to all the attachments of their countries of birth. Here the emphasis falls more on universality rather than on generality.4

* This is the revised version of an invited plenary session symposium paper presented during the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea, July 30 – August 5, 2008. I thank the organizers for their invitation and the seminar participants, Francis Cheneval (Switzerland), Cyrille G. Koné (Burkina Faso), and Alexander Chumakov (Russian Federation), for their comments.

1 Cf. the French version of his speech, Ces liens qui nous unissent, in France's main morning newspaper, Le Figaro, July 3, 2008.

2 These new dictionaries are all based on the extraordinary resources of the British National Corpus of the English Language database, the Oxford English Corpus database, and the Oxford Reading Programme database.


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When viewed from the perspective then of common Oxford English usage today, a philosophical seminar entitled ‘Globalization and Cosmopolitanism’ might seem to be about inviting renewed philosophical reflection not just on some everyday particular matters like the world-wide spread of information, communication, and financial technology. Rather, the title of such a seminar might suggest a focus on two rather abstract matters, on, say, generality and universality. And indeed our colleagues in this seminar have mainly pursued the general and the universal.5

With these initial remarks in mind, let me now reflect with you briefly on four brief points only: first, the general character of today's understandings of globalization; then, one substantive danger that arises from this general understanding of globalization; third, by contrast, the universal character of just one of yesterday's understandings of cosmopolitanism; and, finally, on what might bring together a certain globalization and a certain cosmopolitanism into something more than either just a so-called European or African ‘anthropocentric ethics’6 or just a so-called East Asian ‘eco-centric ethics’.7

1. Today's Globalization as the Generalization of Systematic Cognitive Know-How

We are already aware of course that globalization is not one thing. For in addition to the spread of the sciences and technologies across the entire world, other important areas of human activity have also become increasingly uniform on a global scale. This has been especially the case in the course of the last several generations.

Thus, some cultural activities are now to be found almost everywhere, such as the dominance of certain forms of popular Western music. Similarly, certain industrial practices are also now to be found almost anywhere, such as the dominance of East Asian just-in-time manufacturing and ware-housing techniques. Still another example of globalization can be found in the accounting practices of the World Trade Organization which now uses widely harmonized methods for primary, secondary, and tertiary goods and services. So, far from being just one thing, globalization includes different scientific, technological, financial, industrial, political, and cultural forms – to give a partial list only.

Moreover, globalization in this sense of the world-wide generalization of certain human practices has occurred many times in human history and not just within the limits of our own daily experiences and memories today.

To take but one example, recall that at the end of the nineteenth-century and up until the outbreak of the twentieth-century's ominously entitled First World War, the industrial revolution had already spread – at least in theory – across the entire world. This movement has been called the first modern globalization. That is, countries around the world were already beginning to profit everywhere from the application of efficient manufacturing practices that previously had been confined to one part of the world only. Contemporary world historians point to many other examples in the ancient, medieval, and modern eras across the globe, such as the spread of Alexander the Great's Hellenistic

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5 Cf. F. Cheneval's Chairman's remarks about three contemporary uses of 'cosmopolitanism' and recent criticisms of cosmopolitanism, C. Koné's paper, Mondialisation et cosmopolitanisme, and A. Chumakov's paper, Globalization and Cosmopolitanism in the Context of Modernity.


7 See, for example, Imamichi Tomonobu's critiques of such merely 'eco-eccentric' views and the elaboration of his alternative account of an 'eco-ethics' in his influential book, Eco-Ethica, first published in Japanese in 1990, shortly thereafter translated into Korean by Jung Myong-Hwan, and then recently translated into German by Stefan Döll.
culture across the ancient world, or, in the medieval period, the spread of Chinese maritime trade, and so on.

Many world historians would even appear to have reached provisional consensus on at least two aspects of globalization. Thus, many historians today seem largely to agree, first, that the most important period of extensive and truly pervasive globalization is the present era. And they also seem largely to agree, second, that the most salient kind of globalization is the globalization of today's science and technology. In this second respect we may speak of globalization in Imamichi Tomonobu's felicitous terms as 'the technological conjuncture', that is, as the now historically most important era of the global interconnectedness of informational and communicational technologies.

If globalization today is neither uniform in kind nor unique in number, can we briefly specify globalization further in terms of several of its most striking properties? Recall for now several elements only from just one of many such contemporary analytic attempts to do so.

Thus, we might reasonably characterize globalization thematically as a set of at least six theoretical features we need not take here in any certain order. That is, at the worldwide level globalization would seem to exhibit the systematization and generalization first of economic realities, then of social relationships, and third of political unions. And, similarly at the world wide level, globalization would also seem to exhibit, fourth, the generalized contraction of diversity, fifth, the collapse of various dichotomies between the particular and the universal, and finally a generalized mixture of trust and risk. Very schematic characterizations like these of course call for careful qualifications. Nonetheless, something like this recent thematic characterization of globalization is highly representative of contemporary expert opinion.

If we now go on to reflect on the current working consensus among historians and theorists of globalization, perhaps we can discern at last one very prominent and perhaps even fundamental feature of globalization today. May I suggest that such a feature might not unreasonably be taken in summary as globalization's essential tendency today to generalize at the world level that particular kind of practical knowledge English speakers call 'know-how', the specific cognitive mix of imaginative power and technical expertise? For our present purposes then, we might take globalization here as the planetary generalization of systematized practical know-how. Perhaps we may call the generalization of this kind of knowledge 'cultural globalization'.

2. A Problem with Today's Globalization as the Cognitive Generalization of Mainly Technical Know-How

I come now to a second point, an important problem with today's generalized understanding of globalization as mainly cultural globalization in the sense of the generalization of knowledge understood as mainly technical know-how.

The difficulty is that this insufficiently critical understanding of globalization too often results in devastating cultural consequences. Among these consequences, I think, are often the rather thoughtless Western criticisms of most Asian so-called 'ecocentric' ethical reflections, of so-called 'Asian values' and of the absolute primacy of the value and worth of nature. And, conversely, among these negative consequences also are often rather thoughtless Asian criticisms of most European and African so-called 'anthropocentric'...
ethical reflections, of so called ‘humanistic values’ and of the absolute primacy of human beings.

But perhaps the most important negative consequence of the overly narrow yet dominant understandings of globalization today in terms mainly of cultural globalization is the gradual subjection of the entire planet to a generalized and largely uncritical notion of knowledge and understanding. This notion is the idea of knowledge and understanding as pre-eminently systematized practical know-how as contrasted with the idea of knowledge and understanding as also an always incomplete approximation to less inadequate knowledge of oneself and of others. This subjection of the reflective pursuits of genuine self-knowledge – artistic, philosophical, and spiritual – in turn leads inexorable to the instrumentalization of nature itself including human nature, whether in the smoggy skies today above Beijing or in the smouldering forests of Borneo or in the depleted fisheries of the Mediterranean or in the now virtually completed hyper-development of the Italian, French and Spanish coastlines.

This quite serious problem, however, may also be taken as including in part some elements for a serious solution. For the very cultural \textit{imperium} today that has globalized an overly practical interpretation of knowledge and understanding as systematized cognitive know-how conceals within its origins a still fruitful philosophical view. That view is an understanding of a reflective cosmopolitanism in terms of a stable yet dynamic equilibrium between fundamental self-directed and other-directed primary impulses at the centre of human nature itself.

Besides the generalization of systematized practical know-how, then, globalization now needs to incorporate a certain critical cosmopolitanism. Such a critical cosmopolitanism would be a universal and not just general consciousness of human nature as so constituted that both natural self-interest and natural affinity with others and with all living beings are equally primordial for all human beings.

But on such a view of globalization and cosmopolitanism, neither human nature's instrumentalization of nature as a whole nor the deification of cosmic nature as a whole is finally satisfactory. The simple truth we already recognize everywhere is that neither human kind nor nature is divine. Neither an anthropocentric ethics nor an ecocentric ethics can finally satisfy us. The differences are too profound.

To begin to appreciate just how profound they are, imagine for just a moment another one of those tiresome so-called ‘dialogues’ between still another European sometime political leader visiting East Asia and trying to suggest all too politely to his East Asian host that the violation of human rights in his country is ethically unacceptable everywhere. And imagine a similarly tiresome dialogue between still another sometime East Asian political leader visiting Europe and insisting just as overly politely to his European host that the continuing violation of the natural environment in his country is ethically unacceptable everywhere.

In Europe, the European leader could well respond to his East Asian guest's criticism by questioning the absolute primacy many East Asians seem to place on the value of nature in the light of the finally more important priority human beings have of needing reasonably to use nature for their legitimate development. And in Asia, the East Asian leader could well respond to his European guest's criticism by questioning the absolute primacy many Europeans seem to place on human rights in the light of the fundamentally more important priority over human rights for any truly humane government to guar-

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antee natural communal harmony. The basic difficulty here is how to mediate thoughtfully enough the quite fundamental differences in such a way as to preserve the genuine insights of each quite basic worldview while finding a mutually acceptable way of reconciling their incompatibilities.

We must be careful here not to underestimate the profound nature of differences like these, differences between which of two primary values is taken as finally absolute in the sense of being primordial. For behind such fundamental differences between nature as absolute value versus human beings as absolute value lie still more fundamental cultural presuppositions. Such presuppositions subsist not just as the level of countries nor of languages nor of religions but at the level even of entire civilizations where greatly different comprehensive worldviews have held sway for many centuries.

Thus, for many European philosophers today, often marked beyond their conscious realizations by their Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and Christian heritages, who might argue the absolute priority of human beings over that of nature itself, one profound assumption is necessarily the presupposition of meaningfulness and, still more deeply, of reason in its guise of Greek logos. By contrast, for many East Asian philosophers today, often marked equally beyond their full comprehension by a Buddhist heritage whatever its Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, Korean, or Japanese lineages, who might urge the absolute priority of nature over human beings, one profound assumption would be the presupposition of action and, even more deeply, of suffering in its guise of Sanskrit dukkha.

How could any clear-headed European philosopher argue out of the fundamental cultural presuppositions of a universal cosmic reason in any finally mutually satisfactory way with any right-minded East Asian thinker reflecting out of the fundamental cultural presuppositions of a universal cosmic suffering?

How to proceed?

For an all too partial response if not a solution to this difficulty with today's overly narrow construals of globalization, may I direct our attention briefly to several elements from one of yesterday's reflective cosmopolitanisms?

3. Yesterday's Reflective Cosmopolitanism and the Consciousness of Universal Affinities

If we might agree tentatively, then, on taking the problematic nature of today's globalization as mainly the planetary generalization of systematized practical know-how only, just how are we not unreasonable to understand further the sense and significance here of "cosmopolitanism"?

Like globalization, cosmopolitanism is neither uniform nor unique. That is, cosmopolitanism is neither essentially any one thing nor has it historically appeared at only one time. Rather, I think that, on similar kinds of historical and thematic investigations that we just rehearsed with respect to globalization, cosmopolitanism is also more than one thing and has also appeared historically more than once. This is especially the case for what we might call generally a reflective or philosophical cosmopolitanism. And it is particularly for at least one cardinal conceptual feature of ancient Western Stoic cosmopolitanism.

In short, I would now like to follow up on Alexander Chumakov's evocation of the ancient Greek Stoics. And I would like to suggest that a cardinal conceptual element on exhibit in, specifically, late Stoic cosmopolitanism in one of the major originating moments of Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and Christian Europe may still prove fruitful even today in other parts of the world. For this Stoic notion in yesterday's cosmopolitanism may offer an important conceptual resource for reconfiguring less unsatisfactory the generally one-sided and insufficiently critical understandings of today's globalization.

That almost forgotten conceptual feature was what later Greek and early Roman Stoics termed, with a now barely translatable expression, oikeiôsis or oikeiôusthai. Very roughly in English, the noun form, oikeiôsis means something close to ‘orientation’, or ‘appropriation’, or ‘affiliation’, or ‘the recognition of something as belonging to one[self]’. And in its more frequent occurrences in its verbal form as oikeiôusthai, oikeiôsis means, again very roughly, something like ‘coming to be (or being made to be) well-disposed towards something’.

Stoic philosophers began their reflections with a shared conviction that the nature of human beings was part and parcel of the nature of the universe. Accordingly, cosmic nature and human nature, although evidently quite different in scale and in many other respects, are, in Stoic views, unified in the ways in which the whole is unified with its parts. Stoic thinkers investigated cosmic nature mainly in the contexts of their logic and physics. And they investigated human nature mainly in the related contexts of their logics and their ethics.

In particular, many Stoic thinkers believed that they could most reliably investigate human nature by beginning empirically with careful observations of the newly born human being, and then by confronting their own observations argumentatively with those that eminent non-Stoic thinkers had also made of newborns. Thus, sets of fundamental observations were to be opposed and their oppositions resolved wherever possible through reasoning.

In particular, some Epicureans believed that observations of a newborn human being show that it naturally and above all primarily and originally endowed with a basic inclination towards pleasure. By contrast, some Stoic thinkers held that the most basic, original, natural, and primary impulse of a newly born human being (just as with newborn animals and newly burgeoning plants) was not towards pleasure but towards self-preservation. These Stoic thinkers held, further, that in all cases this primary impulse was directed to the way a human being, an animal, or a plant is so-to-speak ‘constituted’. This constitution while remaining generally fixed nonetheless changes with time. In the specific case of a human being, a generally stable character of one's constitution is the natural basis for one's ego-centric dimension, the self-regarding pole. And the particular evolving character of one's constitution is the natural basis for one's ‘allo-centric’ dimension, the other-regarding pole.

Thus, on many late Stoic accounts, a human being retains a fundamental affiliation with its own natural constitution, with itself. Yet as its natural constitution develop-

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13 In this general summary here I mainly follow Inwood, B., Donini, P. Oikeiôsis and Primary Impulse…
ops, a human being also develops a consciousness of a just as natural fundamental affinity with others. That is, a human being has a natural affiliation both with himself or herself and with all other human beings as well.\(^\text{14}\)

In short, late Stoic teachings on \textit{oikeiôsis} comprise a set of carefully argued both empirical and philosophical views. On these views, all human beings are naturally endowed with a stable and yet dynamic natural constitution. All human beings bear an inalienable affinity to their natural constitutions which their primary impulse is to preserve. And they also bear a natural affinity to all other human beings in that all other human beings have exactly the same natural constitutions. This human nature of all human beings strongly impels human beings to appropriate consciously and reflectively their double affinity, both to themselves as singular individuals and to all other human beings as well, by leading thoughtful, reasoned, and virtuous lives in the interest, one may say with Cyrille Koné, of promoting a new solidarity.

So much then for several brief reminders about one of yesterday's reflective cosmopolitanisms, a truly critical cosmopolitanism refined in both continuing empirical inquiry and in continuing philosophical argument, an almost forgotten resource today for thinking second thoughts about the nature of globalization.

4. Claims, Attitudes, and Philosophical Friendships

I would now like to conclude with a fourth and final remark about mediating profoundly opposed philosophical attitudes such as those often underlying some of today's most intractable ethical disputes about absolute values. This final point can be no more than a speculative proposal. Such a proposal arises not from further reflection on the uncritical globalization of systematized practical know-how. Rather, the proposal comes from trying to retrieve the old ideal, remarkably present in both traditional East Asian as well as in traditional European reflective cultures, of pursuing the virtues of cosmopolitan philosophical friendships. Please allow me to offer you this concluding suggestion not in the typical European form of an extended philosophical argument such as those between Greek Epicureans and late Roman Stoics, but in the looser and larger form of a brief personal reminiscence.

Thus, the bare fact is that in concluding I have no theories to urge on you as to how finally to mediate today such profound differences as those that hold between contrasting basic cultural presuppositions. However, like so many others of us both in Asia and in Europe, I do have several exemplary teachers whom I often remember. And, again like so many others, I also have the experiences of philosophical friendship to reflect on. I would like then to draw on those experiences now in an informal way to bring some of these perhaps overly abstract reflections a little more down to earth. And I would

\(^{14}\) Note that later Epicureans tried to explain how in friendship our own pleasure is more desirable than our friend's and yet how our own pleasure in friendship cannot be more desirable than our friend's without taking our friend's pleasure fundamentally into account. For experience shows that taking our friends as no more than means to our own pleasure finally subverts the friendship itself. Yet taking our friends as ends in themselves would subvert the basic Epicurean doctrine of the primacy of one's own pleasure. Addressing this problem in Book I of his \textit{De finibus}, Cicero distinguished. He argued (at least on one authoritative reading) that 'although our friends' pleasures and well-being are not intrinsically as important as our own, we must love them as though they were. And the only way someone can do that is actually to feel the same towards his friend as he does towards himself... Hence the [Epicurean] theory [of friendship] is made to yield to treat friends altruistically' (1.67–68). The ms. text is to be found in Sent. \textit{Vat.} 23. This translation incorporates, however, a strongly supported textual emendation of \textit{airetê} (choice-worthy) for \textit{arête} (virtue). See Erler, M., Schofield, M. Epicurean Ethics // The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy / Ed. by K. Algra \textit{et al.} – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. – P. 668 (note 61, whose discussion I follow here).
also hope to remind some of you here today of presumably very similar experiences which perhaps you have had yourselves.

With deep gratitude I often remember a most demanding teacher. He was at home in the bi-lingual, multi-religious Alsatian culture of France, my maternal grandmother's culture, but almost everywhere else as well. He had not just generalized but universalized certain reflective views about the proper appropriations of true self-knowledge in the ongoing recognition of one's true affinity with others – ‘soi-même comme un autre’ he would say. And speaking of the profound reflections of the truly great philosophers, he also often said, ‘Do not keep looking for mistakes. Even in the finest works of the finest philosophers there are always far too many mistakes. Rather look always for what is good in these thinkers. And then strive over and over again to re-articulate that good ever less unsatisfactorily’. After some years working together yet always independently, we became friends, philosophical friends.

And with deep gratitude I also remember a most challenging colleague. He was at home in the culture of Japan, the culture of my father's mortal enemies, but almost everywhere else too. For like my French philosophical friend, he also had not just generalized but universalized certain reflective practices, especially those arising from the relationships between jiriki and hariki, between self-power and other-power. While discussing with each other the successes and failures of different philosophical attempts to articulate the good, he often would stop and then say nothing. He simply sat there, and he sat silently. Like many Western persons I was both increasingly disquieted by this behaviour and yet unwilling to risk offence by breaking such silences. And after a while my colleague would start talking again. Then, the pauses became longer. Eventually, I was less disquieted with his now protracted silences. And after some years meeting together, we became friends, philosophical friends.

In the case of my European philosophical friend, speaking together as long as possible both in his own language, French, and in my language, English, while trying to articulate what was good at the very basis of this friendship. Putting together less unsatisfactory words in the order of reasons enabled us, I believe, to open ourselves out onto fresh philosophical reflections which we now share in a feeling of profound respect, gratitude, and freedom. And, in striving to articulate what is good, I also believe we came to realize more fully a fundamental affinity between perhaps some small goodness in ourselves and finally one that subsists in every human being. Thanks to my friend, I sometimes think perhaps mistakenly, I am now a little more like him, a little more at home almost anywhere, at least for awhile.

In the case of my East Asian philosophical friend, however, I discovered that trying together to articulate what is good was not a matter of speaking for as long as possible about such dark matters; it was rather a matter of letting certain silences protract themselves. For although he alternated speaking English and German, my friend could not speak his own language with me because I neither understood nor spoke Japanese. We were often silent.

Meditating these initially frustrating silences, however, eventually became the basis of this different philosophical friendship. Letting the silences gather gradually made room, I now believe, for intimations of very much larger contexts which we learned to share. And, in struggling repeatedly to let myself be silent while my friend was silent, I also believe I succeeded not so much in opening up a set of philosophical claims about what is good that each of us together could reasonable come to endorse. Rather, I came
to believe, again perhaps mistakenly, that my friend and I had allowed ourselves to come to recognize perhaps some of those much larger contexts that underwrite no particular set of philosophical claims yet sustain some of our most fundamental philosophical attitudes, the complex contexts of our shared humanity.

These two personal experiences of philosophical friendship – so similar I am sure to what so many here today from both Asia and the West have also experienced – give rise to my concluding suggestion. The suggestion is that exploring the universalization of the reflective cosmopolitanism we find in traditional understandings of philosophical friendship can help counter often dangerous consequences of most understandings of globalization today only in terms of generalization of systematic practical know-how. This reflective cosmopolitan attitude that philosophically interiorizes a critical re-appropriation of Stoic doctrines of oikeiōsis is part of what makes for true philosophical friendship. And this reflective cosmopolitanism is also what can motivate the striving for a dynamic equilibrium between egocentric self-regard and altruistic concern for others, between self-power and other-power, between a merely anthropocentric ethics and a merely ecocentric ethics.
ON THE SUBJECT AND BOUNDARIES OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Alexander N. Chumakov

The origins and formation of Global Studies as an interdisciplinary sphere of academic knowledge refer to the last quarter of the twentieth century. Its emergence was the result of the process of integration of different disciplines in attempts to solve complicated and complex problems of the planetary scale. At the same time the notion ‘Global Studies’, though being in use already in the 1970s, was not widely spread then. Its content has started to be discussed seriously since the end of the 1990s only when the researchers shifted their attention from global problems to comprehension of the globalization phenomenon. By that time considerable theoretical and factual data had been accumulated in the sphere of planetary processes and phenomena, and the terms ‘global studies’, ‘globalization’, ‘global world’, ‘antiglobalism’, ‘global problems’, etc. became common, having become widespread not only in academic literature, mass media and political vocabulary but also in everyday vocabulary, too. So, the necessary conditions for the formation of a new research field have appeared, although it is not accepted unambiguously by all even today.

The matter is that the basic meaning of the mentioned above definitions at the level of general idea seems to provoke no special difficulties, however in the academic sphere their content remains a subject of serious discussions and needs to be defined more precisely, as different researchers quite often interpret them differently. Thus, for instance, some consider Global Studies as an academic discipline, others see it as a sphere of social practice, while yet others as a supradisciplinary branch of academic knowledge, and someone completely denies its right for existence. There are no less discrepancies with respect to globalization which is sometimes interpreted either as a cause of global problems or on the contrary, as its direct consequence. At the same time some scholars believe that globalization is an objective process, and Global Studies aim at investigating this process and its consequences, others view globalization as a result of the action of definite social-economic structures or political forces in the international arena, what also assigns a fundamentally different perspective in understanding of global studies.

Noting such a wide spread of opinions on the interpretation of both Global Studies and its basic tenets, it is important to emphasize that it is quite a regular phenomenon, as the matter concerns a new actively forming branch of academic knowledge. Consequently, this is not a scholastic notions game what is taking place in this case but the process of formation of a unified and quite definite language of interdisciplinary communication. In this respect it is necessary to bear in mind that the term ‘Global Studies’ has for the first time appeared due to quite active discussions and numerous publications concerning the dangers of global problems, which came into serious notice only after the publication of the first reports of the Club of Rome. Originally, this term meant the sphere of science connected with researches only in the field of global problems. Let us notice that it had happened a few decades before globalization started to be discussed. And, for instance, the word ‘antiglobalism’ finally came to everyday life quite recently when in different countries the international movement of so-called antiglobalists manifested themselves with extravagant protest actions.

To arrange all this terminology in a certain system becomes an urgent task nowadays, as the matter of the Global Studies status, categories, principles and approaches is fundamental. Without this it is difficult to expect a success in proper understanding of contemporary world tendencies and withstanding global threats.

Having no opportunity to go into details, let us notice that globalization is a centuries-long natural-historical process; global problems are a determined result of this process; and Global Studies is the sphere of theory and practice that focuses on globalization and global problems.

Global studies firstly arose basing on the investigation of global problems, that is on the analysis of the consequences when the term ‘globalization’ had not simply existed yet, and this fact misleads some modern scholars when the cause and the effect are concerned.

In this respect, let us turn to the term ‘globalization’. It is used as a rule to characterize the integration and disintegration processes of a planetary scale in the field of economy, politics, culture and also anthropogenic environmental changes that have the universal character in their form and in the content they affect the interests of the whole world community. At the same time it is significant to note the two extreme points in the interpretation of both the phenomenon of globalization itself and the history of its appearance. One of them consists in the improperly broad interpretation of the planetary character of social links and relations in the attempt to discover them already in the primitive society. From this point of view, even the early stages of the development of humanity are characterized as global ones.

Another extreme point is to treat globalization too narrowly when modern processes of social development are considered apart from their fundamental causes and genesis, that is history and dynamics of the formation of the international structures and transnational links are not taken into account. Within such an approach globalization is quite often connected with the events of the twentieth century only, and moreover with the last decades. Besides, it is often viewed as a deliberately defined and controlled process, as a purposeful fulfillment of someone’s policy, and they even speak about globalization as a subjective reality, someone’s guileful intention, realized in the interests of a certain circle of people, transnational corporations, or definite states.

The above-mentioned extremes in the views on globalization do not cover the whole range of the existing standpoints on the question, and their diversity can be explained not only by the complexity of the subject, but also by the insufficient develop-
ment of the issue. It causes some negative consequences. In particular, mutual understanding between people is getting embarrassed, the interdisciplinary interaction is hampered, and serious obstacles are created on the way of understanding the true reasons of globalization and global contradictions it brings. The reasons of misunderstanding of many conflicts are rooted here too, determined by the fact that the world in its certain aspects and relations is increasingly becoming unified, integral and mutually dependent while at the same time no mechanisms effective enough to regulate social relations at the global level are available. It is quite obvious that without a profound analysis and quite a clear understanding of the essence of processes of globalization it is difficult to expect a successful overcoming of the problems mentioned above.

Thus, today the necessity has come to a head to define the status of global studies, which has already compiled rich material, acquired a sufficient development and is represented by a variety of schools, directions, different associations, creative collectivities, research groups, etc. A complicated nature of the object of investigation and inevitable in this case interdisciplinarity complicate considerably the establishment of clear boundaries of the subject we are interested in, as they quite often merge with other fields of knowledge: futurology, culture studies and philosophy. Moreover, the theoretical knowledge received in Global Studies is very often connected with the necessity of concrete decision-making that leads to enlarging of the subject under discussion's boundaries. For better understanding of the assigned problem we will make a short survey into the history of the formation of the global world and process of its comprehension.

As has already been mentioned, the formation of global studies begins when they started to speak for the first time about the arisen threats to the whole humanity and began to discuss new issues which assumed the name of ‘global’. It was the period of the late 1960s – early 1970s. In the context of our discussion the circumstance in point has a fundamental meaning, as nowadays the discussions on globalization are weakly correlated or are related in no way at all to the global problems and the beginning of their systematic study about forty years ago. As a result Global Studies is quite often or predominantly correlated with the investigation of processes of globalization, at best declaring it the incipient discipline counting no more than one and a half decade, that is the period when Global Studies is in the focus of scientists' attention.

However, one should emphasize that although since the end of the 1960s scientists focus their attention not on the processes of globalization but on the consequences (global problems), already at that time there emerged an integrative field of interdisciplinary research aiming at a theoretical research and practical coping with fundamentally new dangers urgent for the whole humanity. At that time it became evident that alongside with the differentiation of scientific knowledge accompanying science for centuries, the urgent necessity appeared to integrate theoretical and practical knowledge aimed at studying new phenomena that were noted for the scale, integrity and complex system of mutual relations both inside the global problems themselves and in their connection with economic, social and political spheres.

Therefore, Global Studies initially started to form both as a fundamentally new scientific trend with integration processes coming to the forefront and as a sphere of social practice including international policy, economy and even ideology. Its emergence was a peculiar response to the challenge of time. It is at that period that first in the industrially developed countries and then in other countries the ecological situation deteriorated as a result of increasing misbalance in the relations of the humans and the environment. Soon it became clear that ecological problems were closely connected with other contra-
dictions of the planetary scale. Beyond the discovered unexampled pollution of the environment, the threatening tendencies of the uncontrolled growth of population of the Earth have revealed themselves, as well as the limits of exhaustion of natural resources and the mortal danger of the impetuous arms race that meant a serious danger to the advancing social development and even the existence of life on the planet.

The quantitative and qualitative changes in various spheres of social life and in the interaction of society and nature gradually accumulated during a long period being reflected not only the complexity, variety and dynamics of modern epoch, its particular technocratic, scientific character, but also in the expansionistic moods directed at the absolute conquest of nature. Almost immediately after the recovery from the horrors of World War II the humanity was drawn into new confrontation that caused the unexampled arms race; the ecological equilibrium on the planet was completely undermined. At the same time the inhuman essence of the unrestrained growth of non-ecological industrial production and in no way limited technological progress became evident quite soon. The misbalance in the society-nature relations reaching by that time the maximum permissible meanings and also the fragmentariness and disunity of the humanity in the face of global problems became obvious not only for specialists but also at the level of mass consciousness.

Here, however, one should note that some tendencies in the formation of the integrated world and changes taking place in it got into the focus of scientists and philosophers' attention much earlier than those changes had become evident for everybody. So, to the first attempts to comprehend the arising world tendencies and caused by them fundamentally new and common to all mankind problems, one should refer Thomas Malthus's ideas about natural regulation of population, Immanuel Kant's reflections concerning the eternal world or, for instance, Jean Lamarck's speculation on the role of humans. Undoubtedly Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's universalistic views presented in their ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ and a number of other works must also be placed in this line. Organized on their initiative in 1864, The First International reflected the arising necessity in the consolidation of different political and professional forces at the global level and became per se one of the first prototypes of a great number of international organizations which since then started to appear all over the world in increasingly great number. Nowadays such organizations become a concurrent part of the world community's life and their number has increased manifold.

As applied to the theme of our discussion, it is important to emphasize that the appearance of international organizations in the second half of the nineteenth century was an answer to the developing economical and sociopolitical relations which exceeded the limits of national states and generated an obvious necessity in cooperation and coordination of the intergovernmental efforts in solving principally new transnational tasks. The First and particularly Second World Wars gave a powerful impulse to international organizations' creation. Their end was accompanied by an attempt to prevent the repetition of the experienced horrors and the wish to build an effective system of international security. So, in 1919 there was established the League of Nations, the international organization whose proclaimed main goal was the development of collaboration between peoples and providing a guarantee of peace and security. And in 1945 there was accepted the United Nations Charter created to maintain and support the world security and development of collaboration among states in the post-war period. The essence of the new situation consisted in the fact that the world having completely divided into two ideologically opposing parts was more and more involved into arms race, caused by
‘the Cold War’, and so the increasing tendencies of globalization dropped out of sight for decades.

At the same time in the theoretical aspect a crucial role in the comprehension of global tendencies, when they were not yet that obvious, was played by the works by V. Soloviev, E. Le Rois, P. Teilhard de Chardin, V. I. Vernadsky, A. L. Chizhevsky, K. E. Tsiolkovsky, A. Toynbee, K. Jaspers, B. Russell, J. Somerville, etc. These thinkers worried most of all about fundamentally new tendencies distorting the natural balance of nature and social systems and they attempted to explain them, basing on the knowledge available at that time. By their works and discussions on ‘the population of the Earth’, ‘eternal world’, ‘world integration of proletariat’, ‘the united god-mankind’, ‘noosphere’, ‘world government’, ‘cosmopolitism’ and ‘nuclear omnicide’, etc. they prepared philosophical, scientific and broad public consciousness to the comprehension of the fact that for the humanity as a single whole that is inseparably linked with the natural conditions of its existence – biosphere, geographical sphere and space – the common fate and common responsibility for the future of the planet is prepared.

In particular, V. I. Vernadsky developing the conception of noosphere as early as in the 1930s made a conclusion about the cardinal change of the face of the Earth as a result of unexampled scales of human transforming activity and warned that if the society did not develop according to the rational principles and in accordance with laws of the nature, the death of all living things on the Earth would be inevitable. In his essay ‘Scientific thought as a Planetary Phenomenon’ he pointed out, ‘For the first time a human has really understood that he is the inhabitant of the planet and can – and should – think and act in a new aspect, not only in the aspect of an individual personality, family or kin, states or their alliances but also in the planetary aspect’. And Karl Jaspers keeping to the similar views as early as in 1948 used for the first time the term ‘global’ in the present days meaning and expressed serious anxiety concerning the fact that some day the globe would become scanty. Clearly understanding such a prospective for the humanity he wrote in particular, ‘Our historically new situation, for the first time having the decisive importance, represents the real unity of people on the Earth. Due to the technical facilities of modern means of communication our planet has become a single whole entirely available for a human, it became “smaller” than the Roman Empire used to be in the old days’. And then further, pointing a really global character of World War II, after which these lines were written, he made a conclusion of fundamental importance, ‘From this very moment starts the world history as history of a single whole. From this point of view the whole previous history seems a range of scattered independent from each other attempts, a great number of different sources of human abilities. Now the world on the whole became the problem and the task. Thus a fundamental transformation of history takes place. Nowadays the conclusive is the following: there is nothing beyond the sphere of happening events. The world has enclosed. The globe has become indivisible. New dangers and opportunities are revealed. All essential problems have become world problems, the situation – has become the situation of the whole humanity’ (Ibid.) (my emphasis – A. Ch.). While reading these lines one cannot help

agreeing with the fact that although global studies has been formed quite recently, its foundations have been laid by the works of some scientists much earlier.

Processes of globalization that came to the forefront and sharply enforced in the second half of the twentieth century, and also increasing in this connection interdependency of different countries and peoples determined a new level of understanding of the present topic. Still more new international structures and organizations appeared, among which there were quite a lot of those whose activities were aimed at comprehension of global problems and their reasons. We can give as examples the Institute of Future Problems, founded in Vienna in 1965, International fund ‘Humanity in 2000’, founded the same time in the Netherlands, ‘World Future Society’ organized in 1966 in Washington, etc. The increasing number of other similar organizations grew in the course of time. However, a true interest in global problems appeared after the first reports of the Club of Rome, founded in 1968.6 Its research projects ‘The Limits to Growth’ (1972), ‘Mankind at the Turning Point’ (1974), ‘RIO – Reshaping the International Order’ (1974), ‘Beyond the Age of Waste’ (1976) and others were world-renowned and became a theoretical basis of modern global studies. They did not only fulfill the necessary heuristic and methodological function while forming a principally new branch of interdisciplinary knowledge, but played a significant enlightening role.

So, we can say that Global Studies as a specific sphere of academic research and integral world-representation had formed generally by the end of the 1980s, and later it developing due to the rethinking of globalization processes which at that time still remained out of sight of those working in that sphere. The events provoked by the socialist system’s collapse what determined the new arrangement of forces in the international arena, served as the main impulse for turning the scientific and public thought from studying consequences to the analysis of their true reasons. And this happened only in the second half of the 1990s when the world had basically recovered from fundamental changes and started to comprehend the new situation. At that very period there came ‘the second wave’ of interest in Global Studies which gained the so-called ‘second wind’ due to the active comprehension of globalization processes.

At the same time it should be emphasized that for many contemporary researchers who have joined Global Studies during this (second) wave of the interest to it; what had been worked out before to a great extent appeared to be out of sight mostly because that almost ten-year gap between the two ‘waves’ was accompanied by breaking of the former foundations and ideas which are nowadays quite often taken as rudiments of the past unworthy of serious attention. As a result, a lot of publications appeared whose authors form up their ideas as if Global Studies is a very recent research trend that still has no results deserving serious attention. Nevertheless, before the appearance of the term ‘globalization’ quite clear ideas about the tendencies of the formation of world-economic links as an indivisible system and global problems caused by it had formed in this sphere of research. The nature and genesis of global problems, the criteria of their choice were also discovered and approaches to their systematization defined, a deep interrelation of not only natural and social processes but also of the contradictions following from here, their conditionality by the social, economic, political, ideological and scientific-technical consequences were revealed.

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The significant achievements in Global Studies in the first two decades of its development are: the elaboration and formation of language of interdisciplinary communication acceptable for different sciences, from this point of view the elaboration and improvement of the key notions and categories such as for instance ‘global problem’, ‘ecological crisis’, ‘ecologization of production’, ‘population explosion’, ‘nuclear winter’, ‘global dependence’, ‘world community’, ‘new thinking’, ‘new humanism’, etc. As a result, people's worldview changed sufficiently, their understanding of the fact that a human depends on nature to a much greater extent than it had been realized before, surrounding him terrestrial and space environment and also on the developing relations and arrangement of forces in the world scene. At that very period it became obvious that interdependency of all spheres of social life in the world is steadily increasing, in particular, the influence of different states on each other is increasing, when defending their particular national interests and sovereignty – under the conditions of globalization they provoke fundamentally new contradictions in the international relations. It has also been established that the appearance and sharp aggravation of global problems in the second half of the twentieth century is not a result of some miscalculation, somebody's fatal error or a purposely chosen strategy of socio-economic development. Neither are these the whims of history or a consequence of nature's anomalies. The global changes and panhuman problems provoked by them became a result of the centuries-long quantitative and qualitative transformations both in social development and in the ‘society-nature’ system. The reasons for their appearance are rooted in the history of formation of modern civilization which provoked an extensive crisis of the industrial society and technocratic-oriented culture in general. During the post-war period this crisis covered the whole complex of people's interaction with each other, fundamentally changed the relations between the person and society, society and nature, and touched directly the vital interests of the whole world community.

The result of such a development was not only ‘population explosion’ and globalization of economy but also degradation of the environment which outlined the tendency of human degradation. The human behaviour, ideas and the way of thinking failed to change in due time adequately to the changes which started to occur around him with an increasing speed. As has already been shown by the first research into the field of global studies, the reason for the accelerated development of socio-economic processes turned out to be the human being her/himself and his/her purposeful transformational activity, reinforced by new achievements in the field of science and engineering. In the meantime it was established that only within a few decades as a result of the impetuous growth of scientific technical achievements in the development of the productive forces of society more changes than during a number of previous centuries took place. At the same time the process of changing took place with a growing speed and was invariably accompanied by more profound and substantial transformations in different spheres of social life. By the end of the twentieth century with the appearance of the Internet, email and radio-telephone they had become unexampled, and the unique technique and modern transport had enormously increased the mobility and transforming abilities of people whose number still continues to grow at a fearful rate. As a result there is left neither an unexplored place on the Earth nor even practically pure territories, water and air space which natural state has not been directly or indirectly affected by the human activity. All this gives grounds to call our planet now ‘a common home’, ‘world village’, to call the processes and problems which have turned out common for all the
people – the global ones, and the sphere of academic knowledge about all these things –
Global Studies.

Speaking about different spheres of social life and touching directly people's interests, the Global Studies with the necessity becomes closely connected with politics and ideology. In this aspect it is rightful to speak about different trends and schools of global studies which have revealed themselves clearly already at the first stages of its formation, when the confrontation of the two ideologically hostile socio-economical systems predetermined its development in two directions one of which got the name ‘western’ and the other – ‘Soviet global studies’. During the last decade the ideological resistance gave place to economic, cultural, religious and national discrepancies which underlay the division of the world into a number of large regions – the original subjects of international relations. At the same time cultural civilization differences of countries and peoples came to the forefront and that predetermined somewhat different approaches to the understanding of modern world processes, in particular Western, Eurasian, Oriental and Islamic, etc. Taking into consideration a definite conventionality of any classification, let us mark only some approaches and directions typical of modern Global Studies in which we will distinguish foreign and Russian components for more clearness.

In the non-Russian Global Studies two directions have formed initially: the ‘technocratic’ one within which the positive influence of science and technique on social life was obviously exaggerated, and the ‘technopessimistic’ one making the technological progress, international capital and transnational corporations responsible for the negative consequences of globalization. Later their positions became closer and at the same time were differently corrected under the influence of different estimation of the prospects for the world market development; so, the indicated division is quite relative now. As for the Russian Global Studies, in the Soviet period when it was under the strong ideological influence, a moderately optimistic mood was characteristic of it. At the same time from the very beginning there appeared some directions among which (quite relatively) the following can be distinguished:

– philosophical-methodological: within its framework the philosophical principles, nature and genesis of the global processes are studied, the most important socio-political and economic transformations necessary for successful solution of the global problems and underlying processes are analyzed;

– socio-natural: it covers a wide range of problems the most important of which are produced by ecology, supply of raw material, energetic, water, land and other resources. Within this trend representatives of natural, technical and social sciences, politicians, production workers and public people work in close contact. Their efforts are focused on the elaboration of principles and methods of optimization of the interaction between society and nature, ecologization of industry and rational nature management;

– culturological: it focuses on the problems of globalization appearing in the sphere of scientific and technological progress, population, public health service, culture, law, education and other fields of social life.

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Recently both in Russia and abroad the attention to political, social, ideological, cultural and civilizational aspects of globalization has increased considerably what has essentially enlarged the scope of Global Studies and notably influenced the nature of the problems it solves. The spheres of material production and spiritual activity, ecology and lifestyle, culture and policy – all of them are included now in the sphere of global studies which, taking into account the aforesaid, should be determined as the interdisciplinary field of scientific research aimed at discovering the essence of processes of globalization, causes of their appearance and tendencies of development, and also at the analysis of the problems it generates and the search for the ways of maintenance of positive and overcoming negative consequences of these processes for the humankind and biosphere.

In a broader sense the term ‘Global Studies’ determines the whole totality of scientific, philosophical, culturological and applied investigations of different aspects of globalization and global problems including the received results of such investigations and also practical activity on their realization in economic, social and political spheres both at the level of separate states and in the international scale.

To avoid improper analogies and methodological confusion it is important to emphasize that Global Studies should not be understood as a separate or specific discipline which as a rule appears in multitude as a result of differentiation of scientific knowledge or at the edge of adjacent fields of science. It was born by the opposite phenomenon – by the integration processes typical of modern science and represents a sphere of investigations and knowledge within which different scientific disciplines and philosophy analyze all possible aspects of globalization, suggest these or those solutions to global problems, considering them both separately and as a holistic system in a close interaction with each other, each from the position of its subject and method. Here follows a significant consequence. One could raise the question of the subject, matter, method, goal and conceptual apparatus, etc. of the Global Studies, as some researchers suggest. However, one should keep in mind that answers to these questions concerning the Global Studies lie in a different plane as compared to this or that concrete field of science. In particular, its subject cannot be determined unambiguously though in a simplifying way, one can define its subject as the world integrity, humanity as a whole or the whole biosphere with its basic element – the human being. The same is referred to the conceptual apparatus of Global Studies which (at the philosophical-methodological level) will be indivisible to a certain extent only, in other respects it becomes ‘diffused’ in separate sciences dealing with the appropriate investigations. Speaking about methods or goals of the Global Studies, attention should be paid to the fact that besides defining some basic approaches, one should enumerate not only separate sciences and their contribution to the research of the appropriate problems but also reveal the way philosophy, culture studies, politics and ideology are involved in Global Studies what makes the solution of such a task admittedly almost unachievable.

Another significant difference of Global Studies from concrete scientific disciplines consists in the fact that the comprehension of global tendencies and a principal overcoming of the problems caused by them require not only theoretical investigations but corresponding effective practical activities. The Global Studies thereby, impartially fulfills the integrative role in the sphere of science and practice making many scientists, politicians and public people consider the contemporary world in a new way and realize their involvement into the common fate of the humanity. It makes think that globaliza-
tion and problems it causes do leave no other choice to the humanity than through over-
coming the fragmentation and difficulties to come to its unity saving the originality of
cultures, century-old traditions and basic values of separate nations and peoples whenever possible. But such a unity and coordination of actions can be provided only by the
appropriate understanding of processes and events happening in the modern world whose knowledge is developed and formed in Global Studies where the short-term aims and long-run prospectives are considered in close interconnection.

In the end, it is necessary to point out that a number of conclusions based on the
analyses of objective tendencies of social development can face grounded objections on
the part of those who view globalization first of all as the fight of interests and purpose-
ful activity of separate clans or states at the cost of ignoring interests as well as violating the rights of the rest. The remarks of the kind will be fair and they should be taken
into account both in theoretical research and in practice, when the matter concerns glo-
balization and its consequences. However, speaking about the problem of the Global Stud-
ies' status as well as while determining its subject and scope we deal with solving a differ-
ent task and face not the subjective factor but, as a rule, the subjectivism and predilection of certain researchers whose opinion must not substitute the analysis of the objective tendencies of the world-scale processes.
The general typology of approaches to globalization is presented in the paper. These four approaches are: (1) advocates of globalism who also generally present it as being humane or as capable of becoming humane, (2) critics of globalism who, whether they call themselves antiglobalists, generally admit that its future is not determined, (3) scholars who, regardless of whether they support globalism, admit that the future of globalism is indeterminate, and (4) scholars who, regardless of whether they support globalism, support a disciplinary approach for understanding and assessing globalism. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the history of Globalistics. He supposes that regardless of division of Globalistics into ‘western’ and ‘eastern’, at present we see its amalgamation.

Introduction: Confusions in the Use of ‘Globalization’ and ‘Antiglobalization’

The terms ‘globalization’ and ‘antiglobalization’ are used in very diverse ways. As a consequence, the discussions of globalization processes can be confusing. On the one hand, some globalists and some antiglobalists view environmentalism and democracy positively. On the other hand, some globalists and some antiglobalists view capitalism and militarism negatively. Also, while some globalists and some antiglobalists present globalism as continuous with modernity, other globalists and antiglobalists contend it is a break from modernity.

Despite these differences in the use of basic terms, the time when significant attention to issues of globalism began can be identified historically. Basically, for about fifty years issues related to globalism have been receiving increased attention. Since the 1960s concepts of ‘ecology’, ‘ecological crises’, ‘global problems’, ‘globalization’, and ‘antiglobalization’ have become increasingly common in scientific and political discourse. Moreover, these discussions have in common an understanding that globalism is connected to how capitalism has impacted the entire planet economically and to threats to the environment and human rights.

I will provide two types of analysis in this essay. First, I will survey a variety of perspectives on globalism. Second, I will utilize the interdisciplinary field of Global Studies to provide a conceptual and normative framework for considering globalization.

1. Toward a Typology of Positions on Globalization

I want to provide a general typology for sorting the enormous number of approaches to globalism. Although this typology is not exhaustive, I think it captures the basic

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positions. In presenting four views, I will give some indication of a range of views within each. These four views are: (1) advocates of globalism who also generally present it as being humane or as capable of becoming humane, (2) critics of globalism who, whether they call themselves antiglobalists, generally favor a grassroots process working from below rather than an elitist globalism that is imposed from above, (3) scholars who, regardless of whether they support globalism, admit that the future of globalism is indeterminate, and (4) scholars who, regardless of whether they support globalism, support a disciplinary approach for understanding and assessing globalism.

A. The Humane Portrayal

Many capitalists support globalism and also maintain that globalism is humane. Many of the capitalist globalists support the free market economically and democracy politically. Regardless, they see prosperity, initially for some and perhaps eventually for the vast majority, as an outcome of global capitalism that is sympathetic to democratic political traditions. When they claim the West won the Cold War, they are assuming the global triumph of democracy and market economies.

The contention that globalism is humane should not be taken at face value. Tatiana A. Alekseyeva and I analyzed this claim in relation to the post-Soviet Russian Federation and concluded Russian capitalism has yet to achieve a humane or human face. Now I want to broaden this conclusion. Throughout most of its history, capitalism has lacked a human face, despite pressures on capitalist societies to provide some kind of social security or social safety net. Based on the history of capitalist societies, no obvious basis exists for claiming that globalized capitalism is likely to be any more humane than a variety of other economic systems. Nevertheless, despite my own skepticism regarding the humanistic characterization of globalism, I will cite a few of the advocates of this view.

In Globalization and the Poor, Jay R. Mandle connects globalization with the type of economic growth that is supposedly needed to alleviate poverty. Based on this claim, he contends globalization should be advanced. Nevertheless, he maintains, ‘governments must adopt policies that address the needs of those who are victimized by the dislocations caused by the process’. He asserts that, given the supposed demise of socialism, the opposition has been unable to forge a consensus on such humane policies. As far as I can tell, he thinks the poor will simply always be with us.

Other writers are more emphatic in claiming that globalism will solve our social problems. In Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance Paul Q. Hirst and Grahame Thompson suggest that nationally and internationally market economies can be controlled in ways that promote social goals. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge go even further in A Future Perfect: The Essentials of Globalization. In their defense of globalization, they admit globalism increases inequality, but they deny its results in a win/lose situation and one in which winners are

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predominant. They contend that even though some people are left behind, many more are able to progress. Finally, they maintain globalism reduces the power of nation-states but concede that nation-states remain the fundamental unit of modern politics.4

Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington connect this argument to advancing democracy and freedom in their edited collection Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Berger says he is searching for ‘middle positions between endless relativization and reactive fanaticism’.5 Finally, In Defense of Globalization Jagdish N. Bhagwati takes this argument just about to its limit. He denies that globalization needs a human face and claims, ‘Globalization has a human face, but we can make that face yet more agreeable’.6 As I turn to antiglobalists, I will note that they do not share these positive to enthusiastic assessments of the humanizing consequences of globalization.

B. The Grassroots Antiglobalist View

Alexander V. Buzgalin and Yuri M. Pavlov observe in their essay Antiglobalism that many antiglobalists do not use this term to describe their perspective and many also support a form of globalism from below.7 Over the last decade these characteristics have become increasingly apparent. A very conspicuous form of resistance to globalism is seen in the large public demonstrations staged during international conferences and summits held by the Word Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in cities such as Seattle, Washington, D. C., Quebec, Prague, and Brussels.

Kevin Danaher and Roger Burbach give a typical treatment supporting the protests in Seattle against WTO in their book Globalize This! The Battle against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule. They contend that the protests against WTO in Seattle in November 1999 were highly significant as tens of thousands of people protested having WTO make global rules that favor the interests of large corporations.8 In a related work, Danaher and Burbach stress how the protestors want more attention to be paid to environmental and labor concerns. They maintain that these protests led to a total collapse in the talks. In contradistinction to globalists, these antiglobalists contend these public protests are ‘like a huge shot of adrenaline for the global democracy movement’.9 They view the organizations associated with these protests as developing ways to run the global economy in a life-centered way – instead of in a money-centered way. In addition, they see a shift occurring away from elitist transnational unity toward grassroots transnational unity.

Among antiglobalist groups, some focus on specific problems. For example, some see globalism as posing particular problems for women or for developing countries.

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9 Ibid. – P. 9.
In *Women Resist Globalization*, Sheila Rowbotham and Stephanie Linkogle focus on movements, especially women's movements, which stress employment needs and issues of rights and democracy for all persons. In *The Future in the Balance: Chapters on Globalization and Resistance* Third World activist and scholar Walden F. Bello provides support for developing nations. He maintains that international financial institutions have created an economic crisis that is the result of ‘institutions that advocated free market economies based on the principles of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization’. He insists that achievement of justice and fairness requires a very different system.

Finally, in seeking a different system, some antiglobalists stress the need for more local structures. In *Beyond Globalization: Shaping a Sustainable Global Economy*, Hazel Henderson contends more local enterprises are needed that rely on a more holistic approach in order to break away from the current global market system.

C. The View that the Future of Globalism is not Set

Whatever attitudes we have toward globalism or antiglobalism, we need to be cautious about arguments from the extremes in the debate. Even some famous philosophers have fallen victim to overdrawing their arguments, as occurred in debates between Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook in which Russell used the suspect premise that all would die in a nuclear exchange and Hook used the equally suspect premise that no freedom exists under communism. Michael Pearson and I also noted the problem of extreme arguments when we cautioned against either denial of or resignation to the prospects for nuclear war. In logical terms, historical possibilities are contingent events and have a probability greater than zero percent and less than one hundred percent; they are neither impossible nor certain. One is likewise arguing from the extremes when the outcomes of either globalism or antiglobalism are cast as already determined. Fortunately, among proponents and critics of globalism, some writers are careful to qualify their claims.

In the conclusion to his edited collection *Egalitarian Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Craig N. Murphy observes that the contributors to his volume remain agnostic regarding the Polanyian thesis of a double movement regarding globalization in which one simply assumes that each stage of rapid marketization in which the state retreats from regulating economic forces is followed by a more liberal and socially oriented stage in which egalitarian social movements have increasing success.

Among antiglobalists Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith address the results of efforts from below to redirect globalization in *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity*. They argue that the final outcome is not now known. The possibilities include ‘a war of all against all, world domination by a single superpower, a tyrannical alliance of global elites, global ecological catastrophe, or some combination thereof’. So, what people decide to do can make a difference. Brecher, Costello, and Smith,

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while they know the outcome they favor, do not promise victory and admit that the final result may be even worse than our present situation.

These qualified arguments by globalists and antiglobalists have in common a view that since the outcome is not predetermined, human action is relevant. What we do can make a difference. This message is appropriate regardless of where one falls in political debates on how to assess globalization.

D. The Special Discipline Approach to Globalism

David M. Rasmussen noted more than thirty years ago that scholars should beyond the Kantian view of autonomous disciplines. This need is especially relevant in trying to intellectually grasp and critically assess globalization. Nevertheless, some writers favor a certain discipline or set of disciplines for treating globalism.

One text that stresses a specific discipline for understanding globalization is *Globalization and its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy*, edited by Randall D. Germain. This book, prepared under the auspices of the Political Economy Research Centre (PERC) of the University of Sheffield, contends that the perspective of political economy provides the needed interdisciplinary standpoint for exploring the new issues posed by globalism. Harold James provides a more narrow perspective and conclusion in *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression*. He maintains that globalism will collapse and the model for understanding it is found in the Great Depression.

While broad and even narrow economic analyses can be helpful, they alone cannot provide sufficient understanding. So, instead of turning to one discipline or to a rather restricted set of disciplines, I favor a broadly multi-disciplinary and value-oriented approach. I find such an approach in Global Studies, and, as a philosopher, I am especially pleased that throughout its history Global Studies has included philosophy as a key component. I turn now to providing my reasons for supporting the role of Global Studies in order to understand and assess globalism.

2. The Role of Philosophy in Global Studies

Historically, the field of Global Studies, while being multidisciplinary, is still closely connected with philosophy broadly understood. This connection, however, is more evident outside than within the United States. Perhaps even more surprising is the connection that Concerned Philosophers for Peace has had within international forums that have helped advance the field of Global Studies. Put briefly, Global Studies has gone through three stages. The first stage occurred in the 1960s when the world scholarly community began to study seriously the consequences of globalization. The second stage occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when, as a result of the Cold War, Global Studies was advanced separately in the West and in the Soviet Union. The third stage covers the last fifteen years, when, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a more integrated field of Global Studies has emerged. About forty years separate the emergence, on the one hand, of the first major institutions devoted to the study of globalization and subsequent work of groups like ‘The Club of Rome’ and, on the other hand, the publication


of the first integrative and interdisciplinary international encyclopedia devoted to Global Studies. I will address briefly the Cold War division and the post-Cold War integration of Global Studies, and I will then address some important normative issues.

A. The Temporary East-West Bifurcation of Global Studies

The East-West political divisions during the Cold War led to an extended, but not permanent, bifurcation of the work done in Global Studies. Consequently, the post-Cold War unification of Global Studies has had to overcome differences in problems, methods, and vocabularies that characterized Global Studies in the Soviet Union and in the West during the Cold War. ‘Global Studies in the Soviet Union’ by Viktor A. Los and ‘Global Studies in the West’ by Anatoli I. Utkin are essays that accurately and succinctly present these differences. Given the very useful historical and conceptual overviews that they provide, I will not need to take the time here to summarize these differences in approach during the Cold War.

Instead, I will provide some remarks regarding my personal involvement and the involvement of Concerned Philosophers for Peace in the emergence of the third stage of Global Studies. The disintegration of the Soviet Union took most Sovietologists and other political analysts by surprise. In fact, especially during the 1980s and the nuclear buildup of the Reagan Administration, many people in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe, as well as elsewhere, feared the possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union would lapse into a nuclear war that might largely destroy both of these modern technologically advanced societies. Many grass roots and professional organizations emerged that sought to reduce the tensions between the superpowers.

One result of the glasnost introduced by Soviet Premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev was that more direct contact between American and Soviet philosophers became possible toward the end of the 1980s. The American group that organized an initial visit in 1988 was called ‘SAVI’ for Soviet and American Visits and Interaction. As Pierre Bourdieu has noted the names of organizations are often tied to historical periods or events; even more specifically, the name of a professional group often ‘records a particular state of struggles and negotiations over the official designations’. Such was the case for SAVI and also for Concerned Philosophers for Peace. With the latter group the inception, the name, and the subsequent development occurred in response to the perceived threat of the Reagan nuclear buildup, although, while keeping the same name, this organization has continued to respond to developments within national and global militarism and has continued close ties with philosophers in the subsequent Russian Federation.

Several years after the formation of Concerned Philosophers for Peace and with the formation of SAVI, I was among the group of American philosophers who participated in meetings in Moscow that brought us face to face with Soviet colleagues in philosophy. While most of our meetings took place at the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow,
one afternoon in August 1988 we visited the office of the Philosophical Society of the USSR where we learned that Soviet philosophers regarded the two most pressing global problems to be war, especially the threat of nuclear war, and ecology, especially the problems of environmental degradation. This difference in assessment reflects very well the distinct paths being taken during the 1970s and 1980s in Western and Soviet Global Studies.

Philosophically, another measure of the attention of philosophers to global issues can be found in the programs of the World Congress of Philosophy, which meets every five years. Although globalization was addressed in a variety of panels at the 1988 meeting in Brighton, at the 1993 meeting in Moscow, and at the 1998 meeting in Boston, globalization was central to the 21st World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul, Turkey. This congress met in August 2003 and focused on Philosophy Facing Global Problems. At the 21st World Congress of Philosophy, the Russian and English editions of Global Studies Encyclopedia were released. (At both the meeting in Boston and the meeting in Istanbul, the Russian Philosophical Society and Concerned Philosophers for Peace conducted joint sessions on these topics.)

B. Normative Components of Global Studies

Another writer who has addressed the connection of Global Studies to philosophy is Thomas C. Daffern. In addition to my also stressing this connection in this essay, I have elsewhere tried to show how the former Soviet-style Global Studies and World Order Studies in the West have key values in common. However, for a very good portrayal of the field and its value orientation, I find most helpful the essay on ‘Global Studies’ by Ivan I. Mazour and Alexander N. Chumakov. Also helpful are two essays by Chumakov on the classification of and criteria for global problems.

What issues are addressed by Global Studies? Mazour and Chumakov note that three main topics are addressed: (1) globalization processes, (2) the global problems generated by globalization processes, and (3) augmenting positive and reducing negative consequences of these processes for human beings and the biosphere. The focus is on human rights and the environment and leads to anti-militarism since militarism violates both.

Global Studies seeks to address the root causes of global changes and the ensuing problems. Consequently, investigations go back to the history of the formation of modern civilization. Such investigations include both the degradation of the environment and the degradation of human beings themselves within world capitalist organization that currently describes itself as the free market.

Conclusion: The Future of Our Planet

In examining the views of several writers, I have observed that globalism and anti-globalism each have positive and negative components. Moreover, I have maintained that whether the future for our planet is bright or bleak will not be determined exclu-
sively by whether we accelerate or decelerate the processes of globalization. I have stressed that the complexity of the issues demands a highly multidisciplinary and value-oriented approach toward sustaining the planetary eco-system and respecting the rights of human beings with it. On many levels, human beings, whatever they call themselves and their views, continue to threaten the environment and human life by means of military spending and especially wars. Regardless of where one stand in debates on regulating the global economy, to the degree that capitalism is unregulated it contributes to environmental degradation.

Documenting the damages of human activities on the environment and on human beings themselves and analyzing and extrapolating trends are complex multidisciplinary tasks that need to be open ended yet value centered. Over the last few years, I find myself increasingly more in agreement with the views I heard articulated in Moscow in August 1988. Military and environment threats pose the greatest danger whether we call ourselves globalists or antiglobalists. Global Studies does not settle the political debates, but it does provide a post-Cold War perspective in which past East-West and continuing North-South differences can be set aside in the face of our global challenge to protect our basic human rights and the fragile eco-system upon which the continuation of all life on this planet depends.

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The global environmental crisis is one of the symptoms of modernity. The whole modern civilization is anti-ecological, and the global ecological crisis is caused by the global expanding of modern civilization. From an ecological point of view, we can definitely judge that modern civilization with 'mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes' is unsustainable. Since ancient Chinese civilization remained agricultural civilization, a kind of eco-civilization, it was sustainable for a long time. Confucianism made a special contribution to ancient Chinese civilization. We cannot, of course, go back to ancient eco-civilization, but we can learn a lot from our ancestors when we try to construct a new eco-civilization in the future. We can benefit from valuable suggestions from Confucianism while correcting the mistakes of modernity. A new eco-civilization will also need to inherit good elements from modern Western civilization.

The global environmental crisis or ecological crisis is one of the symptoms of modernity. In other words, it is the crisis caused by modern Western civilization. Modernity and modern Western civilization cannot be separated from the whole Western cultural tradition and its civilization.

I take culture and civilization as roughly synonymous. I would like to use John C. Mowen and Michael S. Minor's definition of culture. They said, ‘…culture is a way of life. It includes the material objects of a society, such as guns, footballs, autos, religious texts, forks, and chopsticks. It is also composed of ideas and values; for example, most Americans endorse the belief that people have a right to choose between different brands of products. Culture consists of a mix of institutions that include legal, political, religious, and even business organizations.’ While agreeing with these two authors, I think a culture or a civilization basically has three dimensions: (1) material objects, (2) institutions, (3) ideas and values.

To use the method of analysis of culture (or cultural analysis), we might clearly know why modern Western civilization has caused the global ecological crisis. We can describe modern Western civilization as the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern Western Civilization</th>
<th>Material objects</th>
<th>Industrial products produced by machine using mineral fuel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Capitalism and democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas and values</td>
<td>Physicalism, scientism, liberalism, utilitarianism or economism, materialism</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

From the dimension of material objects, we can find the direct cause of the global ecological crisis. Since more and more mineral fuel (i.e., coal, oil, gas, etc.) are used in the
production and consumption all over the world, the environment is getting polluted, the biosphere of the earth – damaged, and the earth is becoming increasingly warmer. And only with the rapid development of modern industry, ‘mass production and mass consumption’ is possible. With ‘mass production and mass consumption’, human beings have not only polluted the natural environment but also have occupied more and more habitat of the wilds. Comparing to traditional agricultural products, which are mainly gained by photosynthesis of plants with the help of the human being and domestic animals, almost all modern industrial products are anti-ecological. Cars are typical modern industrial products, and both its production and consumption are processes of pollution. It is impossible to avoid environmental pollution and ecological damage with ‘mass production and mass consumption’ excessively using mineral fuel.

Now let us analyze the second dimension of modern Western civilization: institutions. We can consider them as the institutions of capitalism and democracy. Reviewing the past historically, we can generally state that all social institutions in traditional societies refrain the greed of peoples, and especially the greed of the ruled and the majority, though those belonging to the ruling class are usually greedy. But the institutions of capitalism encourage unprecedentedly all people (both the ruled and the ruling) to be legally greedy. Many economists try to show that the institution of capitalism is a kind of neutral framework of society, but it is not. It presupposes such a belief: the better the greedier, if you always make money or material wealth legally. The institution of capitalism is the institutional condition of ‘mass production and mass consumption’. Since the end of the Cold War, the institution of capitalism has been copied globally. And producing and living under the form of ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ are imitated globally. The global ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ are polluting the earth at much greater speed and scope, and pushing the human being deeper and deeper into the global ecological crisis. Then we can assert that the institution of capitalism is also the cause of the global ecological crisis.

Democracy is not a bad institution, but so far it also supports ‘mass production, mass consumption and mass wastes’. Whether we can make democracy not to support ‘mass production, mass consumption and mass wastes’ any more is, perhaps, a very important question for the future political philosophy.

Lastly, let us examine the dimension of ideas and values of modern Western civilization. We can summarize them as modernity. One often links the rise of modernity to Enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth century, and it may also be traced further back to Renaissance in the fourteenth century. But from a point of non-western view, we can find that modernity is rooted deeply in the whole Western cultural and thinking tradition, including ancient Hellenic culture and Christian culture in the Middle Ages.

We cannot take modernity as a logically consistent system, but it is an ideology strongly supporting ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ and the institution of capitalism. And it is widely accepted as truth by people across the globe, including modern Chinese people.

According to modern sciences, especially Physics, the whole world consists of physical entities, such as atoms, electrons, protons, neutron, or basic particles in general, and fields, and the human being is ultimately an aggregation of genes which are made of basic particles.

Scientism asserts that all knowledge should be integrated in a unified system of science, which takes modern physics as the firm foundation, and there is an internal logic or mathe-
mational structure within the unified science. With the progress of science according to its internal logic, human knowledge will further exhaust all the secrets in the world or get closer to the last secrets of the Creation by God. To use Steven Weinberg's words, Physics will establish a final theory about the final laws of nature. When we know the final laws of nature, we will grasp the rules to dominate the stars, stones and everything in the world.3

Physicalism and scientism presuppose that there is nothing mystic in any sense in the nature, the human being can conquer nature more easily using the system of machines with the progress of science and technology. Today, people believing in physicalism and scientism tell us that the human being can only make progress and overcome all sorts of difficulties with the spirit of Prometheus. All difficulties or crises are temporary. There is no need to worry about the pollution, ecological damage, shortage of resources, extinction of species, and the global warming; we can solve all these problems by the innovation of science and technology. Never try to stop ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’, or human civilization will lose its deepest motive of development. Some of them think that digital technology will bring us a much better man-made world, in which all wilds will be erased.4

Liberalism is an ideology directly supporting the institution of capitalism. It claims that liberty of individuals is the most important social condition for progress of knowledge, wisdom, and morality, or progress of civilization in general. Let people be engaged in free competitions, the society will be prosperous and peaceful naturally. Everybody is selfish and does his best to gain the maximum of his benefits or profits, but the system of markets will change individuals' immoral actions to good for the whole society. Liberals try to prove that a way of living motivated by greed is much better than any ways of moderate living, including that of Christianity.5 They assert that the way of ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ is the one conforming to human nature perfectly. They think that all human beings should cooperate peacefully to conquer nature in order to improve the conditions of human life, and only in this way the wars among peoples can be avoided. That means human beings should conquer nature rather than each other; and if their power of conquering must be abreacted, nature is the proper object for this. Liberalism prominently emphasizes rights of individuals, but pays less attention to duties of individuals.

Utilitarianism and economism presuppose that human preferences or values can be measured uniformly, and all values can be weighed by money or reduced to money. Many contemporary economists think that we can protect environment well only when we realize that environmental issue is an economical one. Make a price for pollution, we will control pollution effectively. That is the prescription to cure the symptom of global ecological crisis given by economists. They do not think any species, even the whole biosphere, have an infinite marginal cost.6 They usually believe that money can push scientists and engineers to solve all problems, including environmental and ecological ones.

Materialism confirmed by physicalism, scientism and economism is an understanding about meanings or values of human life. It claims that the ultimate meaning of human life is to possess more and more money and material wealth, or to improve the material conditions of human life. It is also presented as consumerism today. It is absurd

and vulgar. But it has the strongest influence on today's world. That is a unique paradox of modern civilization. Someone may argue against me, saying that so many people are religious and all religions seem to be anti-materialistic. But I would like to say that almost all religions have been eroded by money with the aggression of capital. For many people, religions are only the tools to get some psychological comfort after the long hard working or fierce competition.

When the majority in a society believes in materialism to a variable degree, the institutions certainly do encourage the way of ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’.

Generally speaking, the whole modern civilization is anti-ecological, and the global ecological crisis is a result of the global expansion of modern civilization. Today the advanced countries like the USA have protected their environments well, but they have just transferred the pollution to developing countries including China. From a point of view of ecology, we can definitely judge that modern civilization with ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ is unsustainable.

By comparing to ancient Chinese civilization, we can know more clearly why modern civilization is unsustainable. For many liberals including today's Chinese liberals, ancient China is backward and unenlightened, and Chinese of ancient times, including those called sages, are all stupid. But from the ecological point of view, we can find that ancient Chinese civilization is quite sustainable, it did exist for over 5000 years, and it had the population of nearly 400 million with splendid culture of its last dynasty. Why is it so sustainable? Comparing to modern civilization, you can easily find that every dimension of ancient Chinese civilization is much more in favor of protecting natural environment and ecological systems.

Scholars embracing modernity will certainly mock me, saying that people cannot live happily with mainly agricultural products, only living in the way of ‘mass production, mass consumption, and mass wastes’ they can be happy. People driving cars are much happier than those who have to walk. But I will never agree with them. Here I just want to point out that agricultural technology contributing to the photosynthesis of plants without using machines, chemical fertilizer and pesticide is quite a kind of ecological and humanistic technologies. And products produced by this kind of technologies are the very goods which nature allows the human being to consume. Since ancient Chinese civilization remained agricultural civilization, it was sustainable for a long time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancient Chinese Civilization</th>
<th>Material objects</th>
<th>Mainly local agricultural products produced by plants through photosynthesis with the help of human and critters, and no chemical fertilizer and pesticide are used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>The hierarchy with emperor in the top, but the leading class mainly consisting of the scholars, and the fundamental principle of promoting agriculture and restraining commercial business is consistently the guidance for the construction and reformation of social institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas and values</td>
<td>Mainly Confucianism, with Taoism and Buddhism as complement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reason why it could remain agricultural for a long time is that its institutions consistently encouraged agriculture and restrained commerce. The rulers of all dynasties considered agriculture as the foundation and the most important issue of politics and economy, and took commerce as secondary. This kind of social institution never encourages peoples' greed.

According to Confucianism, man is always in nature. Nature is absolutely not the aggregate of physical entities, because nature is living, and there are a lot of things to be born and to die for every second in nature (天地之大德曰生). The most important knowledge is the knowledge about what the meaning of human life is, how to do the right things and how to play a good role in one's familial and social position. Science in modern sense is never the most important affair within the framework of ancient Chinese civilization. Elites of intellectuals in ancient China never thought that human knowledge could discover all the secrets of nature, and that human being could conquer nature. Individual's freedom can only be embodied as one's self-consciousness of the right way of living and autonomous obeying to it. The right way of living (道) is indicated by the unification of both the natural laws (天道) and the moral laws (人道). Confucians never think that human beings could become more and more autonomous or freer and freer with endless expanding power to conquer nature. Though Confucians have no clear ideas about diversity of values and pluralism, they never think that human values can be measured quantitatively, and definitely refused to measure all values by money. The ultimate concern of a Confucian is to become a sage by tireless studies and practice to cultivate his virtues and increase his spiritual state, or his state of mind. A sage always learns from Nature, a gentleman always learns from sages, and an intellectual always learns from gentlemen (圣希天，贤希圣，士希贤). With such ideas to guide the construction and reformation of social institutions, materialism can hardly become the most popular understanding of meaning for human life.

From the perspective of ecology, ancient Chinese civilization is progressive while the modern civilization is backward, because the latter is anti-ecological and not sustainable. But since the failure in the Sino-British Opium Wars (1840–1842 and 1856–1860), Chinese in general, and Chinese intellectuals in particular, gradually lost their faith in their own civilization and tradition. The most distinguished intellectuals such as Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Lu Xun, etc. supposed that China had to learn thoroughly from the West, and had to change every dimension of the old civilization in order to survive. Since then modernity has gradually become the most popular ideology in China.

CPC accepts the basic goals of modernity though its guiding principle is Marxism, not Liberalism, and Marxism is an alternative of modernity. Modernization is the basic ideal to change China and CPC accepts this ideal without any doubt and hesitation.

Since 1978 modernization and in some degree westernization have been rapidly developed with the market economy growth. Today, there are increasing number of cars, trains, airplanes, and factories in China. In cities, there are TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, air-conditioners, etc. in almost every family. Cities are getting larger and more new cities and towns have appeared. But the environment is polluted very heavily and the health of eco-systems is getting worse. It is called development, and it is the development of westernization. But this kind of development is definitely unsustainable.

Fortunately, some people in China have realized that we cannot develop like this any more, and since 2007 the leaders of CPC began to call on people to construct eco-
civilization. Now more and more intellectuals realize that ancient Chinese civilization is not as bad as Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lu Xun judged in the beginning of the twentieth century. Actually, ancient Chinese civilization is a kind of eco-civilization. We cannot, of course, go back to ancient eco-civilization, but we can learn a lot from our ancestors when we will try to construct a new eco-civilization in the future. A new eco-civilization will also inherit good elements from modern western civilization.

With new sciences such as ecology, new physics and recent philosophical studies, we can criticize both modernity and ancient Confucianism and try to make some ideas clear which can guide the construction of eco-civilization.

Physicalism as a view of nature is absolutely wrong, though it can be helpful for some scientists to get certain achievements in certain direction of research. Nature is not the aggregate of physical entities, as Ilya Prigogine says, ‘Nature is indeed related to the creation of unpredictable novelty, where the possible is richer than the real’. I think that the view of nature in Confucianism is more correct than in physicalism. But the Confucian view of nature has its own flaws. For instance, there is no conception of nature in Prigogine’s sense in thinking of Confucianism. Confucians use three categories to include all things in the world, and they are Tian (天), Di (地), and Man (人). In some context, the meaning of Tian is quite close to that of Nature as the ultimate reality. But in some context, Confucians exaggerate human agency, and debase ‘Tian’'s transcendence. Confucianism can learn from new sciences and its view of Nature should be expressed as transcendental naturalism.

Scientism is absolutely wrong when it claims that science will get closer and closer to discover all the secrets in nature, and science is a consistent system with its internal logic. We should better listen to Prigogine to know what sciences are. Prigogine says, ‘I have always considered science to be a dialogue with nature. As in a real dialogue, the answers are often unexpected and sometimes astonishing’. If Nature is indeed related to the creation of unpredictable novelty and sciences are dialogues between human and Nature, then, whatever progress science makes, Nature always hides unlimited secrets from human beings. Therefore, we must revere Nature.

Liberalism makes sense in political philosophy and it can help to correct some mistakes of Confucianism. But the freedom and human rights defined by liberals should be re-surveyed. Liberals think that the limit of an individual’s freedom is just the other individuals’ freedom, and human being can unlimitedly expand its freedom by changing natural environments or conquering nature. It is the very idea that leads human beings to live in the way of ‘mass production, mass consumption and mass wastes’. With the strong influence of liberalism in today’s world, people think that the uppermost goal of ethic and politics is to expand freedom of both individuals and man kind (as a species). But I think we should keep Aldo Leopold’s words in mind, ‘An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence’. I think Confucians have a more reasonable understanding of human freedom than liberals do. Human beings have no right to covet gods’ power, and cannot have more and more freedom in Nature. And I think Confucianism is right when it asserts that human freedom can only be embodied as the self-consciousness of the right way of living (道) and the autonomous following to the right way of living.

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2 Ibid. P. 57.
Utilitarianism as an approach to ethics has its special contribution to modernity. Its fatal mistake is its monism of values, presupposing that there is only the one intrinsic good and all other values can be reduced to the one. Classical utilitarianism claims that pleasure or happiness is the sole intrinsic good and contemporary utilitarianism presupposes that utility is a proper conception to denote the common value to which the all concrete goods can be reduced. This approach strongly supports economism. And economism affirms that all human actions are economic actions at the end, all choices of human actions can be exactly made by calculation of economics, and fatally, all values can be reduced to and measured by money. Therefore, utilitarianism and economism directly support materialism. From any transcendental philosophy and religion, we can easily find that materialism is a wrong and vulgar understanding of human life. But it affects almost everybody in today's world and it is justified by utilitarianism, economism and contemporary economics, which are believed as science. I think Confucian virtue ethics shows us a much better understanding about the good. Confucians never affirm anything as absolutely good and never think that there is anything which people get the more the better. According to Confucianism, suitability of action (行) is one of the main virtues of human beings. A gentleman should always do his job properly, not too much, and not too little. According to Confucianism, it is not the case that it is a larger economical growth, the better for people, people just need moderate material wealth to live peacefully and happily. In this point, Confucianism is quite consistent with ecology. Ecology proclaims that human economical systems are subsystems of ecosystems, and human economical actions should be limited within the bound of carrying capacity of ecosystem.

I think eco-civilization is the only choice for human kind in the future. The future eco-civilization might be as follows.

It is impossible to unify the faiths of all people, because nobody can prove that there is only one system of truth and any beliefs conflicting with it are false. But we can prove that physicalism, scientism, and materialism are ridiculous. Only when rejecting physicalism, scientism and materialism, people can realize that modern industrial civilization with the living way of ‘mass production, mass consumption and mass wastes’ is unsustainable, and eco-civilization is the only way for the human kind to go in the future. I think that Christians, Buddhists, Confucians and people of other beliefs who have rejected physicalism, scientism and materialism can all agree to choose eco-civilization.
INFORMATION ABOUT PREVIOUS PUBLICATIONS OF THE ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THE VOLUME

Princess Irene of the Netherlands. ‘The Well-Being of the Earth and Our Own Well-Being are One and the Same’. The Russian translation of the article was published in the journal Age of Globalization [Vek globalizatsii], Num. 2, 2013, pp. 3–6.


Leonid E. Grinin. ‘Which Global Transformations would the Global Crisis Lead to?’ The Russian version of this paper was published in the journal Age of Globalization [Vek globalizatsii], Num. 2(4), 2009, pp. 117–140. The English article was also published in the digest Age of Globalization, Num. 2, 2010, pp. 31–52.


Petr Blizkovsky. ‘Stakeholders of Economic Governance: European Perspective’. The Russian translation of the article was published in the journal Age of Globalization [Vek globalizatsii], Num. 1, 2014, pp. 66–89. The English article was also published in the digest Age of Globalization, Num. 3, 2013, pp. 44–62.


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Ervin Laszlo. ‘The Culture of ‘Oneness in Diversity’: A Manifesto’. The Russian translation of the article was published in the journal *Age of Globalization* [Vek globalizatsii], Num. 2, 2013, pp. 7–10.


Lu Feng. ‘Reflections on the Global Environmental Crisis from Confucian and Ecological Perspectives’. The Russian translation of the article was published in the journal *Age of Globalization* [Vek globalizatsii], Num. 2, 2013, pp. 38–47.
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